Jones v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.

• Decision Date: 19 March 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action Case No. 10–02896–WGY.
• Citation: 932 F.Supp.2d 893
• Parties: Latayina JONES, Plaintiff v. SHARP ELECTRONICS CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

932 F.Supp.2d 893

Latayina JONES, Plaintiff

v.SHARP ELECTRONICS CORPORATION, Defendant.

Civil Action Case No. 10–02896–WGY.

United States District Court,

W.D. Tennessee,

Western Division.

March 19, 2013.

Prior Version Recognized as Invalid

29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d)Travis Edgar Davison, III, Davison Law Firm, Memphis, TN, for Plaintiff.

W. Kerby Bowling, II, Charles W. Cavagnaro, Jr., Evans Petree, PC, Memphis, TN, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WILLIAM G. YOUNG,¹ District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This is an action brought by Latayina Jones (“Jones”) against Sharp Electronics Corporation (“Sharp”). Jones asserts that (1) Sharp interfered with her right to take leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (the “FMLA” or the “Act”), (2) Sharp terminated her employment in retaliation for exercising her rights under the FMLA, and (3) Sharp fired her on the basis of her disability in violation of the Tennessee Disability Act.² Sharp moved for summary judgment on all counts.

A. Procedural Posture

On November 23, 2010, Jones filed a complaint against Sharp in the Circuit Court of Tennessee for the Thirtieth Judicial District at Memphis. Notice Removal, Ex. 1, Compl., ECF No. 1–1. Jones alleged that Sharp interfered with her right to take leave under the FMLA, Compl. ¶ 29, terminated her employment in retaliation for her taking leave under the Act, id. ¶¶ 16–27, and violated the Tennessee Disability Act by terminating her employment because of her disability, id. ¶¶ 36–44.

On December 15, 2010, Sharp removed the action from the Tennessee Circuit Court to the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, Western Division. Notice Removal, ECF No. 1. Sharp filed its answer on December 27, 2010. Answer, ECF No. 4.

On January 17, 2012, Sharp filed a motion for summary judgment, Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 11, along with a memorandum in support of its motion, Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 1, Mem. Supp. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. (“Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.”), ECF No. 11–1, and a statement of undisputed material facts, Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 2, Statement Undisputed Material Facts Supp. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 11–2. On February 24, 2012, Jones filed her response to Sharp's motion for summary judgment, Pl.'s Resp. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. (“Resp. Mot. Summ. J.”), ECF No. 14, along with a supporting memorandum, Resp. Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 1, Pl.'s Mem. Resp. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. (“Mem. Resp. Mot. Summ. J.”), ECF No. 14–1, and a statement of facts, Resp. Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 2, Pl.'s Resp. Def.'s Statement “Undisputed” Material Facts Supp. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. (“Jones SOF”), ECF No. 14–2. On March 9, 2012, Sharp filed its reply to Jones's response to the summary judgment motion. Reply Pl.'s Resp. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. (“Sharp Reply”), ECF No. 15.

On June 21, 2012, the case was reassigned to this Court pursuant to the Court's Visiting Judges Program. Elec. Clerk's Notes, June 21, 2012, ECF No. 23. On September 7, 2012, the parties notified the Court that they agreed to submit on the papers and waive oral arguments. Elec. Clerk's Notes, Sept. 7, 2012, ECF No. 30.

B. Undisputed Facts

1. Jones's Employment at Sharp

Sharp originally hired Jones as a casual employee on August 8, 1996, and subsequently hired her as a regular employee on August 4, 1997. Jones SOF ¶¶ 1–2. As a regular employee, Jones joined the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL–CIO, Local 474 (the “Union”). Id. ¶ 3. The Union and Sharp had a Collective Bargaining Agreement (the “CBA”), and Jones received updated copies of the CBA whenever new agreements were reached. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. The CBA permits covered employees a maximum leave of 140 days, which provides fifty-six days of leave beyond that provided by the FMLA. Id. ¶ 36.

Sharp fired Jones on November 24, 2009. Id. ¶ 5. On December 2, 2009, Jones filed a grievance with Sharp pursuant to the CBA to protest her discharge. Id. ¶ 6. Ultimately her grievance was denied. Id. at 7. ³

2. Hours Worked and Leave Taken

Jones requested FMLA leave beginning on September 20, 2009. Id. ¶ 15. Sharp informs employees through the Leave Request Forms that employees complete when requesting leave that it uses a rolling twelve-month leave period to calculate an employee's remaining FMLA leave. Id. ¶¶ 24–25. Jones completed these forms each time she requested leave as early as 2007. Id. Sharp also included notification of the rolling twelve-month calculation method in the Employer Response to Employee Request for Family Medical Leave, which Jones received before her September 2009 leave. Id. ¶ 26. Although Jones was aware of the rolling twelve-month period through the Leave Request Form and Employer Response, she did not understand what it meant. Id. ¶¶ 25–26.

In the preceding twelve-month period, from September 20, 2008, to September 20, 2009, Jones worked 923 hours. Id. ¶¶ 16–18. The cumulative time column of Jones's time card printout shows 2457.45 hours, however this includes time not worked by Jones, including paid and unpaid holidays, time off due to lack of work and while on leave of absence, personal days off, vacation, and voluntary time off. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. Her “FMLA Tracking” printout also shows she only actually worked 923 hours.⁴Id. ¶ 19. Jones is unaware of how many hours she worked prior to September 20, 2009. Id. ¶ 20.

From January 20 to May 3, 2009, Jones took voluntary layoff and consequently missed significant time from work. Id. ¶ 21. Jones did not work, nor did Sharp ask her to come into work during her voluntary time off. Id. ¶ 22. Jones has never had any disputes with her time records or paychecks and admits she has been paid by Sharp for all the hours she worked. Id. ¶ 23.

Jones requested and received several FMLA leaves throughout her employment with Sharp. Id. ¶¶ 51–52. Jones took FMLA leave from October 17 to October 27, 2008, and for one day on October 31, 2008, totaling eleven days. Id. ¶ 27. She took another thirteen days from November 4 to November 16, 2008. Id. ¶ 28.

Jones used another forty-four days of her FMLA leave to have her kidney removed. Id. ¶¶ 29, 32. She took FMLA leave beginning on November 24, 2008, and, while she was originally expected to return to work on December 8, 2008, she remained out of work until January 19, 2009.⁵Id. ¶¶ 29–30, 32. Sharp informed Jones that this leave would be counted as FMLA leave except for the twelve days that Sharp shut down in December, which would count as leave under the CBA. Id. ¶ 31. Accordingly, Jones used sixty-eight of her eighty-four days ⁶ of FMLA leave in the twelve months preceding her scheduled September 20, 2009, leave. Id. ¶ 33. Consequently, she was entitled to sixteen days of FMLA leave on September 20, 2009. Id.

Jones requested the September 2009 leave for depression. Id. ¶ 34. She scheduled her leave to begin September 20, 2009, and originally arranged to return on October 20, 2009. Id. Sharp approved this entire period as FMLA leave (even though Jones actually had but sixteen days remaining of her FMLA leave). See Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 3, Oral Dep. Latayina Jones (“Jones Dep.”), ECF No. 11–3. On October 13, 2009, Jones's physician sent Sharp a letter recommending that Jones remain excused from work through November 13, 2009. Mot. Summ. J, Ex. 4, Exs. Dep. Pl. (“Dep. Exs.”) 40, ECF No. 11–4. On October 19, 2009, Sharp approved Jones's additional leave and (now correctly) notified her that she had exhausted all of her FMLA leave on October 5, 2009. Jones SOF ¶ 37; Dep. Exs. 41.

On November 6, 2009, Sharp sent Jones a letter informing her that she was going to exhaust all of her leave on November 18, 2009, and may be terminated from her employment if she did not return on November 19, 2009. Jones SOF ¶ 38; Dep. Exs. 43. On November 16, Jones's physician sent Sharp a letter recommending that Jones be excused from work through December 15, 2009. Dep. Exs. 42. Jones's physician did not release her to return to work until December 16, 2009. Jones SOF ¶ 40. Jones was unable to work from September 20 to December 15, 2009. Id. ¶ 41.

Jones testified about a casual (non-bargaining unit) employee named Amber who was terminated for absences but was later reinstated after she provided the proper paperwork. Id. ¶ 47. Amber was a casual employee, however, and was therefore not entitled to FMLA or CBA leave. Id. ¶ 49. Jones does not recall Amber's last name, learned of the situation through a co-worker, and admits that Sharp terminated Amber for different reasons. Id. ¶¶ 48, 50.

3. Jones's Alleged Disability

Jones suffered from bipolar disorder. Id. ¶ 53. She was not diagnosed as bipolar until November 2009 despite requesting leave for depression beginning September 20, 2009. Id. ¶ 54. Jones's condition made her depressed, unable to be around large crowds, afraid, and unable to be left alone. Id. ¶ 55. Jones did not provide any paperwork to Sharp that stated she had bipolar disorder, and she listed depression as the reason for requesting leave on her Leave Request Form. Id. ¶ 63; Dep. Exs. 30.

Jones has not seen a doctor for her condition since December 2009. Jones SOF ¶ 56. She reports no problems with her bipolar disorder since the beginning of 2010, and she has maintained a normal life. Id. ¶ 57. Without insurance or other sources of funds, Jones has not received medical treatment since Sharp discharged her. Id. ¶ 56.

In order for Jones to perform her job at Sharp, she required a reasonable accommodation of time off from September 20, 2009, to December 15, 2009. Id. ¶ 58. While no one at Sharp ever told Jones she would be a risk due to her condition, Jones believes she was terminated because Sharp thought she was a “risk” and terminated her in retaliation for taking FMLA leave. Id. ¶ 65.

II. ANALYSISA. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Substantive law...