Jones v. Sharp Mfg. Co. of Am., of Sharp Elecs. Corp.

• Decision Date: 03 May 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:14-cv-03020-STA-tmp
• Parties: PAMELA JONES, Plaintiff, v. SHARP MANUFACTURING COMPANY OF AMERICA, a Division of SHARP ELECTRONICS CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

PAMELA JONES, Plaintiff, v. SHARP MANUFACTURING COMPANY OF AMERICA,a Division of SHARP ELECTRONICS CORPORATION, Defendant.

Case No. 2:14-cv-03020-STA-tmp

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE WESTERN DIVISION

May 3, 2016

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Pamela Jones filed this action on December 29, 2014, alleging that her former employer Sharp Manufacturing Company of America, a division of Sharp Electronics Corporation ("Sharp") violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. as amended ("ADA"), and the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. ("FMLA").¹ (ECF No.1.) Defendant Sharp has filed a motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 33), and Plaintiff has filed a response (ECF No. 34) and an amended response. (ECF No. 36.)Defendant has filed a reply to the response. (ECF No. 39.) On April 14, 2016, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to file a sur-reply to address evidentiary objections that were raised in Defendant's reply (ECF No. 44), and, on April 27, 2016, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to file a sur-reply to address new arguments raised in the reply. (ECF No. 48.) The "evidentiary objection" sur-reply was filed on April 15, 2016. (ECF No. 45.) The "new arguments" sur-reply was filed on April 29, 2016. (ECF No. 51.) The parties have now fully briefed the Court. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant Sharp's motion is DENIED.

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."² When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must review all the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant.³ The Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and it "may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence."⁴ When the motion is supported by documentary proof such as depositions and affidavits, the nonmoving party may not rest on his pleadings but, rather, must present some "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."⁵ These facts must be more than a scintilla of evidence and must meet the standard of whether a reasonable juror could find by apreponderance of the evidence that the nonmoving party is entitled to a verdict.⁶ The Court must determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law"⁷ and must enter summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."⁸

Defendant's Objections to Plaintiff's Proffered Evidence

As an initial matter, the Court will address Defendant's objections to the affidavits of Julia Elliott and Pamela Webster that have been submitted in support of Plaintiff's response.⁹ As noted by Defendant, Plaintiff did not identify Elliott or Webster as potential witnesses in her Rule 26 initial disclosures or in her answers to Defendant's first set of interrogatories.¹⁰ Plaintiff first mentioned these witnesses in her response to Defendant's motion for summary judgment that was filed on March 18, 2016. Plaintiff amended her initial disclosures to include these witnesses on March 19, 2016.¹¹ The amended disclosures also included previously unidentified witness, Laquitta Beckum, and were not provided until three months after the discovery deadline of December 18, 2015.

Rule 26(a) (1)(A)(i) requires that parties "provide to the other parties: (i) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable information—along with the subject of that information—that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment...." Rule 26(a) disclosures must be supplemented or corrected "in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect...."¹² If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness under Rule 26(a) or 26(e), that party "is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or was harmless."¹³

Plaintiff argues that her failure to timely disclose Elliott and Watson was substantially justified because she did not become aware of the need for their testimony until after the close of discovery.¹⁴ Plaintiff had intended to reply on Troy Lensey as a witness to the alleged harassment she received while working for Defendant, matters surrounding her EEOC charge, and Defendant's alleged replacement of her with a casual employee after she was sent home on July 30, 2013, and had timely disclosed him as a witness.¹⁵ According to Plaintiff, two days after mediation, Lensey "disappeared" and would not respond to Plaintiff's efforts to contact him.¹⁶ Plaintiff contends that, while she was attempting to locate Lensey, she learned that Elliottand Watson had similar knowledge. Plaintiff does not explain why Beckum was not timely disclosed as a witness.

Based on Plaintiff's explanation, the Court finds that her failure to timely disclose Elliott and Watson was substantially justified, and the Court will not strike their affidavits.¹⁷ The Court also finds that the failure to timely disclose Beckum was not justified, and she will be STRICKEN as a witness¹⁸

Statement of Facts

The parties agree that the following facts are undisputed for the purpose of deciding this motion.¹⁹

Defendant Sharp hired Plaintiff on September 9, 1991, as a casual employee; Plaintiff became a regular employee in January 1992. As a regular employee, Plaintiff was a member of the union, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, Local 474, which had a Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") with Defendant.

When Plaintiff became a regular employee, she was a Grade F-2 Assembler in the Microwave Oven Department ("Microwave") working on a production line. Plaintiff held other positions in Microwave during her employment, but, between the time of her work injury of September 8, 2010, and her termination, she was an F-2 Assembler.

On September 8, 2010, Plaintiff was working on the production line when a forklift hit the line, which caused it to move and hit Plaintiff's knee. Plaintiff reported her injury to Defendant's company nurse, Rosalyn McClain, who administered first aid. Plaintiff returned to work but continued to complain of pain in her knee, so Defendant sent Plaintiff to the medical facility, Concentra, who gave her a work restriction of 100% sitting.

Defendant placed Plaintiff on leave on the ground that it did not have any work that met those restrictions at that time although Plaintiff contends that she could have been returned to her original position on the K-B line building control panels because that was a sitting position. Defendant called Plaintiff on September 17, 2010, to report for work for a light duty position. On September 21, 2010, Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter informing her that her time off would be counted as FMLA leave.

Plaintiff was later treated by an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. W. Lee Moffat, who continued the work restrictions of 100% sitting. Plaintiff also saw Dr. Aren Manugian, who kept the work restrictions of 100% sitting.

Defendant assigned Plaintiff to a different light duty position until she was released to full duty by Dr. Manugian on February 8, 2011. Plaintiff then returned to her regular F-2 Assembler position in Microwave at full duty, where she remained until Dr. Moffat performed surgery on her knee on May 31, 2011. Defendant informed Plaintiff that her time off work beginning May 31, 2011, would be counted as FMLA leave.

Dr. Moffatt released Plaintiff to full duty on August 8, 2011, at which time she returned to her regular F-2 Assembler position in Microwave with no restrictions.

Plaintiff continued to see Dr. Moffatt as needed on October 26, 2011, January 11, 2012, and October 16, 2012, and he kept Plaintiff at full duty with no restrictions following thosevisits. Plaintiff does not recall seeing Dr. Moffatt between October 16, 2012, and June 12, 2013. Plaintiff saw Dr. Moffatt on June 12, 2013, at which time he placed her on permanent restrictions of no prolonged standing or walking for more than two to three hours at a time, no pushing or pulling more than twenty pounds, no overhead lifting of more than fifteen pounds, and no lifting of over ten pounds.

On June 18, 2013, Plaintiff brought Nurse McClain a note asking that, as an accommodation, she be placed in a permanent position on K-B line and requesting that, when that line was down, to be placed in another position. In response to this note, Nurse McClain and Plaintiff's supervisor, Glenn Burnett, identified positions that they believed met her restrictions to try and accommodate Plaintiff.²⁰

On July 30, 2013, Plaintiff was performing a job on F-line when she complained to Nurse McClain that the position was hurting her knee. Plaintiff showed Nurse McClain the task she was performing and how it was bothering her. Nurse McClain sent Plaintiff to lunch so she could discuss the matter with T.C. Jones, Karin Tanaka, and Reginald Yurchik in Defendant's Human Resources Department ("HR"). Nurse McClain described the situation to them and was instructed to ask Plaintiff was there anything she could think of to accommodate her in the F-line position. Nurse McClain asked Plaintiff what she could do to accommodate her in that position, and Plaintiff responded that she could not think of anything. Plaintiff asked to be put in anotherposition but was...