Jones v. Simek

• Decision Date: 20 September 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-2243,98-2243
• Citation: 193 F.3d 485
• Parties: (7th Cir. 1999) Clifford Jones, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Randall Simek, et al., Defendants-Appellees
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 485

193 F.3d 485 (7th Cir. 1999)

Clifford Jones, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Randall Simek, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 98-2243

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit

Argued December 9, 1998

Decided September 20, 1999

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 94 C 1097--Charles P. Kocoras, Judge.

Before Flaum, Easterbrook, and Diane P. Wood, Circuit Judges.

Diane P. Wood, Circuit Judge.

Clifford B. Jones suffers from a painful and debilitating condition known as Reflex Sympathetic Dystrophy ("RSD") and, as a result, has lost the use of his right arm and hand. He attributes his affliction to the treatment he received at the hands of the four defendants, all employees of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, during a stay at Chicago's Metropolitan Correctional Center ("MCC"). Jones filed this civil rights suit under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging that the defendants had subjected him to excessive force and refused to give him medical treatment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The district court dismissed the medical care claim in response to the defendants' motion in the alternative for dismissal on the pleadings or summary judgment. It allowed the excessive force claim to go to a bench trial, after which the court found for the defendants. Jones now appeals the dismissal of the medical care claim, as well as the district court's decisions on two pre- trial motions. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

I

Initially, Jones claimed that the defendants caused his RSD, when on three separate occasions MCC officials Randall Simek, Stanley Paciorek, and Michael Rule allegedly used excessive force against him. The defendants denied this, offering instead the theory that his RSD was attributable to either elbow surgery he underwent in the early 1980s or a basketball injury he suffered in May 1993, or a little of both. Because the district court resolved this issue in the defendants' favor and Jones has not appealed on that point, we accept the defendants' view of causation. Nevertheless, both parties agree that Jones does suffer from RSD (or, as the defendants suggest, Complex Regional Pain Syndrome), which remains relevant for his medical treatment claim. We therefore focus our attention on what and when the defendants knew about Jones's medical problems and how they responded to this knowledge.

As it pertains to the medical treatment claim, Jones offered the following account of events. (As we explain below, we are approaching this as a case in which the defendants won summary judgment, rather than a simple dismissal on the pleadings; we thus look to Jones's affidavit and supporting materials for the facts in the light most favorable to him.) On January 14, 1993, Jones complained to an MCC official about pain in his right arm and asked to see a doctor. Defendant Paciorek, who overheard the complaint, informed the official that nothing was wrong with Jones and ordered him placed in isolation. Jones went without medical attention for five days.

During that time, Jones's pain worsened and he began to feel numbness in two of the fingers on his right hand. In late January 1993, he managed to see Defendant Edwin Lopez, a physician at the MCC. Dr. Lopez ordered that Jones be handcuffed only from the front, but otherwise provided no treatment. Jones saw Dr. Lopez multiple times thereafter, but Dr. Lopez refused to prescribe medication in response to Jones's complaints of pain. When Jones insisted that the numbness was increasing, Dr. Lopez promised Jones an appointment with a specialist, but none was provided. Dr. Lopez's demeanor was hostile and insensitive to the point that when Jones expressed concern about losing his arm, Dr. Lopez said, "So you lose your arm, that won't kill you."

On July 21, 1993, Jones finally saw the long- awaited specialist, a neurologist, who diagnosed a nerve blockage in his right elbow. Approximately three weeks later, Jones saw an orthopedic surgeon and then, after another three weeks passed, a neurosurgeon. The neurosurgeon prescribed medication, ordered Jones to wear a sling, and recommended that he see an anesthesiologist. Afterward, Dr. Lopez told Jones he did not have a pass to wear the sling and refused to provide a clean sling. He also denied Jones a medical idle, refused to reinstate the front handcuff only order, denied his request for a medical pass to prevent his right hand from being cuffed, and refused to issue a bottom bunk pass.

On October 22, 1993, Jones once again complained about pain. He initially managed to obtain some medication, which proved to be ineffective, but when prison officials requested permission from Dr. Lopez to issue more medication, the doctor refused. Jones then telephoned his mother, who contacted various authorities to aid in the resolution of the pain medication dispute. Jones did not begin to feel relief, however, until he underwent a nerve block treatment on January 26, 1994.

Based upon the preceding allegations, Jones filed his pro se suit in federal court on March 29, 1994. On October 13, 1995, the defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Jones obtained the services of his present counsel and filed a response to the defendants' motion. Because the defendants had requested summary judgment, the motion and response were supported by affidavits and other evidentiary materials, including Jones's medical records, and they added a number of factual allegations to those set forth in the complaint.

Jones's summary judgment papers describe the progression of his condition and Dr. Lopez's response in greater detail. Jones maintains that when Dr. Lopez first examined him on January 22, 1993, he was unable to extend his right elbow because of the pain. At that time, Dr. Lopez informed Jones that he was suffering from nerve damage and told him that an appointment with a neurologist would be made. Jones remained in isolation until April 14, 1993. Because inmates in administrative detention cannot sign up for sick call, Jones appealed to the medical staff for relief when they made their rounds. During this period, he reminded Dr. Lopez about the promised appointment with a nerve specialist, but Dr. Lopez treated him with hostility and refused to prescribe pain medication.

After his release from administrative detention, Jones sought treatment at the prison health unit on April 19, April 22, and May 10. Dr. Lopez did not make the promised appointment with a neurologist for Jones until July 21, at which time the specialist diagnosed a nerve blockage. (Jones's medical records reveal that the precise diagnosis was "a conduction block of the ulna nerve at the level of the right elbow.") The visit was apparently unsuccessful because on August 6, still in pain, Jones returned to the health unit and requested a different specialist. The MCC physician who treated him, Dr. Cynthia Alston, recommended a neurosurgery consultation. Jones made further visits to the health unit on August 9, 12, 13, 16, and 19, but nothing was done for him. On August 20, an in-house orthopedist saw Jones, but he was in so much pain that the doctor was unable to complete the examination. After several more visits to the health unit (during which the physician's assistant told Jones she would tell Dr. Lopez about his worsening condition), on August 27 Jones saw a neurosurgeon who prescribed a sling, medication, and a consultation with an anesthesiologist. Back at the MCC, Dr. Lopez essentially disregarded the specialist's advice.

Jones returned to the health unit 17 more times before the end of September. By this time, his right hand was swollen, cracked, and bleeding, and he had lost the use of his right arm from the elbow down. On October 1, Jones again saw the in- house orthopedist, who ordered a ganglion nerve block. However, the block was not performed until January 26, 1994. During the intervening months, Jones continued to suffer, not only from the pain of his condition, but also from the side effects of the pain medication, which made him nauseous.

Not surprisingly, Dr. Lopez offers a significantly different account of the facts. Dr. Lopez acknowledges Jones's numerous visits to the health unit, but he suggests that some of the delays in Jones's treatment occurred because Jones himself failed to show up for scheduled appointments or were otherwise beyond Dr. Lopez's control. For example, although Dr. Lopez requested a neurology consult on June 16, it was not scheduled until July 21. He also points out that the many doctors who examined Jones were unable to agree on a diagnosis. During the August 20 consult, the orthopedist diagnosed "amplification of symptoms or RSD." The neurosurgeon who examined Jones on August 27 reported "melodramatic response of severe pain and discomfort to light touch anywhere in the right arm and hand," and could find no objective symptoms consistent with the pain being reported. On August 29, Dr. Lopez noted that the examinations suggested a non-organic origin and that a psychiatric consult was in order. Before Jones's condition was identified definitively, he made multiple visits to a neurologist, an orthopedist, a neurosurgeon, a psychiatrist, and an anesthesiologist.

Without addressing the competing allegations set forth in the defendants' summary judgment motion and the plaintiff's reply, on February 14, 1996, the district court dismissed the medical care claim for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.

II

The district court's order dismissing the medical treatment claim appears to rely on Rule 12(b)(6) for the dismissal, rather than Rule 56. (The court used the term "dismissal," for example, and it...