Jones v. Slater Steels Corp.

• Decision Date: 29 May 1987
• Docket Number: Civ. No. F 86-184.
• Citation: 660 F. Supp. 1570
• Parties: Robert JONES, Plaintiff, v. SLATER STEELS CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

660 F. Supp. 1570

Robert JONES, Plaintiff, v. SLATER STEELS CORPORATION, Defendant.

Civ. No. F 86-184.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

May 29, 1987.

Ralph R. Blume, Blume, Wyneken, Connelly & Stucky, Fort Wayne, Ind., for plaintiff.

John R. Burns, III, Baker & Daniels & Shoaff, Fort Wayne, Ind., for defendant.

ORDER

WILLIAM C. LEE, District Judge.

This is a reverse sex discrimination case brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (1982). The plaintiff is a former male employee of the defendant, Slater Steels Corporation (Slater Steels). The plaintiff alleges that Slater Steels discriminated against him because of his sex and asserts claims based on the disparate treatment theory of discrimination. Slater Steels has filed a motion for summary judgment and argues that the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of reverse discrimination. For the following reasons, Slater Steels' motion for summary judgment is granted.

I Summary Judgment Standards

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(c). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and in which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the directed verdict standard under Rule 50(a), which requires the court to grant a directed verdict where there can be but one reasonable conclusion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's position is not sufficient to successfully oppose summary judgment; "there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id., 106 S.Ct. at 2512; Valentine v. Joliet Tp. High School Dist. No. 204, 802 F.2d 981, 986 (7th Cir.1986).

Initially, Rule 56 requires the moving party to inform the court of the basis for the motion, and to identify those portions of the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admission on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The non-moving party may oppose the motion with any of the evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), but reliance on the pleadings alone is not sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Posey v. Skyline Corp., 702 F.2d 102, 105 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 960, 104 S.Ct. 392, 78 L.Ed.2d 336 (1983). In ruling on a summary judgment motion the court accepts as true the non-moving party's evidence, draws all legitimate inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and does not weigh the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Anderson, 106 S.Ct. at 2511.

Substantive law determines which facts are material; that is, which facts might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. at 2510. Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not preclude summary judgment even when they are in dispute. Id. The issue of fact must be genuine. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e). To establish a genuine issue of fact the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The non-moving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. A summary judgment determination is essentially an inquiry as to "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.

When intentional discrimination is at issue, as it is in this case, this court approaches the application of these principles with special caution. Powers v. Dole, 782 F.2d 689, 694 (7th Cir.1986). Summary judgment is infrequently an appropriate resolution. McKenzie v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d 62, 67 (D.C.Cir.1982). The factual issues in discrimination cases, including the issues of discriminatory intent, which are often proven by circumstantial evidence, cannot often be resolved on summary judgment. Powers, 782 F.2d at 694. However, even when such issues as motive or intent are at stake, summary judgment is proper "where the plaintiff presents no indications of motive and intent supportive of his position." Id.; Muson v. Friske, 754 F.2d 683, 690 (7th Cir.1985). Accepting the plaintiff's evidence and drawing all legitimate inferences in his favor, the court now turns to the facts.

II Factual Background

A. The Parties

The plaintiff, Robert Jones (Jones), is a black male. Throughout his tenure with Slater Steels he was a "probationary employee." He was originally employed by the defendant on August 13, 1984. He began working in the Cold Finish Department. Jones was disqualified from the Cold Finish Department and was reassigned to the Maintenance Department, but never actually worked in the Maintenance Department due to an injury. Before Jones could return to work, he was laid off due to a general reduction of employees.

Based upon seniority Jones was recalled to work on January 14, 1985 and was assigned to the Twelve Inch Mill Department. (Pre-Trial Order, Stipulation of Fact). During his tenure at the Twelve Inch Mill Department Jones' supervisor observed that he was unproductive (Deposition of Mey, pp. 26, 29, 34), and that he did not always do what he was told to do. (Deposition of Mey, pp. 26, 29, 34). On September 2, 1984 and on January 23, 1985 Jones was verbally counseled regarding his job performance. (Pre-Trial Order, Stipulation of Fact). On the day before Jones was disqualified from the Twelve Inch Mill Department he was observed standing unproductively beside the scrap schear, the machine he was assigned to operate.¹

Department Superintendent Didion disqualified and terminated Jones on February 6, 1985. Jones was represented at the termination meeting by Union Representative and Grievance Committeeman Paul Robison. Jones was informed that he was being terminated for poor work performance. (Deposition of Didion, pp. 20-21). The plaintiff's disqualification from the Twelve Inch Mill, which led to his termination, was his second disqualification.

The defendant is a producer of specialty steels. Currently, it employs 345 production employees at its Fort Wayne facility. Of those employees only 2 are female; the rest, like the plaintiff, are male. Since January, 1984, the defendant has hired 135 males and 5 females. (Affidavit of Bower). Of those employees, 7 males have been terminated (5.19%) and 2 females have been terminated (40%). (Affidavit of Bower).

B. The Defendant's Policies

The defendant's new employees (such as Jones) are classified as "probationary employees" until they complete 520 hours of work. (Affidavit of Bower). Probationary employees may be discharged without rights of appeal, including arbitration. (Affidavit of Bower). Probationary employees are evaluated weekly by their supervisors and may be disqualified from a department at any time. (Affidavit of Bower). Since January, 1984 it has been the defendant's policy to terminate probationary employees who are disqualified twice during their probationary period.

The collectively bargained agreement between the defendant and the steelworker's union does not prohibit probationary employees from filing grievances. The agreement does, however, deny probationary employees the contractual protections relating to provisional discharge which non-probationary employees enjoy. By the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, grievance procedures may be initiated by the union or by employees. The defendant has no duty to advise employees to file grievances.

C. The Defendant's Female Employees²

The plaintiff compares himself, primarily, to Norma Snyder, who was employed by the defendant on May 7, 1984 as a probationary employee. Snyder was originally assigned to the Twelve Inch Mill, but was disqualified for not being able to perform the work and was transferred to the Maintenance Department. (Affidavit of Snyder). After her disqualification, Snyder requested Union Grievance Committeeman Paul Robison to file a grievance on her behalf. (Affidavit of Snyder). The defendant did not encourage Snyder to file a grievance. (Affidavit of Snyder). Ultimately, Snyder's grievance was settled and it was agreed that "in case there was a layoff or cutback, her seniority would take her back to the Twelve Inch Mill." (Deposition of Didion, p. 28).

Snyder successfully completed her probationary period without a second disqualification. (Affidavit of Snyder). Snyder's work performance was outstanding.³ It is the defendant's policy, because of the physical nature of the work done by its employees, to encourage its employees to assist each other with heavy labor. (Second Deposition of Middleton, pp. 5-6). Snyder both gave and received help. (Second Deposition of Middleton, pp. 4-6; Affidavit of Snyder).⁴

The defendant's other female employees include Gloria Mason, Nancy Oswald, Judy Coldiron, and Emma McGee. Mason was initially assigned to the Twelve Inch Mill; she was disqualified from the Twelve Inch Mill and transferred to the Billet Conditioning Department. She subsequently died from injuries suffered in an on the job accident. (Affidavit of Bower). Oswald was also assigned to the Twelve Inch Mill. Based upon seniority she bid out of that department...