Jones v. Springfield Missouri Packing Co.

• Decision Date: 09 July 1942
• Docket Number: No. 199.,199.
• Citation: 45 F. Supp. 997
• Parties: JONES et al. v. SPRINGFIELD MISSOURI PACKING CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

45 F. Supp. 997

JONES et al. v. SPRINGFIELD MISSOURI PACKING CO.

No. 199.

District Court, S. D. Missouri, W. D.

July 9, 1942.

E. C. Hamlin (of Hamlin, Hamlin & Hamlin), of Springfield, Mo., for plaintiff.

Farrington & Curtis, of Springfield, Mo., for defendant.

REEVES, District Judge.

This is a suit authorized by Section 216, Title 29 U.S.C.A., for an alleged violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It is charged in the complaint that the defendant, a Missouri corporation, is engaged "in the business of killing, producing, processing and preparing for transportation in interstate commerce hides, greases and tallows, cured and fresh meats, which are the products from the killing and slaughtering of animals for the same, and in the distribution in the markets in interstate commerce between the several states."

It is further stated that the several plaintiffs were in the employ of the defendant from and after the effective date of the Fair Labor Standards Act, namely, October 24, 1938, until the termination of such employment at definite times later. During such employment, and after the effective date of the law, it is asserted that each of the plaintiffs worked hours longer than those prescribed and limited by the law without compensation as contemplated by said law. Each of the plaintiffs seeks recovery for alleged unpaid wages and for penalties as directed by the statute and also for attorneys' fees.

Defendant has interposed numerous defenses; the chief one being that the defendant is not engaged in interstate commerce but, even if so, the plaintiffs were not "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce" during the time of their employment.

If, upon the facts, it should appear that the defendant is correct in this contention it then becomes unnecessary to consider other questions raised. The evidence showed that the defendant is engaged as asserted by the plaintiffs, in the business of slaughtering, processing and producing edible meats with the incidental by-products of hides, greases, tallows and offal. Animals for slaughter are bought locally and some shipped from other states. Its products, however, are sold locally. It distributes its meats over fixed routes within the State of Missouri. It has been careful not to sell its meat products outside of the state, and, because of that fact, it has never been subject to federal inspection.

At the trial a question arose as to whether or not it transported and sold some of its meat products in the state of Arkansas. It was contended by plaintiffs that it regularly sold products at Blue Eye, a village or hamlet on or near the state line between the states of Missouri and Arkansas. The evidence was that Blue Eye, according to postal records, is in Missouri, and that there is no post office known as Blue Eye in Arkansas. However, since the question was raised whether its products were in fact flowing over into the state of Arkansas, and to avoid controversy and a possible federal inquiry, the defendant discontinued the distribution of its product at Blue Eye, Missouri. There was no substantial evidence that any of its edible products were ever sent by it or distributed into any other state than its home state, Missouri. Its by-products, such as hides, greases, tallows and offal, were all sold at Springfield, Missouri. Whether such by-products, after being sold, remained at rest in Missouri for processing or were shipped out of the state was left an open question. There was no evidence either way. Concerning the by-products, the evidence was that such constituted a very small percentage of the total products of the defendant. Ninety-five percent of its products were edible meats, and, as stated, according to the evidence these were distributed only within the State of Missouri.

As a predicate or postulate to a decision the following rules and rulings should be noted:

1. Since the statute, Section 207, Title 29 U.S.C.A., specifically provides that the benefits of the statute only accrue to an employee "who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce", it should be determined whether the plaintiffs by their labor are within the ambit of this law.

In the case of Jewel Tea Co. v. Williams, 118 F.2d 202, the Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, adverted to the history of the legislation. It appeared that as originally drawn the language above quoted was used, but the House of Representatives by amendment attempted to make the bill more comprehensive by using the words "employer engaged in commerce in an industry affecting commerce." This, however, was rejected by the Conference Committee. In expressing the purpose of the bill, Senator Pepper, a member of the Conference Committee, said, among other things: "I want it distinctly stated that this proposed law is not applicable to all employees of an industry which itself is engaged in interstate commerce. It is applicable only to those employees who themselves are engaged either in interstate commerce, or the production of goods for interstate commerce, and the contrary theory was definitely rejected by the Committee."

It will be seen, therefore, that unless the plaintiffs were engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce they are not entitled to recover even though defendant may have been otherwise engaged in interstate commerce.

The definition of "commerce" as set out in the statute is as follows (Section 203, Title 29 U.S.C.A.): "(b) `Commerce' means trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States or from any State to any place outside thereof."

It follows that the commerce referred to by the Congress means interstate commerce.

2. The fact that the defendant had bought livestock for slaughtering purposes in other states does not aid the plaintiffs in their contention. It has been...