Jones v. State

• Decision Date: 02 September 2011
• Docket Number: 2010.,17,Nos. 16,2010,s. 16
• Citation: 28 A.3d 1046
• Parties: Marcellous JONES, Defendant Below, Appellant,v.STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware

28 A.3d 1046

Marcellous JONES, Defendant Below, Appellant,

v.STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

Nos. 16

2010

17

2010.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: June 15, 2011.Decided: Sept. 2, 2011.

Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County, Cr. ID No. 0903 020716 and 0903 010114.Upon appeal from the Superior Court. REVERSED.Thomas A. Foley, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant.Gregory E. Smith, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee.

Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, JACOBS, RIDGELY Justices and NOBLE, Vice Chancellor ^* constituting the Court en banc.STEELE, Chief Justice:

The police arrested Marcellous Jones at a private party in Newark, Delaware for drug related offenses. Based on evidence seized on the night of Jones's arrest, a magistrate issued a warrant to search his home. Executing this warrant, police discovered drugs and firearms in Jones's residence. Jones attempted to suppress all the items seized as fruit of an illegal seizure and invalid search warrant. A Superior Court judge denied Jones's motions to suppress, rejecting both arguments. After a trial at which the items seized from his residence were not in issue, a jury convicted Jones of drug crimes committed on the evening of his arrest. After a separately stipulated trial, a judge convicted Jones of additional drug and firearm offenses relating to the items seized from his home. Jones appeals both convictions, contending that the Superior Court judge erred by denying his motions to suppress. In this opinion, we consider Jones's appeals together. Because the police illegally seized Jones when they obtained the drugs leading to his initial arrest, the evidence against him, including evidence seized from Jones's home, constitutes inadmissible fruit of the poisonous tree. We accordingly REVERSE.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On the evening of March 13, 2009, Cheryl Hollingsworth held a private party at the Plumber and Pipefitter's Banquet Facility in Newark to celebrate the release of a DVD her son had produced. Hollingsworth arranged for volunteers from the Thunderguards Motorcycle Club, including Appellant Marcellous Jones, to provide security at the event. Although Hollingsworth did not pay the Thunderguards, she contemplated making a donation to their local chapter.

Late that evening, Delaware State Police Corporal Chris Popp responded to the banquet hall because “a group of individuals [was] providing security for either a dance or some type of CD release party, and it was believed that these individuals did not possess a security license to provide or act as a security agency.” When Popp arrived, several Thunderguards were already outside talking with other police officers. Popp overheard his colleague, Lieutenant Ford, explaining that, “[w]e are just here to check security status.”

Popp and a Lieutenant Sapp then entered the vestibule of the banquet facility. Popp knew which persons were providing security because they were standing at the doorway checking guests as they arrived, and they were wearing the Thunderguards jackets and clothing. Sapp identified these persons, including Jones, and asked them, “[c]ould you step outside so we [can] obtain information to inquire on security status?” All of the Thunderguards—including Jones—complied with Sapp's request.

Outside the banquet facility, approximately ten police officers congregated in the driveway in a semicircle formation surrounding the front entrance of the building. About twelve to fifteen Thunderguards were standing on the sidewalk adjacent to that driveway. Popp acknowledged that, “[t]he members of this security detail were surrounded by law enforcement on three sides, and directly behind them was the building.” The police were “obtaining and documenting [the Thunderguards'] information.”

Delaware State Police Detective Dudzinski then asked Jones for his identification. Jones replied, “I already provided it to somebody else.” Jones then “made his way back to [a] little garden area next to the corner of the building behind everybody else.” Probation Officer Mark Lewis was standing near Jones and “heard something, a sound like something hit the ground.” Lewis observed what he believed to be a package of illegal drugs on the ground. The package contained 24 grams of cocaine in 22 separate baggies. Popp then heard Lewis inquire, “[d]oes anybody want this [c]ocaine that Mr. Jones dropped.” Police arrested Jones, and the search incident to the arrest yielded 40 Oxycodone pills and $2,951 in cash.

As a result of this arrest and the discovery of drugs, on March 24, 2009 the police obtained a warrant to search Jones's home at 1003 Liberty Road in Wilmington. The search warrant application identified the evidence seized at the banquet hall, as well as Popp's opinion that the packaging of the drugs and presence of a large sum of cash indicated a drug dealing operation. The affidavit supporting the search warrant application also detailed the history of drug activity at Jones's home by his brother and nephew who were at that time incarcerated on drug charges. Pursuant to the search warrant, the police searched Jones's residence and discovered more cocaine and two firearms with obliterated serial numbers. Police arrested Jones again on March 27, 2009.

On April 13, 2009, a New Castle County grand jury indicted Jones for various crimes arising out of the events of March 13, 2009, including trafficking in cocaine (10–50 grams), possession with intent to deliver cocaine, possession of cocaine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. On June 22, 2009, Jones filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized at the banquet hall. A Superior Court judge held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress on July 17, 2009, and denied the motion on September 11, 2009.¹ Thereafter, the State dropped the drug paraphernalia charge and the Superior Court judge dismissed the charge of possession of cocaine. After a two day trial beginning on September 15, 2009, a jury found Jones guilty of trafficking in cocaine and of possession with intent to deliver.

On April 27, 2009 a grand jury indicted Jones for separate crimes unrelated to the events of March 13, based on the evidence police later seized from his home. These offenses include trafficking in cocaine and other related drug and weapon crimes. On June 1, 2009, Jones moved to suppress the additional drugs and weapons, challenging the “four corners” of the search warrant. The Superior Court judge heard oral argument related to the March 24 search warrant at the same hearing held to consider Jones's previous motion to suppress. Thereafter, the judge denied the motion to suppress the fruits of the search warrant. After a stipulated trial on June 6, 2009, a judge convicted Jones of trafficking in cocaine and possession of a firearm by a person prohibited. On December 11, 2009, a Superior Court judge sentenced Jones to 15 years in prison. Jones appeals all his convictions, arguing that the Superior Court judge erred by denying his motions to suppress.

II. JONES'S INITIAL ENCOUNTER WITH POLICE

Jones argues that the police illegally seized him when officers asked the Thunderguards to step outside. Consequently, Jones maintains, the bag of cocaine he discarded, and the evidence found during the ensuing search incident to his arrest, should be suppressed. Jones further contends that he was not subject to administrative seizure under 24 Del. C. § 1324 concerning private security agencies because he was not engaged in activity requiring a license under § 1329.

We review the denial of a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion. ² To the extent the Superior Court judge's decision is based on factual findings, we determine whether the judge abused his discretion by finding sufficient evidence to support his ruling and whether those findings were clearly erroneous.³ To the extent that we examine the Superior Court judge's legal conclusions, we review them de novo for errors in formulating or applying legal precepts.⁴

A. The police seized Jones because a reasonable person in his position would not have felt free to ignore the police presence.

In California v. Hodari D., the United States Supreme Court articulated the test for whether an encounter with police constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment to United States Constitution.⁵ Under the Fourth Amendment, a seizure occurs when an officer applies force or, where that is absent, the defendant submits to an officer's “show of authority.” ⁶ We considered this test in Jones v. State, but adhered to our own precedents, concluding that the question of whether a seizure occurs under article I, section 6 of the Delaware Constitution “requires focusing upon the police officer's actions to determine when a reasonable person would have believed he or she was not free to ignore the police presence.” ⁷ Although we declined to adopt the Hodari D. test for interpreting our Constitution, we required that a police officer and a citizen may engage in a consensual encounter that does not amount to a seizure. In Williams v. State, we explained:

Even under this more stringent standard, “law enforcement officers are permitted to initiate contact with citizens on the street for the purpose of asking questions.” This type of interaction is an encounter and, if consensual, neither amounts to a seizure nor implicates the Fourth Amendment. During a consensual encounter, a person has no obligation to answer the officer's inquiry and is free to go about his business. Only when the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the police officer's actions would cause a reasonable person to believe he was not free to ignore the police presence does a consensual encounter become a seizure.⁸

The United States Supreme Court also has distinguished between seizures and consensual encounters. In Muehler v. Mena, the Court explained:

We have “held repeatedly...