Jones v. State
| Docket Number | 3:23-CV-9-KAC-DCP |
| Decision Date | 06 July 2023 |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER STEPHEN JONES, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF TENNESSEE, TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, TENNESSEE REHABILITATIVE INITIATIVE IN CORRECTION TRICOR, TONY PARKER, LISA HELTON, SHAWN PHILLIPS, BRETT COBBLE, MELISSA CAMPBELL, ALLAN LEWIS, BRIAN COX, TIM MOONEYHAM, JESSICA BROWN, and ZACK KOCZWARA, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
Plaintiff an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) currently housed at the Hardeman County Correctional Facility (“HCCF”) who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis filed an Amended Complaint under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986; 15 U.S.C. § 2087; and 26 U.S.C. § 7623 [Doc. 9]. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is before the Court for screening pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A. As set forth below, the Court permits Plaintiff to proceed on his claims of First Amendment retaliation against Defendants Shawn Phillips, Lisa Helton, Brett Cobble, Allan Lewis, Tim Mooneyham, Jessica Brown, and Zack Koczwara, but dismisses all other claims and Defendants from this action.
Under the PLRA, district courts must screen prisoner complaints and sua sponte dismiss any claims that are “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seek[] monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Benson v. O'Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999). The dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) “governs dismissals for failure state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive an initial review under the PLRA, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Formulaic and conclusory recitations of the elements of a claim do not state a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 681. Likewise, an allegation that does not raise a plaintiff's right to relief “above a speculative level” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. However, the Supreme Court has instructed that courts should liberally construe pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases and hold them to a less stringent standard than “formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
As of December 20, 2021, Plaintiff was housed in the Bledsoe County Correctional Complex (“BCCX”) [Doc. 9 ¶ 4]. Plaintiff was employed with the Tennessee Rehabilitative Initiative in Correction (“TRICOR”) program as a wood scraper for Shaw Flooring Group, a Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program partner of TRICOR [Id. ¶ 20]. On December 20, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint in Jones v. Tennessee, No. 3:21-cv-123 (E.D. Tenn.), a separate lawsuit Plaintiff filed against the State of Tennessee, TDOC, and others concerning the deduction of his TRICOR wages to satisfy court costs and fees [Id. ¶ 25].[1]
On December 21, 2021, Plaintiff's TRICOR supervisor, Defendant Lewis, fired Plaintiff from his TRICOR job, in alleged retaliation for Plaintiff's wage-deduction lawsuit and because of Defendant Lewis' personal relationship with Melissa Campbell, a Defendant in that suit [Id. ¶ 26]. At the time he was fired from TRICOR, Plaintiff had been on the registry for a reentry clerk's position (TDOC Job Code “CLGOC”) for approximately six (6) years [Id. ¶ 32]. Plaintiff refused to sign a “Job Drop” form for his TRICOR position and informed all pertinent parties that he consented to being removed from the registry for the reentry clerk position [Id. ¶ 27]. Plaintiff asserts that he was nonetheless “forcibly placed into” the reentry clerk position, even though he was not interviewed or tested prior to the assignment as is purportedly required by TDOC policy [Id. ¶¶ 27, 32].
On December 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed a prison grievance complaining of the loss of his TRICOR position [Id. ¶ 27]. Sergeant Ray Worthington processed the grievance and forwarded it to Defendant Associate Warden of Treatment (“AWT”) Cobble on December 27 [Id. ¶ 28]. On December 28, Sergeant Worthington informed Plaintiff of Defendant Cobble response to Plaintiff's grievance [Id. ¶ 32].[2] Defendant Cobble's response stated that Plaintiff needed to fill the reentry clerk position because the previous reentry clerk had held the position for over sixteen (16) months and Plaintiff was “next” on the registry for the position [Id.].
On December 28, 2021, Plaintiff appealed Defendant Cobble's decision and presented arguments to the Grievance Board, comprised of Defendants Brown and Koczwara [Id. ¶¶ 32, 33]. At the Grievance Board hearing, Plaintiff argued that (1) the prior clerk had in fact been a reentry clerk for Counselor Susan Garrett for over eight (8) years; (2) Plaintiff had been on the reentry clerk registry for over six (6) years; and (3) Plaintiff was suddenly told that he needed to fill the reentry clerk position the day after he filed his amended complaint in his wage-deduction lawsuit [Id.]. Plaintiff also informed the Grievance Board that a few years prior, “the inmate who was in the clerk's position was removed from that position for disciplinary reasons and the position remained vacant during his absence and he was permitted to volunteer in that position until he was permitted by policy to be reassigned as the clerk” [Id. ¶ 33]. Plaintiff also submitted a witnessed copy of his December 21, 2021, “Request for Removal from the Job Register” and handwritten portions of TDOC Policy #505.07 [Id.]. The Grievance Board ultimately affirmed Defendant Cobble's decision [Id.].
After the hearing concluded on December 28, 2021, Defendant Lewis “placed a negative and false Contact Note” in Plaintiff's Tennessee Offender Management Information System (“TOMIS”) profile [Id. ¶ 34]. This Contact Note stated that Plaintiff “quit” his TRICOR position and then made “job threating [sic] statements” pertaining to one of the supervisors [Id.]. Plaintiff did not learn of the contents of the Contact Note until May 12, 2022, when Defendant Mooneyham provided Plaintiff a printout of the Note [Id.].
On December 30, 2021, Acting Warden Jonathan Higdon returned Plaintiff's second-step appeal affirming the conclusions of Defendant Cobble and the Grievance Board [Id. ¶ 35]. On January 6, 2022, Plaintiff appealed Acting Warden Higdon's determination to Assistant Commissioner Lee Dotson, though the transmission paperwork was backdated to January 4, 2022 [Id. ¶ 37]. On January 13, 2022, Plaintiff received his final-step grievance response showing that Assistant Commissioner Dotson upheld all previous levels of review [Id. ¶ 39].
On January 2, 2022, Plaintiff submitted a “Request for Placement on Job Register” to reapply for a position with TRICOR [Id. ¶ 36]. Reentry Counselor Susan Garrett, Plaintiff's then-supervisor, witnessed the request [Id.]. On January 12, 2022, Defendant Lewis denied Plaintiff's request, citing the December 28, 2021 Contact Note as justification for the denial [Id. ¶ 38].
On April 20, 2022, Plaintiff received a scheduling order setting a trial date in Plaintiff's wage-deduction suit via mail [Id. ¶ 41]. That mail was opened, inspected, and logged into the institutional logbook before being given to Plaintiff [Id.]. Three (3) weeks later, on May 5, 2022, Defendant Mooneyham informed Plaintiff that Defendant Cobble directed Mooneyham to draw-up reclassification paperwork for Plaintiff's institutional transfer to HCCF [Id. ¶ 42]. Defendant Mooneyham stated that the reason for this transfer was that “HCCF had some ‘problem children' that they wanted to exchange for some of ours (BCCX)” [Id.]. Defendant Mooneyham presented Plaintiff with a “Notice of Classification Hearing” and told Plaintiff he would “try to get him in the hearing on Tuesday, May 10, 2022” [Id.].
On May 6, 2022, Plaintiff filed a grievance against Defendant Cobble concerning his intent to transfer Plaintiff [Id. ¶ 43]. The grievance was accepted and logged by Sergeant A. Mace, but the issue was deemed non-grievable by all three levels of review [Id.]. Also on May 6, 2022, Defendant Mooneyham showed Plaintiff an email from Defendant Cobble containing the names of four (4) inmates selected by Defendant Cobble for “special reclass (someone reclassified outside of their regular annual re-class date) to HCCF” [Id. ¶ 44]. Plaintiff recognized two (2) of the other names in the email [Id.]. One of those individuals had two (2) ongoing federal civil rights actions pending in the Middle District of Tennessee, and the other was known for filing complaints about his conditions of confinement [Id.]. Thus, “Plaintiff was able to deduce, based on the available evidence, that the phrase ‘problem children'. . . was in fact a reference to inmates who complain about and expose crimes and unconstitutional conditions within TDOC relating to their incarceration, and that inmates who make such complaints will get labeled and transferred for doing so” [Id.].
On May 10, 2022, Plaintiff attended the reclassification hearing [Id. ¶ 51]. Defendant Mooneyham printed Plaintiff a copy of the previously mentioned Contact Note [Id.]. The reclassification panel consisted of Defendants...
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