Jones v. State
| Decision Date | 31 August 1926 |
| Docket Number | 7 Div. 218 |
| Citation | 109 So. 564,21 Ala.App. 505 |
| Parties | JONES v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Shelby County; E.S. Lyman, Judge.
Jess Jones was convicted of distilling, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Leeper Wallace & Saxon, of Columbiana, for appellant.
Harwell G. Davis, Atty. Gen., and Chas. H. Brown, Asst. Atty. Gen for the State.
The indictment was in two counts. The defendant was by the verdict of the jury convicted under the first count, thus eliminating all questions arising under the second count.
The evidence chiefly relied on by the state was the testimony of the law enforcement officers who raided the still at which defendant is alleged to have been engaged in the manufacture of the liquors. These witnesses testified to the fact of distilling and to the participation of defendant in the crime, although defendant was not then and there arrested but, according to the state's witnesses, ran away and was arrested later in the day. The defendant sought to establish an alibi and for that purpose introduced witnesses who testified, that at the time testified to by the state's witnesses, he was at a different place and not connected with the crime charged. The trial judge in an able charge to the jury covered every phase of the case and either in the oral charge or in written charges given at the request of defendant covered every correct proposition of law embraced in the written charges requested by defendant and refused by the court. It will therefore not be necessary for us to go into a detailed discussion of the refused charges.
The principal insistence of error is the method resorted to by the solicitor in conducting the cross-examination of defendant's witnesses and his persistence in undertaking to get before the jury testimony that was clearly illegal and held to be so by the court, the sole effect of which was to prejudice the minds of the jury against the witness. In several instances this occurred. The court would sustain the objection of defendant to a patently illegal question, and the solicitor would immediately repeat the question to the witness. The defendant moved the court to declare a mistrial and to continue the case. The court overruled the defendant's motion, but stated, ß7FI want to ask the solicitor to desist from doing that." We cannot say from a reading of this entire record, that the method used by the solicitor so influenced the jury in their verdict as to require the judge trying the case to stop the trial, declare a mistrial, and to continue the case. But we are clear to the conclusion that the record discloses such discourtesy to the court as to evidence a contempt which would have warranted, and, we may add, demanded, a severe reprimand, if no more, that the dignity of the court might be preserved.
Witnesses who testify in court are under the protection of the judge, and methods and manners used by examining counsel which partake of the "third degree" or the "rack" or the "inquisition" should be promptly stopped, to the end that men on trial may obtain justice by due process and fair trial. We do not reverse this case on account of the ruling of the court on this motion because he was in better position to judge of the effect of the solicitor's conduct on the jury than is this court, and we cannot say from this record that in overruling the motion there was an abuse of discretion, but we are justified in saying that the court was entirely too lenient in dealing with the question, so far as the solicitor was concerned. Dennison v. State, 17 Ala.App. 674, 88 So. 211; Windom v. State, 18 Ala.App. 430, 93 So. 79.
During the argument of the solicitor to the jury there were several objections made to statements in such argument, the objections were overruled, and exceptions reserved. For instance, "I say in my judgment they are better organized than the Ku Klux Klan are in Oklahoma," and "I wish you could live in Columbiana and see how it goes on," and "It...
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Young v. State
...examiner knew he could not support by evidence, and that the court erred in overruling appellant's motion for a mistrial. Jones v. State, 21 Ala.App. 505, 109 So. 564; Bezotte v. State, supra; McGovern v. State, supra; American Bar Association Standards For Criminal Justice, Prosecution Fun......
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Miller v. State
...examiner knew he could not support by evidence, and that the court erred in overruling appellant's motion for a mistrial. Jones v. State, 21 Ala.App. 505, 109 So. 564; Bezotte v. State, supra; McGovern v. State, supra; American Bar Association Standards For Criminal Justice, Prosecution Fun......
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Smith v. State
...are accorded trials free from appeals to prejudice or other improper motives. The views of this court are fully set forth in Jones v. State, 109 So. 564. When the rule there stated is violated, the defendant entitled to a reversal. This record is replete with error, and we do the Attorney G......
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Rowland v. State, 1 Div. 487.
... ... holds and wields great power and influence, and as a ... consequence erroneous insistences and prejudicial conduct ... upon his part tend to unduly prejudice and bias the jury ... against the defendant ... In our ... case of Jones v. State, 21 Ala.App. 505, 109 So ... 564, 566, this court said: 'Solicitors should realize ... that they occupy very high, honorable, important, and ... powerful political positions in the administration of ... justice. To discharge the duties of this office there should ... ever be kept in ... ...