Jones v. State

Decision Date30 January 1917
Docket Number8 Div. 412
Citation16 Ala.App. 7,74 So. 843
PartiesJONES v. STATE.
CourtAlabama Court of Appeals

Rehearing Denied March 23, 1917

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; W.W. Haralson, Judge.

La Fayette Jones was convicted of murder in the second degree and he appeals. Affirmed.

The facts sufficiently appear. The following charges were refused to defendant:

(1) If there is a reasonable probability of defendant's innocence, this may be a just foundation for a reasonable doubt of his guilt, and therefore for his acquittal.
(2) The court charges the jury that if it is not shown that the dogs could take up and carry the trail of a human being after the lapse of the time when deceased was killed to the time of putting them on the trail, then you should not consider the trailing of the dogs as a circumstance in this case.
(3) If the jury find from the evidence that the witness Tom Mullican may have killed deceased, or you are left in a state of doubt and uncertainty as to who killed deceased, then you should acquit defendant.

Milo Moody, of Scottsboro, for appellant.

W.L Martin, Atty. Gen., and P.W. Turner, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

BRICKEN J.

The defendant, La Fayette Jones, was indicted for murder in the first degree, and was convicted of murder in the second degree. There were no eyewitnesses to the killing. The evidence in this case showed that the deceased, Matton Mullican, came to his death by a gunshot wound. It also showed that bad feeling existed between the defendant and the deceased; and that the defendant had made threats against the deceased; and that on the day of the killing, the defendant was in the proximity of the scene of the homicide about the time the offense was committed. Bloodhounds trailed the track of a man from the scene of the killing to the home of the defendant. The track was shown to have measured the same length and width of the track of the defendant. The defendant's first statement as to his whereabouts on the day of the homicide was that he reached his home by 12 o'clock. When testifying as a witness in his own behalf on the trial of this cause, he swore that he reached his home on that day at 3 o'clock. Testimony of other witnesses showed that he did reach his home at or about 3 o'clock in the afternoon on the day of the homicide.

The motive for the crime and the opportunity to commit it by the defendant appear to be established by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. There was some effort by the defendant undertaking to show that another the brother of deceased, did the killing; but no substantive facts were proven in this connection.

The motion to quash the venire because of mistakes in the names of two of the jurors and because the name of one of the jurors had not been served upon the defendant was properly overruled. Section 29 of the act known as the jury law (Acts 1909, p. 317) expressly provides that no objection can be taken to any venire of jurors except for fraud in drawing or summoning the jurors. The same act also provides that:

"If the sheriff fails to summon any of the jurors drawn, or any juror summoned fail or refuses to attend the trial, or if there is any mistake in the name of any juror drawn or summoned, none, nor all of these grounds shall be sufficient to quash the venire or continue the cause." Acts 1909, p. 317, § 32, at page 320.

This court held, in the case of Vincenzo v. State, 1 Ala.App. 62, 55 So. 451, that a motion based upon the same point as this one was without merit. The ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Smith v. State, 165 Ala. 56, 51 So. 610, is to the same effect.

On the trial of the case, Lonnie Waller, a witness for the state, over the objection of the defendant, was permitted to testify that about a month before the killing the defendant, when told that his uncle (the deceased) was going to whip him, said that he was not man enough. The defendant moved to exclude this testimony on the ground that it was immaterial and irrelevant. The court did not err in permitting this testimony to stand, for the manifest effect of such a statement showed that bad feeling existed between the defendant and the deceased, the tendency of which was to prove a motive for the commission of the offense, which is always permissible.

There is no merit in the objection to the ruling of the court in permitting the state to prove that the defendant was seen with a pistol a short time prior to the killing. The fact of ownership or possession of a weapon may be of some probative force, and may tend to show preparation for the crime, and is therefore admissible. Neither is there any merit in the objection to the court permitting a witness on the stand to look at the picture of a pistol in order to identify the kind of a pistol he had testified to having seen in the possession of the defendant. No injury or harm could have resulted therefrom.

On cross-examination of state's witness T.R. Mullican, the defendant propounded the following question: "You had been trying to make arrangements to kill your brother, had you not?" and excepted to the ruling of the court in sustaining the objection by the state. There is clearly no merit in this contention, for it is a well-settled proposition of law that while it is competent for the accused to show that another committed the offense charged, yet such proof must be confined to substantial facts, and must relate to the res gestae, and not to conduct, declarations, or alleged confessions of the party on whom it is attempted to cast suspicion. Tennison v. State, 183 Ala. 1, 62 So. 780. The question propounded was objectionable because it could not have evoked testimony which would come within this rule.

State witness L.M. Phipps testified that he was in the bloodhound business, and that he kept trained dogs to hunt human beings that he went with these dogs to where deceased was; that the dogs, after having circled the hill from where the deceased lay, took up a track 8 or 10 feet from the dead man, and followed it 3 1/2 miles through the mountains into the house where the defendant lived; that in following the trail with the dogs he saw the track of one man all the way in soft places; that he measured the track, and that afterwards he measured the shoe of the defendant, and the measurement was the same, etc. On cross-examination of this witness, the following question was asked: "Did you ever trail a man down by these dogs in this town or this county, or any other?" and defendant excepted to the ruling of the court in sustaining objection interposed by the state. It is a well-settled principle of law that, when evidence of this character is admitted, a defendant should have the fullest opportunity, by cross-examination, to inquire into the breeding and training of the dogs, and into all circumstances and details of the hunt. Richardson v. State, 145 Ala. 50, 41 So. 82, 8 Ann.Cas. 108. It is contended that the sustaining of the objection to...

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5 cases
  • Arrington v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Appeals
    • March 24, 1931
    ... ... Caldwell v. State, 203 Ala. 412, 84 So. 272; ... Rikard v. State, 209 Ala. 481, 96 So. 412; Riley ... v. State, 209 Ala. 505, 96 So. 599; Whittle v ... State, 213 Ala. 301, 104 So. 668; Burkett v ... State, 215 Ala. 453, 111 So. 34; Jones v ... State, 16 Ala. App. 7, 74 So. 843; ... [133 So. 594.] Green v. City of Demopolis, 20 Ala. App. 115, 101 ... So. 529; Wilson v. State, 20 Ala. App. 137, 101 So ... 417; Grimsley v. State, 20 Ala. App. 155, 101 So. 156; ... Gilchrist v. State, 20 Ala. App. 307, 101 So. 634; ... Hill v ... ...
  • Minor v. Coleman
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Appeals
    • February 6, 1917
    ... ... word, much stronger than the word 'intentionally.' ... *** It means governed by the will, obstinate, perverse." ... Johnson v. State, 61 Ala. 9. And again, that an act, ... to be willful, must be "without lawful excuse." ... Harrison v. State, 37 Ala. 154. "Willful means ... ...
  • Reed v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Appeals
    • January 31, 1922
    ... ... Nichols" appeared as a juror. There was no merit in this ... motion, and the court so ruled. Acts 1909, p. 317; Acts 1919, ... pp. 1039, 1042; Harris v. State, 203 Ala. 200, 82 ... So. 450; Blevins v. State, 204 Ala. 476, 85 So. 817; ... Savage v. State, 174 Ala. 94, 57 So. 469; Jones ... v. State, 16 Ala. App. 7, 74 So. 843; Brown v ... State, 109 Ala. 70, 20 So. 103 ... Upon ... the submission of this cause on November 17, 1921, request ... was made of this court to grant appellant's counsel ten ... days in which to file briefs, which was allowed. However, no ... ...
  • Davis v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Appeals
    • June 5, 1917
    ...quash the venire was not sustained by the proof, and was therefore properly overruled. Noel v. State, 161 Ala. 25, 49 So. 824; Lafayette Jones v. State, 74 So. 843. careful and thorough examination of the numerous questions presented relative to the rulings of the court upon the evidence cl......
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