Jones v. State

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Ohio
Writing for the CourtSUMMERS
Citation70 N.E. 952,70 Ohio St. 36
PartiesJONES v. STATE.
Decision Date12 April 1904

70 Ohio St. 36
70 N.E. 952

JONES
v.
STATE.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

April 12, 1904.


Edwin Jones was convicted of maliciously burning a building, and moves for leave to file petition in error. Motion overruled.



Syllabus by the Court

1. It is not essential to the crime defined by section 6832, Rev. St., which makes it a crime to maliciously burn any building of the value of $50, the same being his own property, and insured against loss or damage by fire, with the intent to prejudice the insurer, that the building be the sole property of the person who burns it, or that the value of his property in it be $50; it is sufficient that he has an estate in it, and that the building be of the value of $50; and an indictment charging the building as of the value of more than $50 and as the property of the accused is, in respect of those elements of the crime, sufficient.


[Ohio St. 36]Charles C. Bow and O. C. Volkmore, for plaintiff in error.

Robert H. Day, for the State.


SUMMERS, J.

The plaintiff in error was indicted by the grand jury of Stark county for burning a building, his own property, with intent to prejudice the insurer. The crime was described in the indictment in the following language: ‘Did unlawfully, willfully, and maliciously burn a certain building, to wit, a building used as a storehouse by Robert Legg, of the value of more than fifty dollars, the property of the said Edwin Jones and Mary Jones, with intent in so doing to prejudice, damage and defraud the German Fire Insurance Co. of the city of Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, the insurer of said property, which said building used as a storehouse [Ohio St. 37]by said Robert Legg, the property of said Edwin Jones and Mary Jones, was then and there insured against loss or damage by fire unto the said Edwin Jones and Mary Jones in the sum of $1,000 by the said the German Fire Insurance Co. of the city of Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, by a contract and policy of insurance duly executed by and between the said the German Fire Insurance Co. of the city of Pittsurg, Pennsylvania, and the said Edwin Jones and Mary Jones therefor.’ The statute (section 6832, Rev. St.) is as follows: ‘Whoever maliciously burns or sets fire to any dwelling house, kitchen, smokehouse, shop, office, barn, stable, storehouse, warehouse, stillhouse, mill, pottery, or any other building, of the value of fifty dollars, or any goods, wares, merchandise, or other chattels, of the value of fifty dollars, the same being his own property, and insured against loss or damage by fire, with intent to prejudice the insurer, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than twenty years.’ A motion to quash and a general demurrer were filed and overruled. The defendant entered a plea of guilty, and then filed a motion in arrest of judgment, which was overruled, and he was sentenced to three years in the penitentiary. The circuit court affirmed the judgment of the court of common pleas, and a motion is made for leave to file a petition in error in this court.

By the motions and the demurrer it was sought to question the sufficiency of the indictment on two grounds: First, that it appears upon the face of the indictment that the plaintiff is not the owner of the property; and, second, that it does not appear that the plaintiff's interest in the property is of the value of $50. [Ohio St. 38]At common law arson is the malicious burning of another's house. ‘It is an offense against the security of the habitation, rather than the property. So that by ‘another's house’ is meant another's to occupy; consequently, at common law, one cannot commit arson of his own house, even when it is insured.' 2 Bishop's New Criminal Law, §§ 8, 12; Snyder v. People, 26 Mich. 106, 12 Am. Rep. 302. Our arson statute reads as follows (section 6831, Rev. St.): ‘Whoever maliciously burns, or attempts to burn, any dwelling house, kitchen, smokehouse, shop, office, barn, stable, storehouse, warehouse, railroad coach or car, malthouse, stillhouse, mill, pottery or any other building, the property of another person or any church,

[70 N.E. 953]

meeting house, courthouse, workhouse, schoolhouse, jail or the Ohio penitentiary, or any shop, storehouse or building within the inclosed walls thereof, or any other public building, or any ship or other water craft, or any toll bridge or any part thereof, erected across any river, wholly or partly within this state, or any other bridge erected across any of the waters within this state, or sets fire to or attempts to set fire to anything in or near to any such building, coach or car, water craft or bridge, with intent to burn the same, shall, if the value of any such building, coach or car, water craft or bridge, burned, attempted or intended to be burned, is fifty dollars or more, be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than twenty years, or if the value is less than that sum, be fined not more than $200, or imprisoned not more than thirty days, or both.’ This section, while extending the offense of arson at common law, also comprised it, and, as we shall see, was interpreted in the light of the principles of the common law, and did not make it an offense to burn one's own building; hence the [Ohio St. 39]reason for section 6832, Rev. St., making it an offense for one to burn a building his own property, of the...

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6 practice notes
  • Fox v. State, No. 2-376A109
    • United States
    • January 30, 1979
    ...with the view that first degree arson is an offense against the security of habitation, rather than property. Jones v. State (1904), 70 Ohio St. 36, 70 N.E. 952. In the case at bar, the evidence viewed most favorably to the State shows that the burned building was a barn that had been conve......
  • Judd v. Landin, No. 32935.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)
    • January 2, 1942
    ...owner thereof." Cf. United States v. Ninety-Nine Diamonds, 8 Cir., 139 F. 961, 971, 72 C.C.A. 9, 2 L.R.A.,N.S., 185, and Jones v. State, 70 Ohio St. 36, 43, 70 N.E. 952, 954, 1 Ann.Cas. 618. As such, "owner" W. C. A. was within that term as used in § 3104 of the 1934 code, and its duty ther......
  • Henderson v. Chesley, (No. 6836.)
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Texas
    • April 8, 1925
    ...72 C. C. A. 9, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 185 (quoting Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Walker, 16 N. E. 475, 480, 45 Ohio St. 577, 585); Jones v. State, 70 N. E. 952, 954, 70 Ohio St. 36, 1 Ann. Cas. 618 (quoting and adopting definition in Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Walker, 16 N. E. 475, 45 Ohio St. "The wo......
  • Judd v. Landin, No. 32935.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)
    • January 22, 1942
    ...owner thereof.' Cf. United States v. Ninety-Nine Diamonds, 8 Cir., 139 F. 961, 971, 72 C.C.A. 9, 2 L.R.A.,N.S., 185, and Jones v. State, 70 Ohio St. 36, 43, 70 N.E. 952, 954,1 Ann.Cas. 618. As such, ‘owner’ W. C. A. was within that term as used in § 3104 of the 1934 code, and its duty there......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
6 cases
  • Fox v. State, No. 2-376A109
    • United States
    • January 30, 1979
    ...with the view that first degree arson is an offense against the security of habitation, rather than property. Jones v. State (1904), 70 Ohio St. 36, 70 N.E. 952. In the case at bar, the evidence viewed most favorably to the State shows that the burned building was a barn that had been conve......
  • Judd v. Landin, No. 32935.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)
    • January 2, 1942
    ...owner thereof." Cf. United States v. Ninety-Nine Diamonds, 8 Cir., 139 F. 961, 971, 72 C.C.A. 9, 2 L.R.A.,N.S., 185, and Jones v. State, 70 Ohio St. 36, 43, 70 N.E. 952, 954, 1 Ann.Cas. 618. As such, "owner" W. C. A. was within that term as used in § 3104 of the 1934 code, and its duty ther......
  • Henderson v. Chesley, (No. 6836.)
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Texas
    • April 8, 1925
    ...72 C. C. A. 9, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 185 (quoting Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Walker, 16 N. E. 475, 480, 45 Ohio St. 577, 585); Jones v. State, 70 N. E. 952, 954, 70 Ohio St. 36, 1 Ann. Cas. 618 (quoting and adopting definition in Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Walker, 16 N. E. 475, 45 Ohio St. "The wo......
  • Judd v. Landin, No. 32935.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)
    • January 22, 1942
    ...owner thereof.' Cf. United States v. Ninety-Nine Diamonds, 8 Cir., 139 F. 961, 971, 72 C.C.A. 9, 2 L.R.A.,N.S., 185, and Jones v. State, 70 Ohio St. 36, 43, 70 N.E. 952, 954,1 Ann.Cas. 618. As such, ‘owner’ W. C. A. was within that term as used in § 3104 of the 1934 code, and its duty there......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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