Jones v. State

• Decision Date: 08 February 1894
• Citation: 14 So. 772,100 Ala. 88
• Parties: JONES v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

14 So. 772

100 Ala. 88

JONES v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 8, 1894

Appeal from circuit court, Crenshaw county; John R. Tyson, Judge.

Dock Jones was convicted of selling intoxicants to a man of known intemperate habits, and appeals. Affirmed.

The testimony for the state and the defendant was in conflict as to whether Bill Turner, the man to whom the liquor was sold was known to be a man of intemperate habits. The only ruling of the court upon the evidence is sufficiently shown in the opinion. Upon the introduction of all the evidence the defendant requested the court to give the following written charge, and duly excepted to the court's refusal to give the same: "The court charges the jury that before they can find the defendant guilty they must believe three things to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt: First that the defendant sold the liquor to Mr. Turner; second that Mr. Turner was a man of known intemperate habits; third that the defendant knew at the time of the sale to Mr. Turner that Turner was a man of known intemperate habits. And I charge you that if the state has not proven these three things to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant not guilty."

Gamble & Bricken, for appellant.

Wm. L. Martin, Atty. Gen., for the State.

STONE C.J.

Defendant was indicted for "selling or giving spirituous, vinous, or malt liquors to Bill Turner, a man of known intemperate habits, and not upon the prescription of a physician." Code 1886, § 4038. Bill Turner was on the stand as a witness for the prosecution, and was asked, "Have you not been frequently arrested by the marshal of the town of Luverne, here, for getting drunk?" This question was objected to by defendant, the ground stated being that "there is better evidence of the fact, if it be a fact." The objection was overruled, the witness required to answer, and defendant excepted. It is not shown in the record that any warrant or written authority was necessary to authorize the marshal of the town to arrest an offender against the by-laws of the corporation, who was in the actual commission of such offense in his presence. It is alike the law and common knowledge that such officers may arrest without warrant, either to preserve peace and good order, or to prevent a threatened violation of the law. "Officers who, by virtue of their office, are conservators of the peace, have at common law the right to arrest without warrant all persons who are guilty of a breach of the peace or other violations of the criminal laws in their presence." 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 734, and citations. The officer may arrest upon seeing such acts as show a reasonable ground for making the arrest; and an act done in his presence which is violative of a general law, or of a municipal ordinance, or which reasonably threatens such violation, authorizes arrest without warrant. Id.; Com. v. Cheney, 141 Mass. 102, 6 N.E. 724; O'Conner v. Bucklin, 59 N.H. 589. But this question is expressly settled by statute in this state. Code 1886, § 4260; Martin v. State, 89 Ala. 115, 8 So. 23; Hayes v. Mitchell, 69 Ala. 452. There is nothing in this exception.

The bill of exceptions affirms that it contains all the testimony bearing on the questions raised. Defendant himself testified that he made the sale to Bill Turner for which he was indicted, and there was no testimony from any quarter tending to show a gift of "spirituous, vinous, or malt liquors" to Bill Turner. So, if the defendant had, in this transaction, violated the statute, it was by a sale, not by a gift. The contested questions before the jury were whether Bill Turner was a man of intemperate habits, and whether knowledge of that habit was sufficiently carried home to the defendant. In Tatum v. State, 63 Ala. 147, we declared what were the constituents of this offense,-a sale or gift, to a person of intemperate habits, and knowledge in the seller or giver of such intemperate habits. These three facts must be proved to authorize a conviction. See, also Smith v. State, 55 Ala. 1; Collins v. Jones, 83 Ala. 365, 3 So. 591; Lane v. State, 85 Ala. 11, 4 So. 730. We also declared the measure of proof which the law requires before conviction of a criminal offense can be had. The jury must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. Such is the rule in all criminal prosecutions, from the...