Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine

Citation555 P.2d 399,97 Idaho 859
Decision Date15 October 1976
Docket NumberNo. 12093,12093
PartiesA. Curtis JONES, Jr., M.D., et al., Plaintiffs-Respondents, and Kenneth E. Droulard, M.D. and J. R. Farber, M.D., Plaintiff Intervenors- Respondents, v. STATE BOARD OF MEDICINE and Department of Health and Welfare of the State of Idaho, Defendant-Appellants, and Idaho Medical Association and Idaho Hospital Association, Defendant Intervenors-Appellants, and State of Idaho and Monroe G. Gollaher, Intervenor-Appellant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Idaho

Eugene C. Thomas, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett & Blanton, Boise, for defendants appellants.

Paul S. Street, Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett & Blanton, Boise, for defendant intervenors-appellants.

Richard C. Fiedls, Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett & Blanton, Boise, for intervenor-appellant.

Paul S. Boyd, Boise, for plaintiffs-respondents.

Lloyd J. Webb, Webb, Pike, Burton & Carlson, Twin Falls, for plaintiff intervenors-respondents.

SHEPARD, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment which held the 1975 Hospital-Medical Liability Act unconstitutional. The action was brought for declaratory judgment by certain physicians and hospitals against the State Board of Medicine and the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The Act in question, Title 39, Ch. 42, Idaho Code, was enacted as a result of an alleged 'medical malpractice insurance crisis.' Among other provisions it places limitations on the remedies and recovery of medical malpractice actions in Idaho against physicians and acute care health facilities licensed in the state. Therein a ceiling is set on recoverable damages for actions against physicians of $150,000 per claim and $300,000 per occurrence, I.C. § 39-4204. The Act also sets a ceiling on recoverable damages for actions against acute care hospitals of $150,000 per claim and $300,000 per occurrence or the amount of $10,000 multiplied by the total number of beds in the hospital, I.C. § 39-4205. The Act limits the grounds for malpractice actions to those of common law negligence and requires that recovery should be restricted to compensatory damages not satisfied from collateral sources, I.C. § 39-4210. We note parenthetically that the term 'compensatory damages' is not defined by the Act and it is appellants' argument that such provision was only intended to exclude punitive damages. The Act also requires all physicians and hospitals in Idaho to obtain malpractice insurance as a condition of licensure, I.C. §§ 39-4206, 4208, 4209.

Plaintiff-respondents are licensed physicians and hospitals in Idaho who are alleged to be affected by the provisions of the Act. Respondents below alleged that because of the constitutional doubts raised as to various portions of the Act, they have been compelled to maintain malpractice insurance coverage in excess of the specific liability limitations set forth in the Act. The cost of this seemingly unnecessary coverage, they contend, has necessarily had to be passed on to their patients. They also allege that uncertainty as to the validity of the limitations set forth in the Act has compounded a crisis in medical malpractice insurance as indicated by excessive insurance costs and a reluctance of insurers to offer coverage competitive or otherwise to health care providers. Accordingly, pursuant to I.C. § 10-1201 et seq., plaintiff-respondents sought to have their status and legal obligations under the Act resolved by declaratory judgment. They contended that the limitations found in I.C. §§ 39-4204, 4205 and 4210 are in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and Art. I, §§ 2, 13 and 18 of the Idaho Constitution. They also sought invalidation of the conditions of licensure found in I.C. §§ 39-4206, 4208 and 4209.

Appellant-defendants are the State Board of Medicine and the Department of Health and Welfare who are charged with hospital and physician licensing and general health care regulation. I.C. § 54-1805, et seq., I.C. §§ 39-1303, 1305. In response to plaintiff-respondents' complaint, they admitted all allegations but denied the constitutional invalidity of the challenged limitations. The parties stipulated submission of the controversy on the merits and the only formal factual matter submitted was the affidavit of the Director of the Department of Insurance.

Below petitions to intervene were filed and admitted on behalf of the Idaho Medical Association and the Idaho Hospital Association. They are appellant-intervenors on this appeal. In addition, the American Trial Lawyers Association and the Idaho Trial Lawyers Association, the California Trial Lawyers Association, the Washington Trial Lawyers Association, the American Medical Association and the State Department of Insurance appear as amici curiae.

As to the due process and equal protection violations asserted by plaintiff-respondents below, the district court held that it would presume constitutionality and utilize the restrained view test stating that 'the limitation of liability feature of the Act obviously bears a reasonable relationship to the objectives sought to be advanced by the Act itself, i. e., the availability of liability insurance.' The district court, however, went on to hold that the ability of citizens to seek redress for a breach of duty is a fundamental right preserved by Art. I, § 18 of the Idaho Constitution, which the court said requires 'a full and complete remedy for every injury of person.' The district court reasoned:

'In my opinion, Art. I, Section 18 of the Idaho Constitution prohibits the limitation of liability for injuries otherwise recoverable under a right or cause of action and recognized by the common law at least at the time of the adoption of the Idaho Constitution in 1890. The clause provides relief for 'every' injury. Particularly does this clause prohibit limitation of liability where no substitute procedure or remedy, judicial or administrative, is provided. * * *

'By way of Section 18, the Idaho Constitution recognizes those common law causes of action as existing in 1890 as the ability of an individual to seek redress for a breach of a duty owed as a basic right. These basic rights must be preserved even in times of economic stress concerning a great segment of the public, otherwise the door would be open for the dissolution and diminution of these basic rights to the disinterest of the individual members of the public under the contention and allegation of general public necessity.

'It is thus the conclusion of this Court that the limitation of liability feature of the Hospital-Medical Liability Act violates Art. I, Section 18 of the Idaho Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional.'

The court further held that that portion of the Act requiring the acquisition of malpractice insurance as a condition of licensure of physicians and hospitals was also invalid. The district court made no holding regarding the constitutionality of I.C. § 39-4210 limiting malpractice action to common law negligence and recovery thereon to compensatory damages.

Here, appellants assign error to the holding of the lower court as it relates to Art. I, § 18, and all parties here have argued as to whether the Act violates the due process and equal protection guarantees of both the Idaho and federal constitutions. Therefore we review the issues pertaining to due process and equal protection. See, Grayot v. Summers, 75 Idaho 125, 269 P.2d 765 (1954); Taggart v. Latah Co., 78 Idaho 99, 298 P.2d 979 (1956).

In addition, respondents and intervenors assert that the restricted liability provisions of the Act are in violation of Idaho Constitution Art. I, § 7 (right to trial by jury) and Art. II, § 1 and Art. V, § 13 (prohibition against legislative encroachment upon judicial functions). Those issues were not reached below and are not reached here.

I.

At the outset we consider the assertion that the district court erred in its finding that that portion of the Act placing a limitation on damages recoverable in medical malpractice actions contravenes Art. I, § 18 of the Idaho Constitution. That section provides:

'Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property or character, and rights and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, delay or prejudice.'

The holding of the trial court was predicated upon its opinion that by this provision the Idaho Constitution effectively adopted the common law as it existed in 1890 and thereby preserved the common law right of action for medical malpractice. See, Nelson v. Harrington, 72 Wis. 591, 40 N.W. 228 (1888). It is argued that the rights to recovery for injury to person, property or character which existed at the time of the adoption of our constitution remain inviolate and, while the legislature may alter common law remedies and attach conditions precedent to the exercise of those common law rights, it must provide substitute procedures or remedies in lieu thereof or it cannot deny a remedy which existed at common law. See Newlan v. State, 96 Idaho 711, 535 P.2d 1348 (1975) (dissenting opinion). We hold that the trial court erred in its reasoning and its application of Art. I, § 18 of the Idaho Constitution.

To adopt that argument would be to hold that the common law as of 1890 governs the health, welfare and safety of the citizens of this state and is unalterable without constitutional amendment. Nothing in Art. I, § 18 either explicitly or implicitly prohibits liegislative modification of common law actions. Art. I, § 18 contains no reference whatsoever to the common law. The only adoption of the common law in this jurisdiction is found in Art. XXI, § 2 of the state constitution and I.C. § 73-116. Those provisions clearly contemplate the inherent power of the legislature to modify the common law with few exceptions. See, State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 486 P.2d 247 (19...

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