Jones v. State Board of Education of and for State of Tenn.
Citation | 279 F. Supp. 190 |
Decision Date | 18 January 1968 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 4887. |
Parties | Kenneth R. JONES et al., Plaintiffs, v. The STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF AND FOR the STATE OF TENNESSEE et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
I. T. Creswell, Jr., Nashville, Tenn., Robert L. Carter and Richard Bellman, New York City, and Reber F. Boult, Jr., Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiffs.
Thomas E. Fox, Deputy Atty. Gen., Robert F. Hedgepath and Robert H. Roberts, Asst. Attys. Gen., State of Tennessee, Nashville, Tenn., for defendants.
In this action the plaintiffs, Kenneth R. Jones, James Mickey Booth, and Frederick Brooks, filed their complaint on behalf of themselves and as a class action on behalf of others similarly situated, against the Tennessee State Board of Education, Tennessee A. & I. State University, the Faculty Advisory Committee of said University, and other state and university officials and agencies, invoking the jurisdiction of the Court under 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331 and 1343 and under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Tennessee A. & I. State University (hereinafter University) is a state supported land grant college, originally established as an institution for higher learning for members of the Negro race. Today the institution still consists primarily of Negro students, teachers, and administrators.
Plaintiffs contend that they have been wrongfully suspended or expelled from the University and that they will suffer irreparable injury unless they are readmitted. In their complaint plaintiffs make a two-pronged attack upon the action of the Faculty Advisory Committee (hereinafter F.A.C.) in ordering their indefinite suspension. First, the action of the F.A.C. is attacked on procedural grounds, it being alleged that the F.A.C. in making charges against plaintiffs and in conducting hearings deprived the plaintiffs of due process of law and of equal protection of the law. Also, it is alleged that the action was taken to discourage or punish the plaintiffs in the exercise of their First Amendment freedoms. The relief sought is a permanent injunction directing the plaintiffs' reinstatement and enjoining the defendants from interfering with the enjoyment by plaintiffs of their constitutionally protected rights.
The defendants in their answer deny that the plaintiffs were dismissed from the University as a result of plaintiffs' engaging in activities protected by the First Amendment. The defendants further deny that the F.A.C. acted in any manner which would deprive the plaintiffs of due process of law or equal protection of the law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The action was heard on its merits before the Court on October 16-18, 1967, and from the extensive proof the controlling facts appear without serious conflict. At the University the body having responsibility for imposing severe discipline is the F.A.C., composed of nine faculty members and administrators. On or about June 8, 1967, the F.A.C. sent telegrams to approximately seventy students, including the three named plaintiffs, in which each student was informed that he had not been cleared to continue his education at the University and stating that an explanatory letter would follow. It is the policy of the University and the F.A.C. to review the record of each student at the end of each school year. The seventy students who received the telegrams were those who had been recommended for disciplinary action during the previous school year by persons in authority.
On June 21, 1967, the explanatory letters were sent informing each of the seventy students of his indefinite suspension, specifying the reason for the suspension in each particular case, and informing each student that he would be allowed a hearing before the F.A.C. at anytime until July 15, 1967, to show cause why this action should not be taken. If the F.A.C. did not receive a request for a hearing from a student, the suspension was to be considered final.
Following the June 21 letter, considerable correspondence and negotiation ensued between the plaintiffs' retained attorney, the Honorable I. T. Creswell, Jr., who also represented other students, and various members of the University administration. Creswell first wrote on June 22 or 23 to Dr. J. A. Payne, Dean of Students, and to Dr. W. N. Boswell, Chairman of the F.A.C., requesting further information. Boswell replied on June 30 that he was referring Creswell's letter to Dr. Walter S. Davis, President of the University. Payne replied on July 12 that the letter sent to him was being referred to the Tennessee State Attorney General's office. On July 31 Creswell again wrote to Boswell requesting that the hearings be set for August 8-11, and asking for a specification of charges against the plaintiffs and against three other students whom Creswell also represented. On August 7 Creswell sent a telegram to Boswell requesting a reply to his last letter. On August 9 Creswell wrote to the Tennessee State Attorney General, the Honorable George F. McCanless, requesting an answer to the letter that Payne had forwarded to him. This request was answered on August 10 when the Attorney General stated that he had no response to make to Creswell's letter to Payne since the dispute was an administrative matter.
On September 8 Boswell by telegram informed Creswell that hearings had been scheduled for September 9-14 and that he could appear at these hearings as plaintiffs' legal counsel. Letters to the same effect were mailed the same day to the plaintiffs and to Creswell. By request of Creswell the hearings were postponed and did not begin until September 16. The specifications of charges against the plaintiffs requested by Creswell were provided by the F.A.C. on September 14. The hearings for plaintiffs Jones, Booth, and Brooks were held before the F.A.C. on September 16, 18, and 20 respectively.
At the hearings testimony was introduced in the presence of plaintiffs. They were given an opportunity to testify, to ask questions of their accusers, and to present witnesses and other evidence in their own behalf. The witnesses were not under oath and formal rules of evidence were not invoked. A verbatim transcript of the proceedings was made, and the plaintiffs' attorney actively participated in all hearings. At each session the entire F.A.C. was present. The University was represented by the Honorable Robert H. Roberts and the Honorable Robert F. Hedgepath, Assistants to the Tennessee State Attorney General.
In the original June 21 letter sent to the seventy University students, plaintiff Kenneth Jones was charged as follows:
Involved in worm-on-plate incident in cafeteria in an alleged attempt to discredit cafeteria workers; fraud and conspiracy. Participated in riot.
The September 14 specification of charges against Jones was a much longer statement:
The F.A.C., following Jones' hearing, made an explicit finding only on the second of the four charges. The report of the F.A.C. states:
We, the Committee find that Mr. Jones has seized upon the opportunity on different occasions to promote unrest on the campus by such actions as distributing literature designed for that purpose * * *.
In ordering Jones' indefinite suspension the F.A.C. also made the following general finding:
We have found from the evidence presented that the actions of Mr. Jones did constitute violations of the University's regulations governing student conduct and behavior. Mr. Jones has not demonstrated his willingness to observe the minimum standards of propriety in conduct required here.
The June 21 letter which plaintiff Booth received charged as follows:
Arrested in raid on 1720 Jefferson Street. Charged with State warrant for inciting to riot. Printed (or caused to be printed) and passed out inflammatory papers that carried your name. Nashville Tennessean published story revealing immorality on your part.
The September 14 specification of charges against Booth stated:
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