Jones v. State

• Decision Date: 13 September 1990
• Docket Number: No. 72461,72461
• Citation: Jones v. State, 569 So.2d 1234 (Fla. 1990)
• Parties: 15 Fla. L. Weekly S604 Randall Scott JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 1234

569 So.2d 1234

15 Fla. L. Weekly S604

Randall Scott JONES, Appellant, v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 72461.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Sept. 13, 1990.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 15, 1990.

James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Larry B. Henderson, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Pamela D. Cichon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

BARKETT, Justice.

Randall Scott Jones appeals two convictions for first-degree murder and the sentence of death imposed for each.¹He also appeals convictions and sentences received for four noncapital felonies.²We affirm the two capital convictions, but because of cumulative errors affecting the penalty phase, we vacate the sentences and remand for a new sentencing proceeding before a jury.We reverse the conviction for sexual battery and affirm the convictions in the remaining noncapital felonies.

During the evening of July 26, 1987, Jones and his codefendant, Chris Reesh, went target shooting with a 30-30-caliber rifle near Rodman Dam in Putnam County.Jones's car became stuck in the sand pits.At about midnight, they flagged down a fisherman who was leaving the area and asked if he could pull them out.The fisherman indicated that he could not but told them to seek help from the driver of a Chevrolet pickup truck parked in the parking lot.Inside the cab of the pickup Matthew Paul Brock and Kelly Lynn Perry were sleeping.

Between 12:30 and 1:30 a.m., a twelve-year-old boy who was camping at the Rodman Dam Campground awoke to the sound of three gunshots fired in rapid succession.Later that morning, a Rodman Dam concession worker noticed cigarette packets, broken glass, and blood in the parking lot.She followed a trail of blood and drag marks across the parking lot for about 160 yards to a wooded area where she discovered Brock's body lying in the underbrush.She called the Putnam County Sheriff's Office.During the search of the area, deputies discovered Perry's partially clothed body about twenty-five feet deeper into the underbrush.

At trial, Dr. Bonofacia Flora, a forensic pathologist, testified that Brock died instantly from two wounds to the head from a high-powered rifle.Perry died from a single shot to the forehead, also caused by a high-powered rifle.

Matthew Brock's brother and sister-in-law testified to having seen the victim's pickup, while in Jones's possession, parked at a convenience store in Green Cove Springs at approximately 7 a.m. on July 27.They observed bullet holes in the windshield and a 30-30-caliber rifle inside.Richard Brock confronted Jones, who was a stranger to him, and asked him where he got the truck.Jones told him he had just purchased the truck for $4,000 and drove away.

On August 16, Jones was arrested in Kosciusko, Mississippi, by the Mississippi Highway Patrol for possession of a stolen motor vehicle.The next day, Detective David Stout and Lieutenant Chris Hord of the Putnam County Sheriff's Office interviewed Jones in Mississippi.Lieutenant Hord testified that after advising Jones of his Miranda rights, ³ Jones gave a statement implicating himself at the scene but blaming Reesh for having shot both victims.Jones admitted driving the pickup to Mississippi, where he planned to get rid of it.In addition to signing a waiver-of-rights form, Jones also signed a consent to search the trailer in which he had been living at the Lighthouse Children's Home in Mississippi.In the trailer, Detective Stout recovered pay stubs from Perry's employer in Palatka bearing her fingerprint.A calendar bearing Perry's name was also recovered from the bottom of a nearby dumpster.

On August 20, Jones was transported from Mississippi to Florida.Lieutenant Hord testified that at the outset of the trip, he reminded Jones that his Miranda rights were still in effect.Jones then volunteered a second statement which was reduced to writing and signed after their arrival at the Putnam County jail.In this statement, Jones admitted that his earlier statement was true, except that he had reversed his and Reesh's roles in the murder.

The state's case was completed with the testimony of Rhonda Morrell, who was Jones's ex-fiancee.She testified that Jones had told her that he had taken her father's rifle for target shooting and that "he had shot those two people.He didn't remember doing it, but he had done it."She also testified that Jones had told her that he had pawned the rifle, and she identified Jones's signature on a pawn ticket dated August 19, 1987.The rifle was retrieved from a Jacksonville gun and pawn shop.

Jones offered no evidence during the guilt phase.The jury returned guilty verdicts on all charges.

During the penalty phase, Jones presented the testimony of Dr. Harry Krop, a forensic psychologist, who diagnosed Jones as having a borderline personality disorder.He testified that Jones's stepmother described Jones as "almost like an animal."At the age of eleven, Jones was hospitalized for three weeks for psychiatric treatment.He was diagnosed as a borderline schizophrenic due to his difficulty dealing with reality and his environment.After his release from the hospital, a court adjudicated Jones dependent, later delinquent, and finally referred him to a children's home.

The court instructed the jury on three aggravating ⁴ and three mitigating circumstances, ⁵ and the jury recommended the death sentence for both murders by a vote of eleven to one.As to each murder, the trial court found two aggravating circumstances- --that the murders were committed for pecuniary gain and committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner.The court found no mitigating circumstances and sentenced Jones to death.

Guilt Phase

Jones raises five claims of error in the guilt phase of his trial.As his initial claim, Jones contends that the trial court should have suppressed the statements which he gave to Lieutenant Hord on August 17 and 20 because the state denied his request for counsel.

We agree with Jones that if he requested counsel, his subsequent statements to the police authorities must be suppressed.However, the necessary factual basis for relief has not been established.Jones testified at the suppression hearing that he requested counsel when he was arrested in Mississippi by Trooper Haldeman, and again on two subsequent occasions--when he was questioned by Mississippi Investigator Edwards concerning the warrant on the pickup and when he was first interviewed by the Putnam County officers.This testimony conflicts with the testimony of Trooper Haldeman, Detective Stout, and Lieutenant Hord.⁶It also conflicts with Jones's written statements of August 17 and 20, wherein he represented that he neither requested advice from, nor the presence of, an attorney during or at any time before he made the statement.In addition, Jones had the opportunity to review his statements after they were typed.Although he initialed thirty-six changes in the two statements, he made no changes to his stated waiver of counsel.The trial court denied the motion to suppress, specifically finding that whether Jones requested counsel was a question of credibility which it resolved in favor of the state.Based on the totality of this record, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion, and we find no error on this point.

Second, Jones claims error because he was not present during all the voir dire proceedings.He argues that the record fails to demonstrate that he effectively waived his presence during counsel's exercise of peremptory challenges at side-bar conferences.Although there is no indication that Jones was in attendance at the side-bar, the record demonstrates that the court gave defense counsel the opportunity to confer with Jones prior to every side-bar and that Jones had the opportunity to decide which jurors would be stricken from the panel.SeeTurner v. State, 530 So.2d 45, 49-50(Fla.1987)(following remand), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1040, 109 S.Ct. 1175, 103 L.Ed.2d 237(1989).We find no error.Likewise, we reject the claim that Jones should have been present during the court's inquiry into a conversation between Juror McKinney and a bailiff.⁷

Jones's third point on appeal is that the conviction for sexual battery must be reversed because a victim of sexual battery must have been alive at the time of the assault to support the elements of this crime.We agree.SeeOwen v. State, 560 So.2d 207, 212(Fla.1990)(the victim must be alive at the time the offense commences), petition for cert. filed, No. 90-231(U.S.July 31, 1990).The evidence here clearly establishes that the acts constituting sexual battery occurred after the victim's death.Thus, Jones's conviction for sexual battery must be reversed.Jones does not argue and we do not find that the conviction on this count affected the guilty verdicts on the murder counts.

Fourth, Jones challenges the admission of DNA identification testimony as lacking an adequate predicate.At trial, counsel objected to the testimony of an expert who through DNA sampling, identified Jones as the individual who sexually assaulted Perry.Even if it could be said that such testimony was improperly admitted, we find beyond a reasonable doubt that the error would not have affected the verdict and is harmless.Of course, the sexual battery charge is being reversed on other grounds.

Finally, we find no merit to Jones's claim that reversal is mandated because the trial judge failed to comply with section 921.241(1), Florida Statutes(1987), which requires the judge to affix the defendant's fingerprints to a judgment of guilt.

For the reasons expressed, we affirm Jones's two convictions for first-degree murder and convictions on Counts III, IV, and V.We find that each is supported by competent substantial evidence.We reverse the conviction for sexual battery.

Penalty Phase

Jones asserts several errors pertaining to the...