Jones v. State

Decision Date22 April 2005
Docket NumberNo. 49A05-0406-CR-303.,49A05-0406-CR-303.
Citation825 N.E.2d 926
PartiesShannon JONES, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Katherine A. Cornelius, Marion County Public Defender, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Robyn M. Williamson, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

SHARPNACK, Judge.

Shannon Jones appeals his convictions for murder1 and attempted murder as a class A felony.2 Jones raises two issues, which we revise and restate as:

I. Whether the jury's determination that Jones was guilty but mentally ill was contrary to law; and
II. Whether the trial court erred by denying Jones's request for a surrebuttal closing argument.

We affirm.

The relevant facts follow. Jones lived in Indianapolis with his mother, Jenita Jones. Jones's seventeen-month-old daughter, A.J., was staying with him for the summer of 2000. As of July 8, 2000, A.J. had been staying with Jones for two weeks. In the early morning hours of July 8, Jones strangled A.J. to death with the belt of her bathrobe as she slept. Jones placed A.J.'s body in a drawer and closed it. Jones retrieved a gun he had bought three weeks prior. Jones wrapped his arm and the gun in a pillow and some blankets so the neighbors would not hear, went to Jenita's bedroom, and shot her in the head twice. Jones grabbed Jenita's keys, emptied her purse, took her money, and left. Jenita survived the shooting.

Jones drove around looking for "weed" but was unable to locate any. Exhibit 47 at 85. Jones stopped at a convenience store and bought some cigarettes, a lighter, and a drink. Jones drove downtown and went to the City-County Building. Jones approached Marion County Deputy Sheriff Christopher Morgan and some other deputies who were near the Market Street entrance of the building and asked for a cigarette and a light. The deputies gave Jones a cigarette and a light, and Jones left.

Later that night, Jones entered the City-County building and laid down on a bench near the central desk. Marion County Sheriff Deputy Anthony Edgemon told Jones that he could not sleep there. Jones told Deputy Edgemon that he wanted to turn himself in and that he just killed two people. Jones said that he had to kill his mom because she would not give him his medication and that he killed A.J. because she had AIDS. Jones also told Deputy Edgemon that he was a prophet, that Jesus is the devil, and that he had AIDS, chlamydia, and genital warts. Deputy Edgemon noticed that Jones was very calm. Jones said that Deputy Edgemon was working for Satan and quit talking.

Indianapolis Police Detective Larry Cahill interviewed Jones. During the interview, Jones told Detective Cahill that he was not crazy, would not plead insanity, and knew that murder was wrong by "our laws." Transcript at 390. When Detective Cahill was not in the room with Jones, he did not notice anything unusual about Jones's behavior as he observed him from the opposite side of a one-way mirror.

On July 11, 2000, the State charged Jones with murder and attempted murder as a class A felony. Jones's attorney challenged his competency. On October 3, 2001, the trial court found Jones incompetent to stand trial and remanded him to the custody of the Mental Health Department. The trial court found Jones competent to stand trial on July 30, 2002.

Jones entered a plea of not responsible by reason of insanity. During Jones's trial, three doctors testified that Jones had schizophrenia and was insane at the time of the crimes, and several lay witnesses expressed opinions from which one could infer that Jones was sane. After the State concluded its closing rebuttal argument, Jones requested a surrebuttal, which the trial court denied. A jury found Jones guilty but mentally ill of both counts. The trial court sentenced Jones to serve fifty-five years for murder and twenty years for attempted murder concurrently.

I.

The first issue is whether the jury's determination that Jones was guilty but mentally ill was contrary to law. The insanity defense is governed by Ind.Code § 35-41-3-6(a) (1998), which provides, "[a] person is not responsible for having engaged in prohibited conduct if, as a result of mental disease or defect, he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct at the time of the offense." "Mental disease or defect" is defined as "a severely abnormal mental condition that grossly and demonstrably impairs a person's perception, but the term does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated unlawful or antisocial conduct." Ind.Code § 35-41-3-6(b) (1998).

The "insanity defense" is an affirmative defense for which the burden of proof is on the defendant. Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1148 (Ind.2004). "The State must prove the offense, including mens rea, beyond a reasonable doubt but need not disprove insanity." Id. (citing Ind.Code § 35-41-4-1). To avoid responsibility for the crime proven by the State, the defendant must establish the insanity defense by a preponderance of the evidence. See Ind.Code 35-41-4-1(b). The question of whether a defendant can appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct is one for the trier of fact. See Thompson, 804 N.E.2d at 1149. A defendant who claims that his insanity defense should have prevailed at trial is in the position of one appealing from a negative judgment, and we will reverse when the evidence is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that the defendant was insane when the crime was committed. Id. As such, we will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses but will consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable and logical inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id.

Although expert "opinions provide a strong justification for raising the insanity defense, we have never held expert testimony to be conclusive." Cate v. State, 644 N.E.2d 546, 547 (Ind.1994). A jury is free to disregard the testimony of experts and rely upon that of lay witnesses. Garner v. State, 704 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (Ind. 1998). Our supreme court recently held:

Conflicting lay testimony is not required, however, for the trier of fact to reject expert testimony. As a general rule, factfinders are not required to believe a witness's testimony even when it is uncontradicted. If judges and juries can disbelieve uncontradicted testimony about facts, they are surely entitled to decide whether to accept or reject testimony that represents a witness's opinion.

Thompson, 804 N.E.2d at 1149.

We find Barany v. State, 658 N.E.2d 60 (Ind.1995), instructive and strikingly similar to the facts of this case. In Barany, the defendant was charged with murder and found guilty but mentally ill. Id. at 62. Our supreme court addressed the issue of "whether the verdict [was] contrary to law because the evidence was overwhelmingly and uncontroverted that appellant was insane at the time of the killing." Id. The defendant "discussed religion in highly abstract, incomprehensible terms and drew some bizarre pictures on a notepad." Id. Three disinterested psychiatrists concluded that the defendant "was incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct and unable to conform his behavior to the requirements of the law." Id. at 63. Our supreme court held:

In this case, the medical experts were unanimous in concluding that appellant was insane at the time of the killing. However, the State offered testimony from several lay witnesses that indicated that appellant was sane. Indiana State Police Detective Stotts described how, only a few hours after the crime, appellant talked about the victim's complaints and nagging. One of appellant's friends, Chris Brockman, testified as to unusual topics of conversation, such as conspiracies, but indicated that appellant "seemed O.K." In a conversation with his sister, appellant indicated that he believed that the victim was calling the police when he killed her. The jury could have decided that this testimony about appellant's behavior was more indicative of his actual mental health at the time of the killing than medical examinations conducted four weeks after the arrest. Given this conflicting evidence, we will not invade the jury's fact-finding province.

Id. at 64.

Similar to the evidence in Barany, here, three doctors testified that Jones had schizophrenia and was insane at the time of the crimes, and several lay witnesses expressed opinions from which one could infer that Jones was sane. Officer Morgan testified that Jones was in "a very normal state" when he approached a group of deputies in front of the City-County Building and asked for a cigarette and a light. Transcript at 291. Deputy Edgemon testified that Jones was "very calm", "wasn't agitated" until Deputy Edgemon would not pay attention to him, "didn't appear to be under the influence of any kind of medication at the time," and "calmly talked about what happened." Id. at 263. Deputy Edgemon testified that Jones said he had killed his mother because she refused to give him his medication and had killed A.J. because she had AIDS. Detective Cahill testified that Jones did not exhibit any unusual behavior as he observed him on the opposite side of a two-way glass and that Jones's behavior did not cause him to be concerned about Jones's state of mind. Detective Cahill also testified that Jones told him that he was not "crazy" several times, that he would not plead insanity, and that he knew what he had done was wrong by "our laws." Id. at 390.

The State also directs us to Jones's conduct before, during, and after the crimes. Jones wrapped his arm and the gun with a pillow and some blankets before shooting Jenita so that his "neighbors wouldn't hear it" because he "had a plan." Exhibit 47 at 75. After the shooting, Jones took Jenita's keys and money and drove around looking for "weed." Id. at 85....

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