Jones v. State

• Decision Date: 22 February 2012
• Docket Number: Sept. Term,No. 37,2011.,37
• Citation: 425 Md. 1,38 A.3d 333
• Parties: Kimberly JONES v. STATE of Maryland, et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

38 A.3d 333
425 Md. 1

Kimberly JONES
v.
STATE of Maryland, et al.

No. 37

Sept. Term

2011.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Feb. 22, 2012.

[38 A.3d 336]

Cary J. Hansel (Joseph M. Creed of Joseph, Greenwald & Laake, P.A., Greenbelt, MD), on brief, for petitioner.

Matthew J. Fader, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, MD), on brief, for respondents.

Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS, BARBERA and JOHN C. ELDRIDGE (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

BARBERA, J.

[425 Md. 6] This case has its genesis in an altercation between Kimberly Jones (hereafter “Petitioner”) and two Prince George's County Deputy Sheriffs, Billy Falby and Gerald Henderson, during the deputies' attempt to serve an arrest warrant for an individual at the home of Petitioner. Petitioner filed a twelve-count complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, naming as defendants Deputies Falby and Henderson and their employer, the State of Maryland (hereafter “the State”), Respondent here. Among other allegations, Petitioner claimed that the State was negligent in its training of the two deputies in connection with the Fourth Amendment limitations on in-home execution of arrest warrants.

The counts of the complaint were bifurcated for trial and, at the second trial before a jury, the jury returned a verdict finding the State liable for the negligent training of the two deputies. The jury awarded Petitioner damages in the amount of $261,000, which the Circuit Court later reduced to [425 Md. 7] $200,000, pursuant to the Maryland Tort Claims Act. Both parties appealed the judgment.

The State raised numerous claims of error, including, pertinent here, that the trial judge erred in entering judgment against the State, because, in the words of the State: (1) “the State did not owe any duty ... to Petitioner, as opposed to the public generally, with respect to the ... training of Deputies Falby and Henderson”; and (2) Petitioner “failed to present evidence that the State owed a duty or breached a duty with respect to its ... training of Deputies Falby and Henderson, and failed to present that any such breach was a proximate cause of her alleged damages.” In connection with the latter claim, the State asserted that Petitioner was obligated to present expert evidence in support of her claim of negligent training.

The Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment, agreeing with the State that the Circuit Court should have entered judgment in the State's favor because there was legally insufficient evidence that the State breached any duty to Petitioner in connection with the tort of negligent training and supervision. State v. Jones, 197 Md.App. 638, 674, 14 A.3d 1223, 1244 (2011). In light of that disposition, the Court of Special Appeals did not decide the remaining claims the parties raised in that court.

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted, Jones v. State, 420 Md. 81, 21 A.3d 1063 (2011), to answer the following questions:

1. Does the public duty doctrine shield the State from a claim of negligence when its police officers commit intentional torts and/or constitutional violations?

2. Is expert testimony necessary for a plaintiff to meet her burden of proof on a claim of negligent training or supervision of police officers?

3. Is evidence that police officers committed intentional torts and constitutional violations, coupled with testimony by the officers that their actions were in

[38 A.3d 337]

accordance with their training, and evidence that the officers entered a [425 Md. 8] citizen's home without constitutionally sufficient justification sufficient to prove a claim of negligent training?

I. Factual background

Each of the questions presented relates to the ultimate question of whether the Circuit Court properly denied the State's motions for judgment and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Consequently, our factual summary is taken from the evidence presented at trial, cast in the light most favorable to Petitioner. See Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Saville, 418 Md. 496, 503, 16 A.3d 159, 163 (2011) (“An appellate court reviews the trial court's decision to allow or deny judgment or [judgment notwithstanding the verdict] to determine whether it was legally correct, while viewing the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

The events at issue took place on the morning of September 15, 2006, in and about the home of Petitioner, a one-bedroom apartment located at 151 Westway Center Drive, apartment number T–3, in Greenbelt, Maryland. At the time, Petitioner was asleep in bed, having returned home from working a midnight–to–8:00 a.m. shift as a “youth care worker II,” at Father Flanagan's, an emergency shelter for teenage girls and boys. Petitioner, who was not wearing clothing at the time, awoke to someone knocking at her door. She called out “who is it?” and received the response, “it's the sheriff's department.” Petitioner's immediate reaction was that there might be a fire or some other emergency, “because there would be no reason for a sheriff to knock at my door.” ¹

[425 Md. 9] Petitioner called out “one moment,” then went to her closet to retrieve a robe. She donned the robe, went to the door, and opened it. Two men, later identified as Deputy Sheriffs Falby and Henderson, were standing in front of the doorway. Petitioner did not recognize the men's attire as that of a law enforcement officer.²

Petitioner testified to what occurred next:

[A]s soon as I opened my door, this man put his foot in my door. It threw me back a little, and I said, what's going on? And he [later identified as Deputy Falby] asked for Lamarr Wallace. I said, no, Lamarr Wallace don't live here. He said, can we come [in] and check. I said no, because I'm not dressed. He said well, we coming in whether you like it or not. I said, what do you mean? By then, the second person [later identified as Deputy Henderson] left, and I said, well, where is your warrant? He said, I don't have my warrant. My supervisor has my warrant. I said, where

[38 A.3d 338]

is your supervisor? And by then somebody was tapping at my patio door.

So when I turned to look at the patio door, that's when I saw the man tapping on the door. When I turned back, Falby hit me.

Petitioner added that Deputy Falby did not ask permission to enter; indeed, he said nothing before putting his foot through the door opening.

The “hit” Petitioner received from Deputy Falby was a close-fisted punch to her face, which knocked her against a closet door behind her. At the same time, Deputy Henderson pulled out his baton and shattered the glass patio door in order to enter the apartment. Petitioner, unfamiliar with the [425 Md. 10] deputies' style of dress and never having encountered such behavior from law enforcement officers before, “truly didn't believe that they were police officers.” She thought the men were criminals posing as sheriff's deputies. She therefore began to struggle against the two men in an attempt to escape the apartment.

Petitioner testified that she was sprayed with pepper spray, beaten with a baton, and had a portion of hair pulled from her scalp. Eventually Petitioner broke free, ran through the front doorway and into an adjoining hallway. She knocked on the doors of the residential units around her and called out for help. Temporarily blinded by the pepper spray, she eventually began to knock on the door of her own apartment where, for a second time, she encountered the two deputies. During that encounter, one or the other of the deputies again sprayed Petitioner and struck her on the forearm with a baton.

Petitioner ran from the doorway of her apartment, through the hallway, and into the surrounding parking lot. Deputies Falby and Henderson caught up with her there. They subdued and arrested Petitioner by “jerk[ing]” her arms behind her back and “bang[ing]” her head against a car. The deputies then helped Petitioner clean some of the pepper spray from her skin and retrieved clothes from her apartment for her to wear. Petitioner was made to change into those clothes in the parking lot, in full view of her neighbors.

The deputies escorted Petitioner to a hospital for “decontaminat[ion]” from the pepper spray, then transported her to jail and charged her with, inter alia, assault on a law enforcement officer and resisting arrest. The charges were nol prossed after neither deputy appeared for trial. Nevertheless, Petitioner lost her job at the emergency youth shelter because the charges appeared on her annual criminal background check.

The lawsuit

On November 27, 2007, Petitioner filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, naming as defendants Deputies Falby and Henderson and the State of Maryland.[425 Md. 11] She pleaded ten counts arising from the altercation, including: (1) violation of Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 26; (2) violation of Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 24; (3) false arrest; (4) trespass to land; (5) trespass to chattel/trover and conversion; (6) false imprisonment; (7) battery; (8) malicious prosecution; (9) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (10) civil conspiracy. After a period of discovery, during which Petitioner deposed both deputies, Petitioner amended the complaint to add two more counts: (11) negligent retention; and (12) negligent training and supervision, the count at the heart of the instant appeal. With regard to the claim of negligent training and supervision, Petitioner alleged that the “State has a duty to individuals such as [Petitioner] to properly train and supervise officers such that they

[38 A.3d 339]

do not violate the rights of citizens”; the State breached that duty by “failing and refusing to properly train and supervise” Deputies Falby and Henderson; the deputies “were trained that they may...