Jones v. State

Decision Date15 August 2012
Docket NumberNo. 4D10–2515.,4D10–2515.
Citation95 So.3d 426
PartiesAnthony L. JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Narine N. Austin, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melanie Dale Surber, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

TAYLOR, J.

Appellant, Anthony Jones, appeals his conviction for strong arm robbery. Because the trial court committed harmful error in allowing the lead detective to testify as to her interpretation of statements appellant made during a police interrogation, we reverse for a new trial.

At trial, the victim testified that three men on bicycles approached him at night and cornered him against a fence. The men were dressed in all black, wearing cut-off gloves and “hoodies,” with the hoods covering their heads. The man on the victim's right, later identified by the victim as appellant, took $180 cash from the victim's pocket and then pushed him down. The victim testified that this perpetrator's “hoodie” slipped back, showing the man's face and revealing that the man had braids or twists in his hair. The victim estimated that the man who pushed him was about 170 pounds, but the victim stated that it was difficult to tell. The victim acknowledged that he had been drinking before he was robbed.

After the robbers left the scene, the victim immediately called the police. Within ten minutes, a police officer found appellant riding a bicycle alone about five or six blocks from the location of the robbery. The victim was taken to the location where appellant was detained. He positively identified appellant as one of the robbers.

Appellant did not have the victim's money on him when he was arrested. When appellant was booked at the station, he weighed 145 pounds. Although appellant was wearing a black jacket, the jacket did not have a “hoodie.” While there was conflicting testimony as to the color of appellant's pants, the video interrogation appears to show that appellant was wearing jeans of a grayish color. The testifying officers could not specifically recall if appellant was wearing cut-off gloves or full gloves on the night of the robbery, but one officer—after having his recollection refreshed by video of appellant at the police station—testified that the gloves taken from appellant at the station appeared to be full-fingered gloves.

The lead detective interrogated appellant at the police station. During the interrogation, appellant never confessed to the crime. Appellant told the detective that he had just left his brother's girlfriend's house and maintained that he had nothing to do with the robbery. The detective used a ploy in an attempt to gain information, falsely telling appellant that the police had apprehended the other two robbers and that both of them had implicated appellant in the robbery. The following exchange then occurred:

DETECTIVE: ... If you want to add in your side of the story, that's great, man. If you don't, that's on you.

APPELLANT: Story to what, ma'am? I'm not going to put myself somewhere where I know I wasn't nowhere near.

DETECTIVE: Well, you already told me you ...

APPELLANT: ... I'm not fitting to put myself somewhere where I know I was nowhere.

DETECTIVE: You just told me exactly where you were.

APPELLANT: Leaving my brother girlfriend [sic] house.

DETECTIVE: Which is exactly where shit happened, so you're saying I'm not going to put myself where I wasn't. I never told you where this occurred. How can you assume it is not right there where it happened?

APPELLANT: I don't know where it happened.

DETECTIVE: See what I mean when you start to bullshit? You're like oh, I was just right here the entire time. I'm not putting myself where it didn't happen.

That implies that it happened in another location. That's why I'm saying how would you know that because I never said that? See what I mean?

APPELLANT: Yea. I see what you mean, but ... you're not fooling me.

After the tape was played at trial, the following exchange took place between the prosecutor and the detective:

STATE: When he indicates to you “I'm not going to put myself somewhere that I wasn't” and you state to him “Well, you just told me where you are,” what was the purpose of that?

DETECTIVE: ... I wanted to establish that he was saying that this is where I am. This is where I know I told you that I was. I know the crime occurred over here, but I'm not going to tell you that I know where the crime ... not put myself there.

Defense counsel immediately objected and moved to strike the detective's testimony regarding her interpretation of appellant's statement, but the trial court overruled the objection and allowed the detective to continue giving her answer:

DETECTIVE: ... Again, the same thing that I answered before, that I'm not going to put myself where the crime is, I was telling you where I happened to be at my brother's house,” that would indicate to me in my opinion that he knew then that the crime occurred somewhere else and not in front of the place where he told me that he was.

At the conclusion of trial, appellant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to five years in prison, followed by five years of probation.

On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by allowing the lead detective to offer her opinion, over appellant's objection, that the reason appellant said he was in another location was because he knew where the robbery took place. We agree with appellant's argument that this was highly prejudicial and improperly bolstered the state's case.

A trial court's decision on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Hudson v. State, 992 So.2d 96, 107 (Fla.2008). That discretion is, however, limited by the rules of evidence. Id.

“Generally, a lay witness may not testify in terms of an inference or opinion, because it usurps the function of the jury.” Floyd v. State, 569 So.2d 1225, 1231–32 (Fla.1990). For example, a witness's opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused is not admissible. Martinez v. State, 761 So.2d 1074, 1079 (Fla.2000). However, a lay witness may offer an opinion or inference about what the witness perceived if:

(1) The witness cannot readily, and with equal accuracy and adequacy, communicate what he or she has perceived to the trier of fact without testifying in terms of inferences or opinions and the witness's use of inferences or opinions will not mislead the trier of fact to the prejudice of the objecting party; and

(2) The opinions and inferences do not require a special knowledge, skill, experience, or training.

§ 90.701, Fla. Stat. (2009).

As a general rule, lay witnesses may not testify about their subjective interpretations...

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4 cases
  • Williams v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • July 15, 2020
    ...evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard; however, discretion is limited by the rules of evidence. Jones v. State , 95 So. 3d 426, 429 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).At trial, the detective gave his opinion that the shooter was a certain height and that the defendant and the shooter ......
  • McSweeney v. State, Case No. 2D18-2217
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • December 13, 2019
    ...to "testify about their subjective interpretations or conclusions as to the meaning of another person's statements." Jones v. State, 95 So. 3d 426, 429 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (citing Thorp v. State, 777 So. 2d 385, 395-96 (Fla 2000) ). Although the evidence rules permit a witness to interpret ......
  • Herring v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • January 29, 2014
    ...decision on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion, as limited by the rules of evidence. Jones v. State, 95 So.3d 426, 429 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). Under the Florida Evidence Code, a lay witness may testify about an opinion regarding the witness's perceptions if: (1) ......
  • Faust v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • August 15, 2012

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