Jones v. State

• Decision Date: 23 December 2013
• Docket Number: No. M2012–02546–SC–S09–CV.,M2012–02546–SC–S09–CV.
• Citation: 426 S.W.3d 50
• Parties: Zoyle JONES v. STATE of Tennessee.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

426 S.W.3d 50

Zoyle JONES

v.STATE of Tennessee.

No. M2012–02546–SC–S09–CV.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Nashville.

Oct. 2, 2013 Session.

Dec. 23, 2013.

Pamela S. Lorch, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, State of Tennessee.

Jeffery Scott Frensley, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Zoyle Jones.

OPINION

SHARON G. LEE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GARY R. WADE, C.J., and JANICE M. HOLDER, CORNELIA A. CLARK, and WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JJ., joined.

SHARON G. LEE, J.

The issue presented in this case is one of first impression: whether cabinet-level state executive officials are absolutely immune from defamation claims arising out of statements made while performing their official duties. An employee of the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) was disciplined for double-billing claims for his job-related travel expenses to both the state and a private organization. After the TDOC Commissioner responded to media inquiries about the employee's demotion for violating the state's travel billing policy, the employee sued the State of Tennessee and the TDOC for defamation. The State moved for summary judgment, asserting that the TDOC Commissioner had an absolute privilege to make the allegedly defamatory statements to the media. The Tennessee Claims Commission denied the State's motion. Upon review, we hold that the State is absolutely immune from the employee's defamation claims that relate to the TDOC Commissioner's statements in response to media inquiries about the employee's demotion. This ruling allows cabinet-level officials to perform their governmental duties free from legal harassment and uninhibited by the fear of potential lawsuits arising out of their job-related speech. It also furthers the vital free-expression principle that the public has a right to receive critical information from the government and its public officials, who must be free to speak with complete candor about matters of public importance. The judgment of the Claims Commission is reversed.

OPINION FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Zoyle Jones worked for the TDOC for twenty-seven years, beginning in 1985. From April 2003 through February 2009, he served as the TDOC's Director of Classification Programs. Among other things, Mr. Jones's duties required him to visit different penal institutions across the state.

While he was employed by the TDOC, Mr. Jones also served as the President of the Tennessee State Employees Association (“TSEA”), which is a private entity. Occasionally, Mr. Jones would travel both in his capacity as a Director of the TDOC and as the President of the TSEA. On many occasions, Mr. Jones claimed and received travel reimbursement from both the State of Tennessee and the TSEA for the same trips.

In late 2008, the TDOC's Office of Internal Affairs began investigating Mr. Jones's travel claims and reimbursements. By letter dated February 9, 2009, Mr. Jones was advised by TDOC Commissioner George Little that he was being investigated for falsifying travel reimbursement claims and for double-billing the TDOC and the TSEA for the same travel. The results of the investigation confirmed that on twelve occasions between June 2004 and August 2008, Mr. Jones had submitted travel claims to both entities. In the TDOC's view, these actions constituted theft, official misconduct, and a violation of the False Claims Act.¹ Mr. Jones was further advised that a hearing would be conducted on February 11, 2009, to determine the appropriate discipline.

At the February 11, 2009 hearing, Mr. Jones admitted that he had been reimbursed by both the TDOC and the TSEA for the same travel. On February 17, 2009, Commissioner Little sent Mr. Jones a letter informing him that “[i]t is a serious violation of State travel regulations to be reimbursed by the State and another entity for the same travel (in this case mileage). Moreover, the nature of these violations may rise to the level of a criminal matter.” The letter also informed Mr. Jones that he had been demoted to the lower-paying position of Correctional Counselor II and reassigned to the Tennessee Prison for Women.

Media outlets contacted Commissioner Little about Mr. Jones's alleged double-billing. In response to these media inquiries, the TDOC formally released the letters that Commissioner Little had previously sent to Mr. Jones on February 9th and 17th, both of which were public records within the meaning of Tenn.Code Ann. § 10–7–503 (2012).² Commissioner Little also spoke to different members of the media concerning Mr. Jones's demotion. One media outlet quoted Commissioner Little as saying: “At issue was the claim for full reimbursement over a period of several years that certainly was in violation of state travel regulations.” The substance of Commissioner Little's statements to the media was directly related to the content of the February 9th and February 17th letters that he had sent to Mr. Jones.

Rather than accept a demotion, Mr. Jones retired. On August 10, 2009, Mr. Jones filed a claim against both the State of Tennessee and the TDOC with the Tennessee Claims Commission seeking damages for defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and the disclosure of confidential information to the TSEA pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 9–8–307(a)(1)(N) (2012) and § 10–7–504(a)(8) (2012 & Supp.2013). In its answer to Mr. Jones's complaint, the State asserted numerous affirmative defenses, including that the statements published by Commissioner Little were absolutely privileged. The State also filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the defamation claim on the bases that: Commissioner Little's statements were absolutely privileged; the Claims Commission lacked jurisdiction over the false light invasion of privacy claim ³; and Tenn.Code Ann. § 10–7–504 does not provide a private cause of action.

The Claims Commission denied the State's motion for summary judgment on Mr. Jones's defamation claim. In denying the State's motion, the Claims Commission held that it had no authority to determine whether absolute immunity applied to Commissioner Little and found that there was a dispute of material fact regarding whether Commissioner Little acted with actual malice ⁴ in speaking to the press about his February 9 and February 17, 2009 letters. With respect to Mr. Jones's false light and statutory claims, however, the Claims Commission granted the State's motion for summary judgment, reasoning that it lacked jurisdiction to hear false light claims and that Tenn.Code Ann. § 10–7–504(a)(8) does not establish a private cause of action.

The Claims Commission granted the State's motion for interlocutory appeal, but the Court of Appeals denied the motion. The State filed a Tenn. R.App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal to this Court, which we granted.

ANALYSIS

This interlocutory appeal raises an important issue of first impression: whether cabinet-level state executive officials are absolutely immune from defamation claims arising out of statements made while performing their official duties.⁵ Defamation lawsuits serve a vital function by allowing aggrieved individuals to seek redress from false statements of fact that impugn their reputations. In the 1966 case Rosenblatt v. Baer, former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart eloquently expressed the societal importance of protecting individuals from reputational harm, noting that: “The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being—a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.” 383 U.S. 75, 92, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).

Despite the importance of protecting individuals from reputational harm, Tennessee law recognizes both absolute and qualified privileges as defenses to defamation claims in certain instances. Simpson Strong–Tie Co., Inc. v. Stewart, Estes & Donnell, 232 S.W.3d 18, 22 (Tenn.2007). “An absolute privilege is a total immunity granted on the basis of the speaker's position or status.” See Robert D. Sack, Sack on Defamation: Libel, Slander and Related Problems § 8.1 (4th ed.2012). Absolute privileges shield a defendant from liability for defamatory statements even when made with ill will, malice or some other improper purpose. Id. at § 8.2. Qualified privileges, on the other hand, shield defendants from liability for most defamatory statements, but can be overcome by a plaintiff's showing that the statements were made with actual malice or ill will. Id. at § 9.1. In this case, the State argues that this Court should adopt an absolute privilege for defamation claims against state executive officials. In contrast, Mr. Jones contends that this Court should adopt only a qualified privilege.

In Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959), the U.S. Supreme Court adopted an absolute privilege for federal executive officials who publish defamatory statements in the performance of their official duties. In a plurality opinion, Justice John Marshall Harlan expressed the following rationale:

It has been thought important that officials of government should be free to exercise their duties unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect of acts done in the course of those duties—suits which would consume time and energies which would otherwise be devoted to governmental service and the threat of which might appreciably inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies of government.

Id. at 571, 79 S.Ct. 1335. Justice Harlan further explained that the invocation of the absolute privilege represented “an expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government.” Id. at 572–73, 79 S.Ct. 1335.

In Barr, the Court held that absolute privilege applied to the acting director of a federal agency who had issued a press release about...