Jones v. State

• Decision Date: 16 May 2002
• Docket Number: No. CR 01-1095.,CR 01-1095.
• Citation: 74 S.W.3d 663,348 Ark. 619
• Parties: Lloyd C. JONES v. STATE of Arkansas.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

74 S.W.3d 663

348 Ark. 619

Lloyd C. JONES v. STATE of Arkansas.

No. CR 01-1095.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

May 16, 2002.

Bowden Law Firm, P.A., by: David O. Bowden, Little Rock, for appellant.

Mark Pryor, Att'y Gen., by: Clayton K. Hodges, Ass't Att'y Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

DONALD L. CORBIN, Justice.

Appellant Lloyd C. Jones appeals the judgment of the Sebastian County Circuit Court, Greenwood District, convicting him of the rape of his estranged wife and sentencing him to ten years' imprisonment. Jones raises four points for reversal, one of which is an issue that this court has not heretofore considered: Whether Arkansas law prohibits the rape of one spouse by another by means of forcible compulsion. Our jurisdiction of this appeal is pursuant to Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 1-2(b)(1). We find no merit to Jones's arguments, and we affirm.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

For his first point on appeal, Jones argues that there was not sufficient evidence to convict him of rape, and that the trial court erred in denying his directed-verdict motion. We treat a motion for a directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Branscum v. State, 345 Ark. 21, 43 S.W.3d 148 (2001); Stanton v. State, 344 Ark. 589, 42 S.W.3d 474 (2001). The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence that is of sufficient certainty and precision to compel a conclusion one way or the other and pass beyond mere suspicion or conjecture. Id. On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, considering only that evidence that supports the verdict. Id. Before we review the evidence presented below, we must address the point of procedure raised by the State.

The State argues that this point is procedurally barred because Jones's directed-verdict motion below did not specify the proof allegedly missing from the prosecutor's case. We disagree. The record reflects that Jones's attorney moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the State had failed to prove that there was coercion or that the rape actually occurred. Counsel admitted that sexual activity, and even deviate sexual activity had occurred between the two, but that Jones's "point is consensual." We view counsel's argument as a challenge to the proof submitted on the issue of forcible compulsion, which is the argument he makes on appeal. As such, we will review the merits of this point.

Jones was charged with the offense of rape pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 5-14-103 (Repl.1997). Particularly, the State charged that Jones engaged in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity with his estranged wife, Charis Jones, by forcible compulsion. "Forcible compulsion" is defined in Ark.Code Ann. § 5-14-101(2) (Repl.1997) as "physical force or a threat, express or implied, of death or physical injury to or kidnapping of any person." Charis testified that on the early morning of December 14, 2000, between 2:15 and 3:00 a.m., her husband Lloyd Jones broke into the trailer where Charis was living with her three children and a friend and her two children. According to Charis's testimony, she and Jones were separated at the time and had been since the week before Halloween 2000. On the date in question, she was asleep in her bed when she awoke to find Jones standing over her. Jones placed duct tape on her mouth and attempted to handcuff her, but he was unable to get the handcuffs on her completely. Jones also held a box cutter blade to her neck and told her that if she screamed or called to her roommate, Amy Gothard, he would kill the children and her roommate.

At some point, Charis was able to get the duct tape off her mouth. Jones did not retape her mouth. Jones then asked her to "suck on his penis." Charis agreed to do so. Jones then instructed Charis to bend over, and he inserted his penis into her anus. When he had finished engaging in anal intercourse, Jones went into the bathroom and cleaned off his penis. He then told Charis that he wanted her to perform oral sex again. When he tired of that, Jones asked to have vaginal intercourse with Charis, and she complied.

When asked by the prosecutor why she complied with Jones's requests for sex, Charis stated that she was afraid of Jones. When asked if she had consented to the sexual acts at any time during the incident, Charis stated that she had not. She explained that she let Jones do those things and she did not call for help or attempt to get away from him, because she "was scared that he was going to hurt us." She explained further that her fear stemmed from the fact that "he sat there and said he was going to do harm to my children and to my friend and her kids." Charis also stated that after they had vaginal intercourse, Jones told her that he was going to come and live with her in the trailer, and that they were going to be a family again. Charis testified further that Jones told her "that if I wanted out of the marriage by divorce I wouldn't get it because the only way to get out of our marriage was like our wedding vows is through death and I would have to die."

This court has repeatedly held that the uncorroborated testimony of a rape victim is sufficient to sustain a conviction. See, e.g., Russey v. State, 336 Ark. 401, 985 S.W.2d 316 (1999); Williams v. State, 331 Ark. 263, 962 S.W.2d 329 (1998); Freeman v. State, 331 Ark. 130, 959 S.W.2d 400 (1998). Accordingly, we could end our review of the evidence here. In this case, however, we have corroboration of the victim's testimony in the form of a custodial confession by Jones, which was played for the jury.

In his statement, Jones admitted that on the date in question, he broke into Charis's trailer, placed duct tape on her mouth, and threatened her with a box cutter. Although Jones claimed that the box cutter did not have a blade in it at the time, he admitted that he held the box cutter up to Charis's neck and told her that if she screamed, "[he] might harm her friend Amy." He admitted that Charis engaged in the sexual acts "out of fear and not because she wanted to." He also admitted that he had forced Charis to engage in similar sexual acts before, but he maintained that this was the only time that he had placed a knife to her throat. He admitted that he had a problem and he stated: "I would like for somebody to please help me get help, counseling, `cause I want counseling `cause I don't really understand why I am doing this, why I do this." This evidence certainly corroborates the victim's testimony that Jones forced her to engage in the sexual acts out of fear that he would harm her, her children, her friend, and her friend's children. Accordingly, we conclude that there was more than sufficient evidence to convict Jones of rape, and we affirm the trial court's denial of a directed verdict.

II. Rape Within the Marriage

For his second point for reversal, Jones raises an issue of first impression in this state, namely whether Arkansas law recognizes the crime of rape within a marriage. Jones contends that at common law in England, there was no crime of rape within a marriage. He asserts that this rule was based on the theory that consent to any and all sexual relations was deemed to have been given as part of the marriage contract. He asserts further that when the legislature enacted Ark.Code Ann. § 1-2-119 (Repl.1996), it thereby adopted the common law of England. Thus, he argues that the legislature has never specifically recognized the crime of rape between spouses. The State argues, and Jones does not dispute, that this point is procedurally barred because it was not raised in the trial court. See Ramaker v. State, 345 Ark. 225, 46 S.W.3d 519 (2001); Branscum, 345 Ark. 21, 43 S.W.3d 148. Notwithstanding, we reject Jones's argument on this point.

In adopting our Criminal Code, the General Assembly specifically declared: "The provisions of this code shall govern any prosecution for any offense defined by this code and committed after January 1, 1976." Ark.Code Ann. § 5-1-103(a) (Repl.1997). Section 5-14-103(a)(1), which is part of the Criminal Code, provides that a person commits the crime of rape by engaging in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity with another person by forcible compulsion. Under this section, a perpetrator is "[a] person" and the victim is "another person." Thus, on its face, this section is neutral both as to gender and as to the relationship, if any, between the perpetrator and the victim. This section controls all prosecutions for the crime of rape involving forcible compulsion, including those instances of forcible rape between spouses. Because the statute controls, the common law of England is irrelevant. Accordingly, we affirm on this issue.

III. Admissibility of Explicit Photographs under the Rape Shield Statute

For his third point on appeal, Jones argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the admission of several photographs that graphically depict the victim engaging in oral sex and various acts of masturbation. In his written motion, filed pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 16-42-101 (Repl.1999), Jones claimed that the photographic evidence was crucial to refute the allegations against him that he forced the victim to engage in deviate sexual acts. The trial court conducted an in camera hearing on the admissibility of the photographs, during which Jones testified that the photographs were taken by him on two different dates in June 2000. Jones identified himself as the other person in some of the photographs. At the conclusion of the hearing, the deputy prosecutor argued that the photographs were not relevant to the issue of the victim's consent on the night of the rape. He argued that the photographs were not in any way connected to the events of this case. Jones's attorney, on the other hand, argued that the photographs were relevant to...