Jones v. State
| Decision Date | 16 September 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 72135,72135 |
| Citation | 982 S.W.2d 386,1998 WL 618992 |
| Parties | George Alarick JONES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
On March 22, 1995, a Dallas County jury found appellant, George Alarick Jones, guilty of the April 13, 1993, capital murder of Forest J. Hall. 1 See Tex. Penal Code § 19.03(a)(2). At the punishment stage of trial, the jury answered the special issues in such a manner as to require the trial court to sentence appellant to death. See Article 37.071, § 2(b), (e), & (g). 2 Direct appeal to this Court was required by law. See Article 37.071, § 2(h). Appellant now brings eight points of error in his brief to this Court. We will affirm the judgment of the trial court. 3
In his first and second points of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting, over his objection, the State's challenge of veniremember Snyder for cause. Appellant argues that the State did not carry its burden of establishing that the challenge was proper under Article 35.16. The record reflects that the State, without citing any particular provision of Article 35.16, challenged Snyder under four different theories but that the trial court granted the challenge under only one of those theories, to wit: that Snyder would, in the words of the trial court, "start an accomplice witness behind other witnesses" with respect to credibility.
To show error in the trial court's grant of the State's challenge of Snyder for cause, appellant "must demonstrate one of two things: (1) the trial judge applied the wrong legal standard in sustaining the challenge, or (2) the trial judge abused [his] discretion in applying the correct legal standard." Vuong v. State, 830 S.W.2d 929, 943 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 997 113 S.Ct. 595, 121 L.Ed.2d 533 (1992). As an appellate court, we must uphold the trial court's decision if it was correct under any theory of law applicable to the case, even if the trial court gave an incorrect reason for its decision. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.Crim.App.1990).
The first theory that the State offered to the trial court in support of its challenge of Snyder was that "[t]his woman will never, ever give an accomplice's testimony the same weight and credibility that she will [give] other testimony." Appellant responded that Snyder had "only indicated that she would be skeptical" of an accomplice witness, "[b]ut that if she believed that person, she would give credence to their testimony." As noted previously, the trial court granted the State's challenge under this theory.
The record reflects that, during voir dire, the State informed Snyder that an "accomplice" was someone "who may have participated in the crime themselves or ... were there during the commission of the crime." Subsequently, the State, defense counsel, and the trial court all asked Snyder how she would view accomplice witness testimony. Snyder stated repeatedly, without equivocation or vacillation, that she would be more skeptical of an accomplice witness than of witnesses generally because she would always wonder about the accomplice's motivation for testifying. She also stated, however, that she could accept an accomplice's testimony, explaining that "it would just come down to whether or not I believed the individual."
In Hernandez v. State, 563 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Tex.Crim.App.1978), we held that a veniremember was challengeable for cause under Article 35.16(a)(8), for having a bias or prejudice in favor of or against the defendant, if the veniremember could not "impartially judge the credibility of the witnesses." 4 In that case, the veniremember stated that she would always believe police officers who testified at trial. Our holding in Hernandez, however, must not be interpreted to mean that a veniremember is challengeable for cause simply because he would be more skeptical of a certain category of witness than of witnesses generally. What we meant in Hernandez was that litigants are entitled to jurors who will be genuinely open-minded and persuadable, with no extreme or absolute positions regarding the credibility of any witness. We could not have meant that jurors must be completely impartial and free of any trace of skepticism toward any category of witness. Complete impartiality cannot be realized as long as human beings are called upon to be jurors. No person sitting as a juror can completely remove his own experiences, beliefs, and values, however hard he may try. Thus, Snyder was not challengeable for cause simply because she stated she would be more skeptical of accomplice witnesses than of witnesses generally. 5 She expressed no extreme or absolute position regarding the credibility of accomplice witnesses. In short, in granting the State's challenge for cause under the State's first theory, the trial court applied the wrong legal standard.
The State argues that Snyder was challengeable for cause under our holding in May v. State, 738 S.W.2d 261, 270-271 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 206, 98 L.Ed.2d 158 (1987). The State's reliance on May is misplaced, however. In that capital murder case, we held that a veniremember was challengeable under Article 35.16(b)(3), for having a bias or prejudice against a phase of the law upon which the State was entitled to rely, when she stated that she would always disregard an accomplice witness' testimony at the punishment stage of trial and would answer the special issues in such a manner that the defendant would receive a life sentence. Thus, May is easily distinguishable from the case at bar.
The second theory that the State offered to the trial court in support of its challenge of Snyder was that "she is going to require [the State to] prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a person is actually going to be outside the penitentiary before she is ever going to consider [the non-prison segment of society] to be a part of 'society' [for the purposes] of [punishment] question number one." See Article 37.071, § 2(b). Appellant responded that "[a]ll that [Snyder] is requiring is [for] the State [to] meet its burden of proof."
The record reflects that, in response to a leading question from the State, Snyder stated that it would be "reasonable" for a juror to require the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant would actually be out of prison at a certain time before that juror would consider the non-prison population to be part of "society" for the purposes of the first punishment issue. The State now argues that Snyder's answer rendered her challengeable under Article 35.16(b)(3).
Before a veniremember can be properly challenged under Article 35.16(b)(3), the law must be explained to him and he must be asked whether he can follow that law regardless of his personal views. Chambers v. State, 903 S.W.2d 21, 29 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). Here, no one explained to Snyder the law regarding the term "society" as used in the first punishment issue. The State should have explained to Snyder that the term "society" was not defined by statute and that, therefore, under Article 3.01, jurors must give the term the meaning that is ordinarily acceptable in common language, regardless of what the State proves at trial. Camacho v. State, 864 S.W.2d 524, 536 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1215, 114 S.Ct. 1339, 127 L.Ed.2d 687 (1994); Rougeau v. State, 738 S.W.2d 651, 660 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1029, 108 S.Ct. 1586, 99 L.Ed.2d 901 (1988). Because the relevant law was not explained to Snyder, she was not challengeable under the State's second theory.
The third theory that the State offered to the trial court in support of its challenge of Snyder was that she would "never consider prison to be part of 'society' " for the purposes of the first punishment issue. 6 Appellant responded that Snyder was not challengeable on the basis of her views regarding the meaning of "society" because no one had explained to her the law regarding that term.
The record reflects that, in response to a question from the trial court, Snyder stated that she would exclude the prison population from her definition of "society" when answering the first punishment issue. The State now argues that her statement rendered her challengeable under Article 35.16(b)(3). As we noted previously, however, no one ever explained to Snyder the law regarding the meaning of the term "society." Therefore, she was not challengeable under the State's third theory, either.
The fourth and final theory that the State offered to the trial court in support of its challenge of Snyder was that "this juror is going to impose a higher burden of proof on the State of Texas from the get-go" at both stages of trial. Appellant responded that "once they showed her what the law is, she said that she could follow the law." The trial court then expressly ruled against the State on this theory.
The record reflects that, initially, Snyder stated that she would hold the State to a standard of proof higher than beyond a reasonable doubt. However, once the legal definition of "reasonable doubt" was explained to her, 7 Snyder was unwavering in stating that she would follow the law and hold the State only to that standard at both stages of trial. On this record, therefore, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant the State's challenge under its fourth theory.
In view of the preceding analysis, it is clear that the trial court erred in granting the State's challenge of veniremember Snyder for cause. The next question is whether the judgment should be reversed because of the...
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