Jones v. State, 2324

• Decision Date: 29 October 1969
• Docket Number: No. 2324,2324
• Citation: Jones v. State, 227 So.2d 326 (Fla. App. 1969)
• Parties: Willie Frank JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 326

227 So.2d 326

Willie Frank JONES, Appellant, v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2324.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Oct. 29, 1969.

C. Lavon Ward, Public Defender, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Charles W. Musgrove, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

McCAIN, Judge.

As we unsheathed the sword forged by the Supreme Court of the United States in Bruton ¹ to slice into a judgment of guilt where confessions of three co-defendants who did not testify were admitted into evidence over timely objections, we were visited with an Armageddon in the form of Harrington ² where the same court now pronounces that where evidence of guilt is otherwise 'overwhelming' the admission into evidence of such co-confessions is to be considered only harmless error.

If such were the reasoning of Bruton it could have been easily stated.Some jurisdictions have reached this conclusion in analogous situations.³The consonant note however sounded by Bruton echoes the commission of constitutional error by use of such co-confessions, exemplified by the following language:

'* * * Not only are the incriminations devastating to the defendant but their credibility is inevitably suspect, a fact recognized when accomplices do take the stand and the jury is instructed to weigh their testimony carefully given the recognized motivation to shift blame onto others.The unreliability of such evidence is intolerably compounded when the alleged accomplice, as here, does not testify and cannot be tested by cross-examination.It was against such threats to a fair trial that the Confrontation Clause was directed.* * * * * * It was enough that that procedure posed 'substantial threats to a defendant's constitutional rights to have an involuntary confession entirely disregarded and to have the coercion issue fairly and reliably determined.These hazards we cannot ignore.'* * * Here the introduction of Evans' confession posed a substantial threat to petitioner's right to confront the witnesses against him, and this is a hazard we cannot ignore.Despite the concededly clear instructions to the jury to disregard Evans' inadmissible hearsay evidence inculpating petitioner, in the context of a joint trial we cannot accept limiting instructions as an adequate substitute for petitioner's constitutional right of cross-examination.The effect is the same as if there had been no instruction at all. * * *'

This would normally lead to the singular conclusion that irrespective of the presence of a defendant's inculpatory statement, prejudicial error is committed by the use of confessions of co-defendants who do not testify.⁴The dissent in Bruton similarly construed the opinion by stating:

'* * * (T)heCourt now holds this instruction insufficient and reverses Bruton's conviction.It would apparently also reverse every other case where a court admits a codefendant's confession implicating a defendant, regardless of cautionary instructions and regardless of the circumstances.I dissent from this excessively rigid rule. * * *

'The Court concedes that there are many instances in which reliance on limiting instructions is justified--'(N)ot every admission of inadmissible hearsay or other evidence can be considered to be reversible error unavoidable through limiting instruction; instances occur in almost every trial where inadmissible evidence creeps in, usually inadvertently.'Ante, at 1627.The Court asserts, however, that the hazards to the defendant of permitting the jury to hear a co-defendant's confession implicating him are so severe that we must assume the jury's inability to heed a limiting instruction.* * * There are good reasons, however, for distinguishing the co-defendant's confession from that of the defendant himself and for trusting in the jury's ability to disregard the former when instructed to do so.'

Any argument that Bruton's reference to the nonprejudicial nature of some forms of hearsay is sufficient to circumvent reversal, would also normally be dispelled by its pronouncement that:

'* * * Nevertheless, as was recognized in Jackson v. Denno, supra, there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. * * *'

Harrington now compels us to gauge and weigh the adverse effect of the use of co-confessions against other 'overwhelming' evidence of guilt.Although we believe Bruton construed this Violation of a...