Jones v. State

• Decision Date: 03 July 1962
• Docket Number: No. 260,260
• Citation: 182 A.2d 784,229 Md. 165
• Parties: Alexander JONES v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 165

229 Md. 165

182 A.2d 784

Alexander JONES v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 260.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 3, 1962.

Josiah F. Henry, Jr., and Tucker R. Dearing, Baltimore, for appellant.

Robert S. Bourbon, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Thomas B. Finan, Atty. Gen., Saul A. Harris and Charles E. Moylan, Jr., State's Atty. and Asst. State's Atty., respectively, for Baltimore City, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Before BRUNE, C. J., and HENDERSON, HAMMOND, HORNEY, and MARBURY, JJ.

HORNEY, Judge.

The defendant-appellant, Alexander (Punky) Jones, was found guilty, by a jury in the Criminal Court of Baltimore, of murder in the first degree, and, from the judgment and sentence entered on the verdict, has appealed to this Court.

Abraham Givner (the victim) was shot to death in his place of business on March 2, 1960, during a holdup perpetrated by the defendant and others. But the defendant, due to the lack of evidence, was not taken into custody on a charge of murder until June 3, 1960, when he was brought to the Central District Station for interrogation from the House of Correction, where he was incarcerated for another offense. Several days prior to the arrest of the defendant, the police received information tending to implicate the defendant in the robbery and murder of the victim in the course of questioning Robert Galloway White about another homicide case. ¹

On the date he was brought to the police station, the defendant was questioned from time to time from 10:40 a. m. to 7:00 p. m., but the interrogations were not continuous. He was served with food at 11:40 a. m. He was placed in the cellblock from 12:50 p. m. to 1:20 p. m. And he was fed again at about 5 p. m. During the rest of the period the defendant remained in the presence of the interrogating officers, but there were several other interruptions or breaks in the investigative process. As a result of the interrogations the defendant made two statements. The first statement was taken in shorthand beginning at 4:00 p. m. In this statement, the defendant denied having any connection with the killing of the victim. But in the second statement (also taken in shorthand and transcribed along with the first), which was begun at about 5:15 p. m., after he had been confronted with Robert Galloway White, the defendant admitted that he had participated in the commission of the crime. The typed statements were read to him and signed at about 7:00 p. m.

Both statements were admitted in evidence at the trial over objection, but, for some unexplained reason, copies of the statements, and not the originals, were admitted in evidence. Contrary to the practice in Baltimore City, but pursuant to an agreement between the State and the defendant, the preliminary inquiry as to the voluntary character of the statements was held in the presence of the jury. And in the course of the trial when, on cross examination, the prosecuting attorney inquired of the defendant, who professed the Islamic faith, if it was not one of the tenets of that faith 'to kill half of the people in this country and take it over,' the defendant explained that he was orthodox and did not adhere to any such doctrine and that he had 'no intentions of killing nobody,' but he did not then claim that he had been prejudiced by the examination, nor did he object to the remarks or move to strike them out, or request a mistrial; and the trial court did not of its own volition advise the jury to disregard what the prosecutor had said. Subsequently, the murder weapon and several cartridges were admitted in evidence after one of the police officers had testified that the defendant had identified the weapon as his.

There were no motions for a directed verdict or objections to the advisory instructions of the trial court.

Five errors have been assigned as the bases for this appeal: (i) that the inculpatory statement of confession was 'involuntary and extracted by methods violative of the Fourteenth Amendment'; (ii) that it was reversible error to allow evidence of the voluntary character of the confession to be taken in the presence of the jury; (iii) that the cross examination of the defendant as to the tenets of his religious faith was so prejudicial as to deprive him of his right to a fair trial; (iv) that it was error to admit the murder weapon as an exhibit; and (v) that it was error to admit copies of the statements into evidence without showing why the originals could not be produced.

(i)

The appellant, though admitting that no force or violence was used to induce him to make either of the statements, contends that the inculpatory statement or confession was not his free and voluntary act.

The first complaint is that the confession was obtained without warning as to his rights and without benefit 'of the advice of friends, family or counsel,' but there is nothing in the record to show that he ever requested, or was denied, permission to consult anyone. Even if counsel had been asked for and denied (and the same could be said with respect to a friend or a member of one's family), that circumstance alone, absent a showing that the confession was not the free and voluntary act of the defendant, would not make it inadmissible, Presley v. State, 224 Md. 550, 168 A.2d 510 (1961); Driver v. State, 201 Md. 25, 92 A.2d 570 (1952); Day v. State, 196 Md. 384, 76 A.2d 729 (1950). See also Jones v. State, 188 Md. 263, 52 A.2d 484 (1947).

The appellant also complains of the length of the interrogation and contends that the 'more than seven hours of inquisition' invalidated the confession. We do not agree. 'It is well settled in this State that lengthy interrogation in and of itself does not makes a confession involuntary in the absence of a showing that such interrogation, or other cause violative of the right to due process, had overpowered the will of the accused to resist making a statement that he would not otherwise have made.' Ralph v. State, 226 Md. 480, 485, 174 A.2d 163, 166 (1961). And compare Hyde v. State, 228 Md. 209, 179 A.2d 421 (1962). The defendant cited Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224 (1948), to support the contention that the prolonged questioning was coercive, but the circumstances in that case are quite different from the facts in this case. There the police, working in relays, had questioned the inexperienced fifteen year old boy relentlessly hour after hour, from midnight until dawn. But here, where there had been periods of respite from questioning and the defendant had been fed twice, there is nothing in the record to show either physical or mental exhaustion, or that the defendant ever complained that he was tired and needed rest. Nor is there anything to indicate or even suggest that the will of the defendant, (who, though lacking book learning, was nevertheless schooled in the things and ways of the criminal world), had been so overpowered that he was unable to resist making the inculpatory statement he gave the police.

The final contention with respect to the involuntary character of the confession is that it was procured by threats and inducements. Testifying in his own behalf at the preliminary inquiry involving the voluntary character of the confession, the defendant claimed that the police had threatened to charge his pregnant common law wife 'with the gun' in order to induce him to sign the statement; that he did not read the statements (because he could not read), but had signed them upon being informed that they concerned the ownership and possession of the gun; and that the police had brought his 'wife' to the police station for the purpose of having her tell him that she was going to be held in connection with the possession of the gun. But other than the fact that the common law wife was at the police station while the defendant was being questioned, there was no corroboration of any of these claims. And while the record shows that the interrogating officers were not recalled to the stand after the defendant had testified concerning the threats and inducements he claimed were made to him, the record is clear that all four of the officers had repeatedly testified, on direct, as well as on cross examination in reply to the usual questions propounded in similar preliminary inquiries involving the admissibility of a confession, to the effect that no promises, threats or inducements had been made to the defendant to get him to make the statements; and at least one of the officers testified that the defendant had been advised that any statement he made 'must be free and voluntary' and that 'no one would threaten him or harm him.' Besides this, the police stenographer corroborated the fact that no 'threats or promises' had been made to the defendant while she was stenographically recording the statements. It undoubtedly would have been more satisfactory had the officers been recalled to refute the claimed threats and inducements, but it does not follow that failure to do so made the confession inadmissible. After all, regardless of the order of proof, the court was obliged to decide preliminarily, on the conflicting evidence presented, whether there was sufficient proof of a threat or inducement to make the confession involuntary and therefore inadmissible. The court found there was not, and we cannot say that it erred in so doing. And although the common law wife was at the police station, there is nothing to show how she got there or why she was present, and it is not disputed that the...