Jones v. State

Citation727 S.E.2d 456,291 Ga. 35,12 FCDR 1605
Decision Date07 May 2012
Docket NumberNo. S11G1054.,S11G1054.
PartiesJONES v. The STATE.
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia

291 Ga. 35
727 S.E.2d 456
12 FCDR 1605

JONES
v.
The STATE.

No. S11G1054.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

May 7, 2012.


[727 S.E.2d 457]


Gregory Allen Willis, Head, Thomas, Webb & Willis, LLC, for appellant.

Natalie Ashman, Assistant Solicitor–General, Robert Stokely, Solicitor–General, Stephen James Tuggle, Sandra Nadeau Wisenbaker, Kimberly Danielle Sewell, Assistant Solicitor–Generals, for appellee.


HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice.

[291 Ga. 35]Michael Jeffery Jones was convicted of driving under the influence, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. [291 Ga. 36]Jones v. State, 308 Ga.App. XXII (Case No. A10A2092) (decided March 9, 2011). We granted the writ of certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court's denial of Jones's motion to suppress and his request for a subpoena. Because we hold that the arresting officer's detention of Jones was a seizure and there was no evidence that the officer had reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop, we reverse.

While participating in a Georgia State Patrol roadblock in Coweta County just after midnight on March 14, 2009, a trooper observed a sports utility vehicle make an abrupt right turn into the parking lot of a small strip shopping center where all the businesses were closed. Deciding to investigate, the trooper turned around his car and activated his lights as he drove to the parking lot. Before reaching it, he saw a truck that was driven by Jones turn into it. The trooper blocked the lot's exit as Jones was turning around and pulling up behind the SUV. The trooper approached the SUV's driver, who said she thought there had been a traffic accident and she was turning around to avoid it. He decided to let her go, but asked her to wait until he had spoken to the driver behind her. He then walked back to Jones's truck to see why Jones had turned into the parking lot. Smelling a strong odor of alcohol and marijuana through the truck's open window, the trooper told Jones that he was allowing the SUV to leave, but that Jones should remain. After moving his car and releasing the first driver, the trooper returned to Jones and asked him to perform several field sobriety tests. During the tests, the trooper observed signs of impairment, and Jones also tested positive for alcohol

[727 S.E.2d 458]

on the portable alco-sensor machine. As a result, the trooper arrested Jones for DUI.

Jones filed a motion in limine to exclude the results of the state-administered chemical and field sobriety tests on the grounds that the trooper lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to stop and detain him. The trooper testified at the suppression hearing that the parking lot was divided by a grass median and each side had a driveway that served as both the entrance and exit to that side of the parking lot. He further testified that he had blocked the exit to stop the SUV from leaving and “there is no way [Jones's] truck could have exited until I got through dealing with the first vehicle.” The trial court found “there was only one way in and one way out” of the parking lot and Jones had voluntarily stopped his truck behind the SUV. Denying the motion to suppress, the trial court ruled that the trooper's initial encounter with Jones was a first-tier, citizen-police encounter and not a traffic stop. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

1. When the evidence at a suppression hearing is uncontroverted and the credibility of witnesses is not in question, we conduct a de [291 Ga. 37]novo review of the trial court's application of the law to the undisputed facts. Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319, 320(1), 443 S.E.2d 474 (1994). To the extent an issue concerns a mixed question of fact and law, we accept...

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54 cases
  • Mitchell v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • June 26, 2017
    ...credibility unless they are clearly erroneous, but independently apply the law to the facts.(Citations omitted.) Jones v. State, 291 Ga. 35, 36-37 (1), 727 S.E.2d 456 (2012). And we consider the officer's conduct of the traffic stop in its entirety. Cf. State v. Allen, supra, 298 Ga. at 1, ......
  • Wright v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • July 15, 2016
    ...court's application of the law to undisputed facts when ruling on such a motion is reviewed de novo. Id. ; see also Jones v. State , 291 Ga. 35, 36–37, 727 S.E.2d 456 (2012) (where “the evidence at a suppression hearing is uncontroverted and the credibility of witnesses is not in question, ......
  • State v. Allen
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • November 2, 2015
    ...often be a fact-intensive determination, but it is ultimately a holding of constitutional law that we review de novo. See Jones v. State, 291 Ga. 35, 36–37, 727 S.E.2d 456 (2012) ("To the extent [a suppression] issue concerns a mixed question of fact and law, we accept the trial court's fin......
  • Hernandez-Espino v. State, A13A1434.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 19, 2013
    ...order suggested that it questioned the credibility of the officer, who was the sole testifying witness. See Jones v. State, 291 Ga. 35, 36–37(1), 727 S.E.2d 456 (2012) (“When the evidence at a suppression hearing is uncontroverted and the credibility of witnesses is not in question, we cond......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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