Jones v. State

• Decision Date: 24 December 1991
• Docket Number: No. 89-53,89-53
• Citation: 479 N.W.2d 265
• Parties: Ferman JONES, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 265

479 N.W.2d 265

Ferman JONES, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.

No. 89-53.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 24, 1991.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 19, 1992.

Thomas T. Tarbox of Smith, Schneider, Stiles, Mumford, Schrage, Zurek, Wimer & Hudson, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Bonnie J. Campbell, Atty. Gen., Ann E. Brenden, Asst. Atty. Gen., Thomas J. Ferguson, County Atty., and Joseph R. Gunderson, Asst. County Atty., for appellee.

Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and HARRIS, CARTER, NEUMAN, and ANDREASEN, JJ.

McGIVERIN, Chief Justice.

Applicant Ferman Jones, Jr., filed an application for postconviction relief wherein he alleged numerous errors concerning his 1981 conviction for second-degree murder. See Iowa Code §§ 663A.2, 663A.3 (1983). The district court denied the application and Jones has appealed. We affirm.

I. Background facts and proceedings. In early 1981, Jones and Daniel Elam were charged with first-degree murder for the shotgun slaying of Chris Stevens. Jones' case went to trial before Elam's, and Jones was convicted of second-degree murder for aiding and abetting Elam in Stevens' murder. See Iowa Code §§ 703.1, 707.1, 707.3 (1981). Elam subsequently was convicted of first-degree murder. See Iowa Code §§ 707.1, 707.2. Our court of appeals affirmed Jones' conviction.

In September 1984, Jones filed his application for postconviction relief. ¹ See Iowa Code §§ 663A.2, 663A.3 (1983). He claims: (1) that he was denied effective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel due to his counsels' failures to have his trial continued until after Elam's trial; (2) that he is entitled to a new trial due to newly discovered evidence; and (3) that he is entitled to a new trial due to prosecutorial misconduct.

After a hearing, the postconviction court denied Jones' application. Jones has now appealed. See Iowa Code § 663A.9 (1989). On this appeal, he also contends that he is entitled to a second postconviction trial because he was allegedly incompetent at the time of his original postconviction hearing.

We, now, conclude that Jones is not entitled to a second postconviction hearing, and affirm the postconviction court's denial of Jones' application.

II. Claim for a second postconviction hearing. As an initial matter, Jones claims that the postconviction court erred in proceeding with his postconviction hearing. He argues that he was incompetent at the time of the hearing and thus unable to assist his attorney in his case. He therefore claims that he is entitled to a second postconviction hearing. We disagree.

A. Iowa Code chapter 812 outlines procedures for confinement of mentally ill or dangerous persons. More specifically, section 812.3 provides, in part, as follows:

If at any stage of a criminal proceeding it reasonably appears that the defendant is suffering from a mental disorder which prevents the defendant from appreciating the charge, understanding the proceedings, or assisting effectively in the defense, further proceedings must be suspended and a hearing had upon that question.

(Emphasis supplied.) Additionally, section 812.4 provides, in part, as follows:

If, upon hearing conducted by the court, the accused is found to be incapacitated in the manner described in section 812.3, no further proceedings shall be taken under the complaint or indictment until the accused's capacity is restored....

(Emphasis supplied.)

Jones argues that, because he was allegedly suffering from a mental illness at the time of his postconviction relief hearing, the hearing should have been suspended in accord with Iowa Code sections 812.3 and 812.4. We disagree with Jones' contention because we do not believe that chapter 812 applies to postconviction relief proceedings under Iowa Code chapter 663A.

This conclusion is supported by the general rule that postconviction relief proceedings are not criminal proceedings, but rather are civil in nature and are triable at law to the court. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556-57, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 1994, 95 L.Ed.2d 539, 547 (1987); Emery v. Fenton, 266 N.W.2d 6, 10 (Iowa 1978); 18 Am.Jur.2d Coram Nobis, §§ 45-46, at 672-74 (1985); 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law, § 1612, at 216 (1989). Many of the constitutional safeguards guaranteed an individual in criminal trial proceedings are not granted to such an individual in subsequent postconviction proceedings. See Fuhrmann v. State, 433 N.W.2d 720, 722 (Iowa 1988) (attorney need not always be appointed to represent an individual postconviction applicant) (citing Finley, 481 U.S. at 555, 107 S.Ct. at 1993, 95 L.Ed.2d at 545); Sallis v. Rhoads, 325 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Iowa 1982) (no absolute right to appear at postconviction hearing); Hahn v. State, 306 N.W.2d 764, 767 (Iowa 1981) (no right to compulsory process at postconviction hearing); Patterson v. State, 294 N.W.2d 683, 685 (Iowa 1980) (postconviction hearing need not always include applicant's own testimony); State v. Gruber, 281 N.W.2d 636, 639 (Iowa 1979) (no right to a hearing in postconviction proceedings for every allegation); Watts v. State, 257 N.W.2d 70, 71 (Iowa 1977) (burden of proof is on applicant in postconviction proceedings to show error by a preponderance of the evidence).

Furthermore, our conclusion that chapter 812 does not apply to proceedings under chapter 663A is supported by the plain language of sections 812.3 and 812.4, which we believe evidences a legislative intent that postconviction proceedings not be subject to suspension due to a claimed lack of competence by the postconviction applicant. Section 812.3 specifically applies to criminal proceedings where a defendant does not appreciate the charges against him, or is prevented from assisting in his defense. As stated above, postconviction relief proceedings are not "criminal proceedings" involving "charges" and a "defense." They are collateral actions initiated by an incarcerated individual challenging a prior conviction. Additionally, section 812.4 provides that, upon a court's finding of an accused's incapacitation, "no further proceedings shall be taken under the complaint or indictment." No "complaints" or "indictments" are involved in postconviction relief proceedings; such proceedings are initiated by an individual's filing of an application with the district court. See Iowa Code § 663A.3 (1991). "Complaints" and "indictments" initiate the State's criminal prosecution of an accused. See, e.g., Iowa Code §§ 802.8(1), 804.1.

B. Jones also claims that he is entitled to a second postconviction hearing because a guardian should have been appointed to assist him in his defense pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 12. Rule 12 provides that "[a]n action of ... any person judicially adjudged incompetent shall be brought by his guardian...." Jones may not avail himself of this provision, however, because at no time before his postconviction hearing was he ever "judicially adjudged incompetent." Additionally, he did have an attorney to represent him during all postconviction proceedings.

C. In any event, we do not believe that Jones' mental condition entitles him to a second postconviction hearing. As a general rule, a competency hearing is required if the "record contains information from which a reasonable person would believe a substantial question of the defendant's competency exists." State v. Kempf, 282 N.W.2d 704, 706 (Iowa 1979); see also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S.Ct. 896, 903, 43 L.Ed.2d 103, 112-13 (1975) (one who lacks capacity to understand proceedings against him or to aid in his defense may not be subjected to a trial). A criminal defendant is initially presumed to have been competent. State v. Pedersen, 309 N.W.2d 490, 496 (Iowa 1981). The burden is on that defendant to establish otherwise; if the evidence is in equipoise, the presumption of competency prevails. Id. Our task on our de novo review is to examine the totality of the circumstances to determine if, at the relevant time, a substantial question of the applicant's competency reasonably appeared. Kempf, 282 N.W.2d at 707. The relevant factors to consider include: (1) the applicant's irrational behavior; (2) any demeanor at the hearing which suggests a competency problem; and (3) any prior medical opinion, of which the trial court is aware, on competence to stand trial. State v. Myers, 460 N.W.2d 458, 460 (Iowa 1990). Although Jones presented a history of mental illness to the postconviction court, it is well-established that the mere presence of mental illness does not equate to incompetency to stand trial. Hickey v. District Court of Kossuth County, 174 N.W.2d 406, 410 (Iowa 1970).

Based upon our review of the record as it existed at the time of the postconviction hearing, we conclude that the postconviction court did not err in failing to sua sponte order a competency hearing. Jones' present claim of incompetency at the time of the hearing is belied by the rationality and coherence he displayed to the postconviction court. Jones spoke in full sentences, explained the events of the night of Stevens' murder and Jones' involvement with Elam, and indicated that he understood the questions being asked of him. We find no evidence of any irrational behavior in the record, and note that Jones had the ability to aid his attorney by directing, albeit unartfully, that certain questions be asked, by asking the State's attorney whether Jones had received all of the exculpatory evidence which was available, and by directing that his counsel re-open the proceedings after Jones had rested.

We also find it significant that neither Jones, nor his attorney, nor the trial court requested a competency determination at the time of the hearing. See State v. Lucas, 323 N.W.2d 228, 233 (Iowa 1982); State v. Lyon, 293 N.W.2d 8, 12 (Iowa 1980); State v. Stoddard, 180 N.W.2d 448, 451 (Iowa 1970). Although this failure cannot alone preclude a subsequent competency challenge on grounds of error preservation, Pate v....