Jones v. State
Decision Date | 03 March 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 577S319,577S319 |
Citation | 267 Ind. 680,372 N.E.2d 1182 |
Parties | Aaron Thomas JONES, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Stephen M. Sherman, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Wesley T. Wilson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
After trial by jury, Defendant (Appellant) was convicted on two counts of Commission of a Felony While Armed, to-wit: Armed Robbery, Ind.Code § 35-12-1-1 (Burns 1975). He was sentenced to ten years imprisonment for Count I, and twenty years imprisonment for Count II. This direct appeal presents the following issues:
(1) Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain the verdicts.
(2) Whether the trial court committed error by failing to submit a pre-sentence report for the jury's consideration.
(3) Whether the trial court committed fundamental error by allowing the defendant, while in the presence of the jury, to state his reason for refusing to testify in his own behalf.
The evidence most favorable to the State indicates that as one employee of the victimized grocery store was operating the cash register and the second employee was stocking a soda pop cooler, the defendant was standing in line at the check-out counter. The second employee, David Holman, noticed the defendant and initially thought that he was an acquaintance, but realized his mistake. The defendant then left the store, joined an accomplice who had been standing on the sidewalk outside the store, and the two then entered together. Defendant's accomplice thrust a handgun against Holman's back, prodded him to the back of the store, and ordered him to lie down. The accomplice then took cash and a watch from Holman.
While this was occurring, the defendant confronted the employee at the cash register, Jim Robinson, and ordered him to empty the cash drawer into a bag. Although Robinson never saw the defendant with a gun, he saw that defendant's accomplice had a gun. The defendant kept his hand drawn within the sleeve of his coat and acted as if he had a gun. The defendant threatened Robinson, saying "You mess up, I'll blow your head off."
The defendant and his accomplice made off with approximately four hundred twenty dollars and two cartons of cigarettes belonging to the proprietor of the store, and thirty or forty dollars and the watch which belonged to Holman.
Several days following the robbery, Holman went to the Marion County Police Department to view a collection of photographs in an attempt to identify the robbers. He was unable to do so on that occasion, but after the grocery had been robbed again, Holman was able to pick defendant's photograph out of a group of pictures he had not seen the first time. Subsequent to defendant's arrest, both Holman and Robinson viewed a five-man lineup, and they each independently identified the defendant as one of the robbers.
Upon a review for the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court will consider only that evidence of probative value which is favorable to the State, together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. If such evidence establishes each necessary element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not be disturbed. Baum v. State (1976), Ind., 345 N.E.2d 831. This Court will not judge the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. Rosell v. State (1976), Ind., 352 N.E.2d 750.
Defendant argues that the evidence identifying him as one of the robbers, at the scene of the crime and in possession of a gun, is equivocal and insubstantial, but we do not agree. He relies on this Court's holding in Meadows v. State (1968), 252 Ind. 1, 238 N.E.2d 281. In that case, which was reversed for an insufficiency of evidence, the only evidence of guilt was the uncorroborated and equivocal testimony of the prosecuting witness. The prosecuting witness was a mental patient who alternately stated that Defendant did and did not commit the act of sodomy. The reversal was merely an application of Indiana's rule that a mere scintilla of evidence will not sustain a conviction.
In the instant case, both eye-witnesses positively, and independently, identified the defendant. Although there was no direct evidence that Defendant was armed, there was ample circumstantial evidence from which it would be reasonably inferred that he carried a gun. Ind.Code § 35-12-1-1 states, "Any person who * * * commits * * * any felony armed with any dangerous or deadly weapon, or while any other person is present and aiding or assisting in committing * * * such felony is armed * * * shall be guilty of a separate felony." (Emphasis added). See also, George v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 344, 247 N.E.2d 823; Roberts v. State (1964), 245 Ind. 185, 197 N.E.2d 304.
Defendant also contends that the State's evidence was not sufficient to withstand his alibi evidence, which was not directly rebutted. The State, however, does not bear the burden to directly rebut a defendant's alibi. Rather, the jury is warranted in disbelieving an alibi if the State's evidence in chief is such as to render the disbelief reasonable. Casterlow v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 214, 267 N.E.2d 552.
Defendant claims that his sentences of ten years for one armed robbery conviction and twenty years for the other, were arbitrary and capricious. He argues that Ind.Code § 35-4.1-4-9 (Burns 1975), which provides:
"No defendant convicted of a felony shall be sentenced before a written presentence report is prepared by a probation officer and considered by the sentencing court * * *."
should be applied when the sentence is determined by the jury, as well as when it is determined by the judge. In essence, he makes the same argument as was made in the recent case of Pulliam v. State (1976), Ind., 345 N.E.2d 229. We there held contrary to his position, saying:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Lucas v. State
...is a correct statement of the law, it is not well articulated as an instruction. The statement was taken from Jones v. State, (1978) 267 Ind. 680, 686, 372 N.E.2d 1182, 1185, but it was addressed to the reader, not to the jury, as an instruction. We have held that if requested, a defendant ......
-
Tapp v. State
...supra; Cammack v. State, supra. On review, this court will not weigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Jones v. State, (1978) Ind., 372 N.E.2d 1182; Walton v. State, (1980) Ind., 398 N.E.2d 667. We shall consider only the evidence most favorable to the state and all reason......
-
Potter v. State
...this argument refer to situations where the State or the court has made the potentially damaging comments. See Jones v. State, 267 Ind. 680, 372 N.E.2d 1182, 1185 (1978); see also United States v. Guerrero, 938 F.2d 725 (7th Cir.1991) (noting that a perusal of federal case law also showed t......
-
Lambert v. State, 1285S520
...of witness credibility, the jury was free to disbelieve either the prosecuting witness or the alibi evidence. Jones v. State (1978), 267 Ind. 680, 372 N.E.2d 1182. We cannot substitute our appellate impressions for such jury credibility determinations. It was the jury's role to evaluate the......