Jones v. State

Decision Date02 February 2018
Docket NumberSC 19725
Citation328 Conn. 84,177 A.3d 534
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
Parties Melvin JONES v. STATE of Connecticut

Allison M. Near, assigned counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Michael O. Sheehan, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).

Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state's attorney, with whom were Stacey M. Miranda, senior assistant state's attorney, and, on the brief, Patrick J. Griffin, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Rogers, C.J., and Palmer, Eveleigh, McDonald, Robinson, D'Auria and Espinosa, Js.*

D'AURIA, J.

Opinion

In October, 1990, the petitioner, Melvin Jones, was arrested and charged with the murder of Wayne Curtis, who had been found shot to death in New Haven just a few days before the petitioner's arrest. The case was tried to a jury, which found the petitioner guilty. Nearly twenty years after the crime occurred, in 2010, certain pieces of evidence from the petitioner's trial were tested for the presence of DNA pursuant to an agreement with the state. He later relied on that testing to petition for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. In his petition, he claimed that the new DNA testing demonstrated that he did not commit the murder. The trial court disagreed, concluding that the new DNA results, although valid, failed to establish that the new evidence would likely produce a different result in a new trial. The Appellate Court, reviewing the trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion, upheld that decision. Jones v. State , 165 Conn. App. 576, 604, 140 A.3d 238 (2016).

In his certified appeal to this court, the petitioner contends that the Appellate Court should have engaged in a de novo review of whether the new evidence was likely to produce a different result. He argues that de novo review is appropriate because the credibility of the new evidence is undisputed, requiring only the application of the legal standards to the facts found by the trial court. He further asserts that, had the Appellate Court properly engaged in a de novo review, it would have decided the case in his favor.

We agree with the petitioner that de novo review is appropriate in the specific circumstances of this case, namely, when the petition for a new trial is decided by a judge who did not preside over the original trial and no fact-finding was necessary because both parties agreed that the new evidence was fully credible. Applying a de novo standard of review, we nevertheless disagree that the petitioner is entitled to a new trial. We therefore affirm the Appellate Court's judgment.

IFACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following facts from the petitioner's criminal trial and new trial proceedings are relevant to this appeal. On October 17, 1990, police officers were called to Howard Avenue in New Haven where they found Wayne Curtis shot to death in the driver's seat of his car, which was parked on the street. The victim had a bullet wound

through his abdomen and several head wounds from blunt force trauma. Police investigators found blood-stains on the victim's clothing and on the interior of the car, including on the driver's side door. At the petitioner's criminal trial, a witness testified that he saw the petitioner wearing a camouflage jacket and standing outside the victim's car, arguing with the victim, shortly before he heard gunshots. Another witness who was a few blocks away from the crime scene testified that, shortly after hearing gunshots, she saw the petitioner, whom she recognized from the neighborhood, run to a dumpster, take off a camouflage jacket and throw it into the dumpster.

She recovered the jacket and later gave it to the police. In the pocket of the jacket, officers found a receipt for mechanical work done on the victim's car two years earlier. The jacket was tested for blood and for gunshot residue, but the tests returned negative results for the presence of either. The police examined the victim's car but found no fingerprints or hair from the petitioner.

The petitioner was first tried for the murder and found guilty by a jury in 1992 (first criminal trial). This court later reversed the judgment of conviction and ordered a retrial.1 State v. Jones , 234 Conn. 324, 359, 662 A.2d 1199 (1995).

The retrial was held in March, 1996 (second criminal trial). At his second criminal trial, the petitioner presented testimony from a new witness who claimed that he saw the shooting and that the petitioner was not the shooter. The jury nevertheless found the petitioner guilty of the victim's murder2 and of carrying a pistol without a permit. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to a total effective sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release. The Appellate Court upheld the petitioner's conviction and sentence. State v. Jones , 50 Conn. App. 338, 369, 718 A.2d 470 (1998), cert. denied, 248 Conn. 915, 734 A.2d 568 (1999).

In 2010, the petitioner sought, and the state agreed to, DNA testing of the jacket recovered from the dumpster and of the hairs found in the victim's car using techniques not available at the time of his second criminal trial. The test of the jacket identified a mixture of DNA material from multiple contributors. The victim and the petitioner were both excluded as contributors to the mixture. The petitioner also was excluded as the source of the hairs tested.

On the basis of this new evidence, the petitioner filed a petition for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. He claimed that the new DNA evidence established that he had not worn the jacket linked to the victim, but that others had, demonstrating that he was not the perpetrator of the crime. In support of his petition, he presented the testimony of two forensic examiners from the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, Division of Scientific Services (state forensic science laboratory), who performed the DNA analysis on the jacket. The petitioner's witnesses confirmed the results of the testing but also explained that a lack of any of the petitioner's DNA on the jacket did not establish that the petitioner had never worn or touched the jacket. The jacket was tested only for "wearer DNA" by swabbing the inside cuffs and collar of the jacket. Additionally, the witnesses testified that any DNA previously deposited on the jacket could have degraded over time and that the mixture of the DNA that was detected from other individuals could have been deposited by anyone who had touched the areas of the jacket that were tested, including investigators, forensic personnel who originally examined the jacket for gunshot residue, attorneys, court personnel, and jurors. In addition to these two witnesses, the petitioner also presented a DNA test report indicating that certain hairs taken from the victim's vehicle did not come from the petitioner.

The state did not present any witnesses or dispute the testimony of the petitioner's witnesses. The state, instead, argued that the petitioner's evidence failed to establish a probability of a different result in a retrial because the test results neither established that the petitioner had never touched the jacket nor established that one of the persons who contributed to the DNA mixture found on the jacket was the perpetrator of the crime.

The trial court denied the petition. The court first determined that the new evidence met the first three elements for granting a new trial in that the evidence was (1) newly discovered, (2) material to the issues at trial, and (3) not cumulative. See Asherman v. State , 202 Conn. 429, 434, 521 A.2d 578 (1987). The court further concluded, however, that the petitioner had failed to establish that the new evidence would probably produce a different result in a new trial, the fourth and final element required for the granting of a new trial. See id. In its analysis, the court credited the conclusions presented by the petitioner's witnesses, finding that "the methods used to perform the DNA analyses were scientifically appropriate, that the methods were expertly executed, and that the outcomes obtained were accurate." The court observed that the absence of a DNA match to the petitioner or the victim "does not, of course, necessarily imply that neither had contact with the jacket or that the petitioner was never in the victim's car. The results simply demonstrate [that] their DNA was not detected on or in the items tested." The trial court determined that the new evidence would not impact the outcome of the case because the lack of any forensic link to the petitioner had already been argued at the second criminal trial, and the jury had found the petitioner guilty on the basis of eyewitness testimony despite the lack of any supporting physical evidence. The court lastly explained that the state would be able to argue, in a new trial, that the lack of the petitioner's DNA on the jacket could be the result of a number of factors, including that any DNA deposited could have substantially degraded or have been removed by earlier forensic testing and that the discovery of other DNA profiles on the jacket could be the result of handling by other persons in the decades after the crime occurred. The trial court later granted a request by the petitioner to appeal the trial court's decision pursuant to General Statutes § 54–95(a).

The Appellate Court upheld the denial of the petition. Jones v. State , supra, 165 Conn. App. at 604, 140 A.3d 238. In his arguments to the Appellate Court, the petitioner asserted that the court should not defer to the trial court's conclusions on whether the new evidence would produce a different result but should review that aspect of the trial court's decision de novo and conclude that he is entitled to a new trial. Id., at 598–600 n.13, 140 A.3d 238. The Appellate Court disagreed that de novo review was appropriate. Id., at 599 n.13, 140 A.3d 238. It instead applied the abuse of discretion standard and concluded that the...

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    • United States
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    • May 7, 2019
    ...a petition for a new trial, which requires him to establish that there will be "a different result in a new trial"; Jones v. State , 328 Conn. 84, 92, 177 A.3d 534 (2018) ; or by means of direct appeal, in which the appellate courts are deprived of the trial court's views on the matter, esp......
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