Jones v. Steele

• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
• Writing for the Court: Jean C. Hamilton
• Decision Date: 06 August 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 4:13CV234 JCH
• Citation: Jones v. Steele, Case No. 4:13CV234 JCH (E.D. Mo. Aug 06, 2013)
• Parties: LEE JONES, Petitioner, v. TROY STEELE, Respondent.

LEE JONES, Petitioner,

v.TROY STEELE, Respondent.

Case No. 4:13CV234 JCH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

Dated: August 6, 2013

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Missouri State prisoner Lee Jones' pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter is fully briefed and ready for disposition.

On October 5, 2010, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of Statutory Rape in the First Degree. Petitioner was sentenced on December 2, 2010, to life in prison.¹ Petitioner did not file a direct appeal of his conviction or sentence. He did file a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.035, which was denied without an evidentiary hearing. (Resp. Exh. 1, PP. 87-93). The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Petitioner's post-conviction motion. Jones v. State, 387 S.W.3d 423 (Mo. App. 2012).

Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Potosi Correctional Center in Mineral Point, Missouri. In the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus, Petitioner raises the following three claims for relief:

(1) That Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel, in that trial counsel permitted him to enter a guilty plea that was involuntary, unknowing, andunintelligent, as Petitioner was incompetent at the time of his plea;²

(2) That Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel, in that trial counsel failed properly to investigate the defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect ("NGRI"), or diminished capacity; and

(3) That Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel, in that trial counsel coerced Petitioner into entering an involuntary, unknowing, and unintelligent plea by instilling fear that Petitioner would lose at trial because his taped statement to the police would be introduced to the jury.

(§ 2254 Petition, PP. 5-10). The Court will address the claims in turn.

DISCUSSION

I. Ground 1

As stated above, in Ground 1 of his petition Petitioner asserts he received ineffective assistance of counsel, in that trial counsel permitted him to enter a guilty plea that was involuntary, unknowing, and unintelligent, as Petitioner was incompetent at the time of his plea. (§ 2254 Petition, PP. 5-7). Petitioner raised this claim before the 24.035 post-conviction motion court, and the court denied the claim as follows:

1. In order to be entitled to post-conviction relief, a Movant³ is required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that: 1) counsel's performance was deficient to the extent that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed to the defendant by the Sixth Amendment; and 2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Movant bears a heavy burden in attempting to satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, for he must overcome a strong presumption that counsel provided competent assistance by showing that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 425-26 (Mo. banc 2002). To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, a Movant must show "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedingwould have been different." Middleton v. State, 103 S.W.3d 726, 733 (Mo. banc 2003).

2. In his first claim in his Amended Motion, Movant claims his plea was unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary, because Movant was incompetent at the time of his plea.

3. However, on September 25, 2008, after a thorough and extensive examination, Dr. Jeffrey Kline, a licensed psychologist, concluded that Movant had the capacity to understand the proceedings against him and was able to assist his attorney in his own defense, even though Movant was mildly retarded. He recommended that Movant was fit to proceed to trial for the disposition of the charges pending against him.

4. Additionally, Dr. Richard Scott, a licensed psychologist, performed a thorough examination of Movant and concluded, on March 3, 2010, that Movant understood the nature and purpose of sexual contact and its relation to sexual gratification. Further, Movant reportedly engaged in the behavior when no one else was present that could report. it. He allegedly did so unaware that he had gonorrhea, but shortly thereafter understood how he likely acquired gonorrhea. Movant made clear his understanding of the wrongfulness of his sexual contact with children, using terms such as rape and understanding that police would be seeking him if he were accused of rape. Movant questioned the link between gonorrhea and touching a child with his finger. Finally, he told the examiner that sexual contact with children is wrong and that he has always known this to be so. Although Movant is mentally retarded, functionally illiterate and very limited in many ways, he had demonstrated an understanding of sexual contact, the wrongfulness of sexual contact with children, specific understanding of the allegations against him, and the wrongfulness of the alleged behavior. Therefore, in the opinion of the examiner, to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, although Movant suffered a mental defect at the time of the alleged offense, he was not, as a result of this mental defect, incapable of knowing and appreciating the nature, quality, or wrongfulness of his conduct.

5. A review of the plea and sentencing transcripts also show that Movant's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Movant told the Court he was not under the influence of any alcohol or narcotics at the time of his plea. (plea transcript pgs. 4-6 hereinafter referred to as pl. tr.)

6. Movant stated that he had fully discussed his case with his attorney, that he had no criticisms of Ms. Pew, that she had investigated this matter to his complete satisfaction, and that he believed he had been fully advised by her as to all aspects of his case, including his legal rights and the possible consequences of his plea. Movant stated that be [sic] believed his attorneyhad adequately, completely, and effectively represented him in his defense to this matter. (pl. tr. pg. 10-11)

7. Movant fully explained to the Court that he understood he had a right to proceed to trial if he did not plead guilty. Movant also answered the Court's questions pertaining to Movant's rights at trial, including the right to confront witnesses and the fact the state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Movant also indicated he had a right to testify or not to testify and that all twelve, impartial jurors would have to agree to find Movant guilty or find him not guilty. Finally, Movant indicated he would have the right to present evidence at trial and call witnesses, if necessary. (pl. tr. pgs. 11-12.)

8. At sentencing, Movant stated that he had ample opportunity to discuss his case with his attorney, that Ms. Pew did what was asked of her prior to entering his plea of guilty, that he was completely satisfied with the services rendered to him by his attorney regardless of the outcome of his case, and that she had done a "good" job for him. (sentencing transcript pgs. 26-28 hereinafter referred to as sn. tr.)

9. At the time of both his plea and sentencing, Movant appeared lucid, expressed himself clearly, and seemed to fully comprehend the situation and the questions asked of him. As a result, Movant is denied post-conviction relief as to this point.

(Respondent's Exh. 1, PP. 89-91). Petitioner advanced the claim on appeal of the denial of his Rule 24.035 motion, and the Missouri Court of Appeals denied the claim as follows:

In his first point on appeal, Movant claims his guilty plea was involuntary, unknowing, and unintelligent because he was not competent to proceed. Movant argues that he was not competent to proceed because his functioning IQ was too low and rendered him unable to understand the proceedings against him and sufficiently consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. Movant's claim is refuted by the record.

Section 552.020.1 RSMo 2000⁴ provides that "[n]o person who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall be tried, convicted or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as the incapacity endures." A trial court's ruling concerning the competency of a defendant is a factual determination which must be upheld unless there is no substantial evidence to support it. State v. McCurry-Bey, 298 S.W.3d 898, 901 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009).

Here, it is undisputed that Movant's IQ scores placed him in the low range of intellectual functioning, consistent with the mental disease or defect of mild mental retardation. Although IQ scores are a factor for the trial court to consider in determining a defendant's competency, they are not conclusive. State v. Johns, 34 S.W.3d 93, 105 (Mo. banc 2000); see also Pulliam v. State, 480 S.W.2d 896, 904 (Mo. 1972) (finding that the fact "that an accused may be mentally retarded in some degree does not automatically render him incapable of standing trial or entering a voluntary plea of guilty"). If the defendant has "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him", the defendant is competent to proceed. Johns, 34 S.W.3d at 104 (internal quotation omitted).

After Movant was charged with statutory rape, Movant was examined by Dr. Michael T. Armour who opined that Movant's intellectual limitations "significantly impair his ability to process information about the court proceedings" and "[h]is ability to assist his attorney in his defense." Based on Dr. Armour's report, plea counsel filed a motion for Movant to be found not competent to proceed. The plea court ordered an examination of Movant by Dr. Richard Scott to

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