Jones v. Stephens
| Decision Date | 15 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:05-CV-638-Y |
| Parties | QUINTIN PHILLIPPE JONES, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM STEPHENS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
(death-penalty case)
Petitioner Quintin Phillippe Jones petitioned the Court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, contending that his conviction and death sentence are unconstitutional. The Court dismissed Jones's petition as time-barred, and Jones appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit remanded the case for consideration of the intervening opinion in Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010). Jones has filed a post-remand brief arguing that Holland allows equitable tolling. Respondent filed a brief in opposition, and Jones filed a reply.
The Court concludes that Holland does not allow equitable tolling because here the untimely filing of the petition was a result of his counsel's ordinary negligence in miscalculating the deadline andbecause the other alleged errors that Jones attributes to his federal habeas counsel, if true, did not cause the untimely filing. Furthermore, Jones made no independent effort to ensure the timely filing of his petition.
Equitable tolling is a fact-intensive inquiry. The Court therefore sets forth in some detail the facts that underlie Jones's claim, as shown in the record and the parties' exhibits.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ("CCA") appointed Jack Strickland as Jones's state habeas counsel on December 3, 2003. Ex. A.2 Six days later, Strickland wrote Jones a letter stating he had been appointed and intended to visit Jones and asking Jones to provide his version of the events leading up to his conviction. Strickland also explained, among other things, that the deadline for filing the state habeas application was "etched in stone" and would not be extended. Ex. B. In his reply, Jones told Strickland he wanted to raise Wiggins and Atkins3 claims in the state habeas application because he did not believe that his mental and social history were presented at trial the way they should have been. Ex. C. Two months later, Strickland wrote another letter reminding Jones to send the information Strickland had requested. Ex. D. Strickland and his investigator then visited Jones in prison on July 12, 2004. See Ex. F. During this initial visit, Strickland and Jones discussed Jones's medical and psychiatric history. Ex. F. After Strickland's visit, Jones wrote him two more letters about the Wiggins and Atkins claims, providing case law and the names of places where Strickland could find his school and hospital records. Ex. E, F. The record does not show that Strickland answered these letters.
On September 28, 2004, Strickland sent Jones a copy of the state writ application that he had filed on Jones's behalf. Ex. G. The writ did not include a Wiggins or an Atkins claim.4 Jones wrote five more letters to Strickland, asking why Strickland did not raise the claims, complaining of Strickland's lack of response, citing to case law and the American Bar Association Guidelines, and advising Strickland that the issues will be harder to bring up at the federal stage if they are not raised in state court. Ex. H, K, M, O, Q.
There is no indication in the record that Strickland responded to these letters from Jones. Jones wrote to the trial judge in February and September of 2005 asking for help in communicating withStrickland, apparently to no avail. Ex. N, R. On May 2, 2005, however, Strickland responded to a letter from Jones's aunt, who had inquired on Jones's behalf. Ex. L. Strickland assured the aunt that Jones's lawyers were doing everything they could to gain him a new trial or commute his death sentence and would continue to work on his behalf. Ex. P.
On September 14, 2005, the CCA denied habeas relief. Ex parte Jones, 2005 WL 2220030, No. WR-57,299-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 14, 2005) (). The assistant attorney general ("AAG") assigned to the case wrote Strickland a letter stating, erroneously, that relief had been denied in March of 2005 and advising him of his duty to move for the appointment of federal habeas counsel and of the habeas deadline in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Respondent's Ex. A. Strickland replied to the AAG the same day, enclosing a highlighted copy of the AAG's letter and stating that he was aware of his obligation in the matter. Respondent's Ex. A. The letter indicates that a copy was sent to Jones. Respondent's Ex. A. On October 5, 2005, Jones wrote Strickland, advising that he had seen the AAG's letter and asking that Strickland not get appointed in federal court. Ex. S.
This Court appointed Strickland as federal habeas counsel on November 3, 2005. In a letter dated November 15, Jones questioned how they could work together given Strickland's lack of communication in the past, and he asked Strickland to visit him. Ex. T. OnDecember 22, Jones again wrote to Strickland, stating he had not received any communication about the case and complaining that Strickland's state writ (which, he observed, was "filed late, I might add") did not raise his mitigating issues. Jones asked Strickland not to file anything in federal court except a motion to step down as counsel. Jones also advised that a friend was assisting him in filing a motion to appoint different counsel and notes that "the State Bar has stated you did not violate their rules but the media might see it differently." See U.
Jones filed a pro-se motion for appointment of different counsel in this Court on December 27, 2005, and reurged the motion on March 6, 2006. The pro-se motion alleged that Strickland did not investigate Jones's background of mental disorders, did not request funds to conduct intelligence tests on Jones, did not raise any mitigation claims in the state application, was held in contempt for untimely filing the state writ application,5 and sought appointment as federal counsel against Jones's wishes. The motion accuses Strickland of having "no intention of helping the Petitioner's appeals," and being "allowed, and encouraged, to profit by sabotagingof a death row prisoner's appeals." Motion for Appointment of Different Counsel, p. 6 [doc. 9, 14].
On March 7, 2006, Strickland filed a response to the motion explaining why he believed Jones's complaints were meritless. Response from Petitioner's Counsel [doc. 16]. In it, Strickland stated that all the information in the school, hospital, and mental health records mentioned by Jones were discovered by trial counsel, admitted at trial, and made available to counsel, and that Jones is simply complaining that counsel did not "replow the same ground." Strickland stated that additional IQ tests were not needed because reliable testing had been done by a forensic psychologist who testified at trial, that Jones's score of 79 was outside the range of mental retardation even considering the standard measurement error, that the trial court did not limit the presentation of IQ evidence or any other psychological opinions, and that it would have been unreasonable to seek further testing under the circumstances. Strickland also pointed out that he did, in fact, raise a mitigation-related claim in the state writ application regarding the effect of serotonin levels on behavior. Response from Petitioner's Counsel, p. 4; (1 SHR 41, 122). Strickland further wrote:
Response from Petitioner's Counsel, p. 4-5 [doc. 16]. On March 9, 2006, this Court denied the pro-se motion for different counsel.
During the time the pro-se motion was pending, three letters were exchanged between Strickland and Jones. In a letter from Strickland dated January 12, 2006, responding to Jones's letter of December 22, 2005, Strickland said he would "once again attempt to address some of your concerns." Ex. V. Strickland stated that he was appointed as federal habeas counsel against his [Strickland's] wishes and that under the circumstances, he will continue as counsel. Strickland explained he would not file frivolous or meritless claims "nor casually impugn the integrity or competence of your prior attorneys." Strickland advised that, given the unusually horrific facts of the case, it was his opinion that all of Jones's lawyers had done their best, and that Jones seemed "intent on blaming everyone who has tried to assist" him "while seemingly ignoring [his] own behavior." Ex. V. Strickland also stated, incorrectly, that the federal statute of limitations would expire one year from the denial of the state writ, or September 14, 2006. He said he would keep Jones advised of the progress, invited Jones to provide him with anyadditional information or thoughts that he believed might be helpful, and hoped that their future relationship "proves less rocky." Ex. V.
Jones responded twice to this correspondence,...
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