Jones v. Stephens
| Decision Date | 09 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. H-13-3092 |
| Parties | MORRIS JOSEPH JONES, (TDCJ-CID #1713101) Petitioner, v. WILLIAM STEPHENS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
The petitioner, Morris Joseph Jones, seeks relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges a 2011 state felony conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child. The respondent, William Stephens, filed a motion for summary judgment, (Docket Entry No. 12), with a copy of the state court record. Jones filed a response. (Docket Entry No. 14). Based on careful consideration of the pleadings, the motion and response, the record, and the applicable law, this court grants the respondent's motion and, by separate order, enters final judgment dismissing this case, with prejudice. The reasons are set out below.
On April 19, 2010, Jones was indicted for continuing sexual abuse of a child. The indictment stated as follows:
(Docket Entry No. 9-5, Clerk's Record, p. 11).
Jones pleaded guilty to the felony offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child. (Cause Number 1248982). On April 29, 2011, the court sentenced Jones to a 25-year prison term. The judgment and sentence incorrectly state that Jones was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a child, rather than aggravated sexual assault of a child. (Docket Entry No. 9-11, State Court Record, p. 14). The First Court of Appeals of Texas dismissed Jones's appeal for lack of jurisdiction on February 16, 2012.
On October 4, 2012, Jones filed an application for state habeas corpus relief, which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied on April 17, 2013 on the trial court's findings, without a hearing or written order. On August 26, 2013, Jones filed a second application, which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed as an abuse of the writ on October 23, 2013. (Docket Entry No. 9-13, Ex parte Jones, Application No. 78,999-02, p. 2).
On October 17, 2013, this court received Jones's federal petition. Jones contends that his conviction is void for the following reasons:
(Docket Entry No. 1, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, pp. 7-8).
Jones's petition is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Subsections 2254(d)(1) and (2) of AEDPA set out the standards of review for questions of fact, questions of law, and mixed questions of fact and law that result in an "adjudication on the merits." An adjudication on the merits "is a term of art that refers to whether a court's disposition of the case is substantive, as opposed to procedural." Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 281 (5th Cir. 2000).
The AEDPA provides as follows, in pertinent part:
A state-court determination of questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact is reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and receives deference unless it "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000). A state-court decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent if: (1) the state court's conclusion is "opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law" or (2) the "state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent" and arrives at an opposite result. Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000).
A state court unreasonably applies Supreme Court precedent if: (1) it unreasonably applies the correct legal rule to the facts of a particular case; or (2) it "unreasonably extends a legal principle from [ Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Id. at 1495. This court considers whether the state court's application of Supreme Court precedent was "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 1495; Penry v. Johnson, 215 F.3d 504, 508 (5th Cir. 2000). The state court's fact findings are "presumed to be correct . . . and [receive] deference . . . unless it 'was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'" Hill, 210 F.3d at 485 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)).
The respondent has moved for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56 applies to the extent that it does not conflict with the habeas rules. Section 2254(e)(1)'s mandate that a state court's fact findings are "presumed to be correct" overrides the ordinary rule in a summary judgment proceeding that all disputed facts are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Unless Jones can "rebut[ ] the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence" as to the state court's findings of fact, these findings must be accepted as correct. Smith v. Cockrell, 311 F.3d 661, 668 (5th Cir. 2002).
Jones is representing himself. Habeas petitions filed pro se are construed liberally and are not held to the same stringent and rigorous standards as are pleadings filed by lawyers. See Martin v. Maxey, 98 F.3d 844, 847 n.4 (5th Cir. 1996); Guidroz v. Lynaugh, 852 F.2d 832, 834 (5th Cir. 1988); Woodall v. Foti, 648 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981). This court broadly interprets Jones's state and federal habeas petitions. Bledsue v. Johnson, 188 F.3d 250, 255 (5th Cir. 1999).
Jones pleaded guilty on January 26, 2011. He was sentenced after a PSI hearing on April 29, 2011. At the PSI hearing, Jones's stepdaughter, A.C., testified that she was 15and in the 10th grade. She first met Jones when she was 7 years old. A.C. testified that she did not like Jones because he was very strict and whipped her with a belt. When A.C. was 9 years old, Jones asked her to play a game. She was supposed to lick Jones's finger and guess what flavor it was. A.C. testified that instead of licking Jones's finger, she was forced to lick his penis. Approximately 5 months later, Jones said that he would teach her new things, which turned out to be different sexual positions. A.C. testified that she had sex with Jones over 5 years, from when she was 9 years old until she was 14. Jones would have sex with her when her mother was at work or school. When A.C. was 14, shetold her mother about the abuse. A medical exam showed that she had contracted gonorrhea. A.C. testified that she has been in therapy.
K.M., A.C.'s friend, also testified that Jones sexually assaulted her one night when she was sleeping at A.C.'s home.
Jones testified that he was working out of town during much of the time A.C. alleged she was abused. He admitted that he had sexual contact with A.C. on one occasion, but claimed that A.C. initiated it. Jones denied having gonorrhea when he was admitted to the Harris County Jail.
On January 26, 2011, Jones appeared in open court and entered a guilty plea. (Docket Entry No. 9-11, State Court Record, pp. 12-13). The court admonished Jones in writing that he was charged with aggravated sexual assault of a child between January 1, 2008 to December 12, 2009 and what the punishment range was. (Id. at 12).
Jones signed a document with ten admonishments, initialing each one. The document stated, in part:
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