Jones v. Stinson

• Citation: 94 F.Supp.2d 370
• Decision Date: 11 May 2000
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A. 98-CV-3719(DGT).,CIV. A. 98-CV-3719(DGT).
• Parties: Charles JONES, Petitioner, v. James STINSON, Superintendent, Great Meadows Correctional Facility, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

94 F.Supp.2d 370

Charles JONES, Petitioner, v. James STINSON, Superintendent, Great Meadows Correctional Facility, Respondent.

No. CIV. A. 98-CV-3719(DGT).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

May 11, 2000.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Georgia J. Hinde, New York, NY, for Petitioner.

Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Queens County (Nicole Beder, John M. Castellano, Robin A. Forshaw, Assistant District Attorneys, Of Counsel), Kew Gardens, NY, for Respondent.

REVISED MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

TRAGER, District Judge.

Petitioner Charles Jones ("Jones") is currently serving an indeterminate term of imprisonment of six to twelve years pursuant to a 1995 New York state conviction for Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree, N.Y. Penal Law § 220.39 (McKinney 2000). Jones brings this action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Supp.1999) seeking habeas corpus relief on the grounds that (1) certain trial court evidentiary rulings deprived him of the right to present a meaningful defense, (2) the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support his conviction, and (3) closure of the courtroom during the testimony of two undercover police officers abridged his right to a public trial.

Background

(1)

The facts of this case are simple. On March 21, 1994, at about 5:00 p.m., Jones was arrested in a Queens County "buy-and-bust" operation. An undercover police officer ("UD 53") approached Jones on a street corner, a brief conversation ensued, and Jones sold the undercover three red-capped vials containing a white powdery substance in exchange for $15 in prerecorded bills. Shortly thereafter, a uniformed officer, Norah Finn ("Officer Finn"), arrested Jones. Officer Finn recovered the pre-recorded buy money from Jones's person, as well as three orange-capped vials, which also contained a white powdery substance. Subsequent laboratory analysis of the six vials revealed that each of the red-capped vials contained a detectable amount of cocaine, while none of the orange-capped vials contained a detectable amount of any controlled substance. On the basis of these results, Jones was charged with one count of Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree, N.Y. Penal Law § 220.39 (McKinney 2000), and was subsequently convicted after a jury trial.¹

Jones maintained throughout the state proceedings, and now claims on this habeas petition, that he never intended to sell the undercover officer cocaine, but only did so inadvertently. According to Jones, just prior to his arrest, he had purchased six vials of crack and smoked all six at home. He then refilled the vials with baking soda and proceeded out to the street with the intention of selling them as if they contained cocaine, thereby raising money to buy more crack. Jones contends that, unbeknownst to him, three of the vials must have still contained some trace amount of crack when he refilled them with baking soda. Jones insists that he was unaware of the residual crack present in the three vials he sold the undercover officer. Jones argues that since he did not "knowingly" sell cocaine to the undercover, he never had the intent required to be guilty of violating § 220.39.

The crux of Jones's petition, and the only one of his claims that has merit, is that a series of erroneous trial court evidentiary rulings unconstitutionally deprived him of the opportunity to present this defense to the jury.

(2)

a. The Prior Arrests and Dismissals

At argument on pre-trial motions held on January 10, 1995, before the New York Supreme Court, Queens County, Jones's defense counsel represented that Jones had been arrested on three other occasions during the preceding four years for selling what appeared to be controlled substances to members of the same undercover unit that arrested him on March 21, 1994. (Transcript of Trial at 5 [hereinafter Tr.].) According to Jones and defense counsel, on each of those occasions the charges against Jones were dismissed when chemical analysis revealed that the substances he had sold contained no controlled substance. (Id.) Defense counsel requested that the prosecutor be required to turn over copies of any files the District Attorney had related to these arrests. (Id.) When the prosecutor noted that Jones's rap sheet did not reflect these three arrests, defense counsel suggested that the underlying files were sealed and therefore would not appear on Jones's rap sheet. (Id. at 6-7.) The court requested that defense counsel supply the prosecutor with specific details concerning the arrests to assist the prosecutor in locating the files and instructed the prosecutor to produce the files for inspection by the court, once they were found. (Id. at 7-8, 14-15.) Although the trial record does not reflect any subsequent discussion between the prosecution and defense counsel regarding the arrest files, upon inquiry by this court, the Queens County District Attorney verified that during the four years preceding the trial, Jones indeed had been arrested on at least two prior dates (viz., December 3, 1992, and June 9, 1993) for sale of narcotics and that in both cases, the charges against him were dismissed. (Letter from Assistant District Attorney Nicole Beder to Chambers of 12/7/99, at 1 [hereinafter D.A.'s Letter].) The District Attorney confirmed that in the case of the June 9, 1993 arrest (which preceded by only ten and one-half months the arrest which led to the instant conviction), the charges were dismissed because the substance(s) Jones had sold tested negative for narcotics. (Id.) The District Attorney further indicated that his office was in the process of determining the basis for the dismissal of charges stemming from the December 3, 1992 arrest, but the District Attorney has, to date, not been able to furnish that information to the court. (Id.)

b. The Courtroom Closure Hearing

Just prior to trial, on the morning of January 12, 1995, the trial court heard argument and testimony on a motion by the prosecution to close the courtroom during the testimony of two undercover officers, UD 53, and his "ghost," or backup, Undercover Officer 7430 ("UO 7430"). UD 53 testified that he was still working in an undercover capacity and that he had last worked in the area of the crime, 103rd Street and Northern Boulevard, Queens, approximately one week before and might return to that very intersection as soon as the next day. (Tr. 161-62, 165.) UD 53 also stated that he had worked and would be working as an undercover in the one block radius around the courthouse. (Id. 162, 165.) UD 53 testified that he had several open cases in the courthouse, more than dozen cases pending before the grand jury, and at least a dozen "lost subjects."² (Id. at 162-63.) UD 53 testified that if he appeared in open court, he would fear for his "safety and the integrity of the investigation." (Id. at 164.) UO 7430 offered substantially similar testimony. (Id. at 167-174.)

After argument from the parties and a recess, the trial court made findings of fact on the record and concluded that closure of the courtroom during the two undercover officers' testimony was justified in light of the officers' on-going undercover work in the area of the crime scene and the courthouse and in light of their concerns about their personal safety. (Id. at 178-82.)

c. The Evidence

Trial commenced with opening arguments on the afternoon of January 12, 1995. The prosecution's first witness was UD 53. After being qualified as an expert in "street level sale, packaging of controlled substances," the undercover explained the process by which crack is produced, noting that it sometimes comes in rock form but can also be "crush[ed] ... up into powdered form." (Id. at 192.) The undercover then reviewed the general procedure followed by the buy-and-bust team and related the details of his transaction with Jones.

On cross-examination, defense counsel asked UD 53 whether he had ever heard the expression "beat stuff." (Id. at 242.) UD 53 indicated that he had and explained that "[b]eat is when somebody tries to pass off a substance that is not controlled substance to you, not a drug and they try to pass it off to you or sell it to you as if it were drugs." (Id.) When asked whether "there are people who do those sorts of things out on the street," the trial court sustained an unspecified objection by the prosecution. (Id.) Defense counsel then inquired as to what type of substance might be passed off as if it were a controlled substance, but the trial court again sustained a general objection by the prosecutor. (Id. at 242-43.) Defense counsel then asked: "Isn't it a fact, that when people try to sell beat stuff they also just put the baking soda in and don't put anything else in?" (Id. at 243.) Despite being qualified as an expert in street level sale and packaging of controlled substances, UD 53 answered that he had "no way of knowing" because he was "not a chemist." (Id.) Defense counsel further inquired whether soap was sometimes used as beat stuff, and the trial court sustained another unspecified objection. UD 53 was allowed to testify, however, that he would not "be able to tell the difference if [he] looked at a vial of crack, as opposed to a vial of baking soda." (Id. at 244.)

Defense counsel also attempted to ask whether UD 53 was aware that Jones had been arrested on three prior dates for the sale of crack to an undercover. The prosecutor objected on the ground that the question called for hearsay because UD 53 had previously testified that he had never seen Jones prior to the incident leading to his arrest. (Id. at 244-48.) The objection was sustained. (Id. at 249.)

Thereafter, defense counsel asked how much cocaine was usually contained in a $5 vial, "if you know." (Id. at 264.) The prosecutor objected that the question was "beyond the realm of this witness's expertise" arguing that UD 53 was an expert in "packaging and sale, not in chemical...