Jones v. Swanson, 07-1864.
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) |
Writing for the Court | Bye |
Citation | 512 F.3d 1045 |
Parties | Richard M. JONES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Todd V. SWANSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
Docket Number | No. 07-1864.,07-1864. |
Decision Date | 16 January 2008 |
v.
Todd V. SWANSON, Defendant-Appellant.
[512 F.3d 1046]
John P. Mullen, argued, Sioux Falls, SD, for appellant.
Michael J. Schaffer, argued, Paul H. Linde, on the brief, Sioux Falls, SD, for appellee.
Before BYE, ARNOLD, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.
BYE, Circuit Judge.
Todd V. Swanson appeals the district court's1 order' dismissing his motion to vacate brought under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Swanson also appeals the district court's orders denying motions to conduct post-judgment discovery and to designate the real party in interest. We affirm.
Richard M. Jones sued Swanson under South Dakota's alienation of affection law, claiming Swanson's romantic involvement with Jones's wife, Donna, caused the couple's marriage to fail. A jury found in favor of Richard and awarded compensatory and punitive damages totaling $950,000. The district court entered judgment in favor of Richard on February 19, 2002. Swanson appealed and we affirmed on condition Richard accept a remitted verdict of $400,000 ($150,000 in compensatory and $250,000 in punitive damages). Richard accepted the reduced verdict and the district court entered an amended judgment on November 21, 2003.
In September 2004, Donna contacted Swanson asking to meet. The two met on October 9, 2004, and at the meeting Swanson explained he did not intend to revive the romance. Nonetheless, Donna told him about child custody difficulties she was having with Richard and his new wife, and alluded to another issue she wanted to discuss. On October 14, 2004, Donna called Swanson and told him her trial testimony had not been entirely truthful. Specifically, Donna said she was under considerable stress during the `trial and to keep from losing her children and marriage, testified she had feelings for Richard when the affair with Swanson began. In truth, according to Donna, by the time the affair began, her relationship with Richard was tenuous and the affair did not cause the marriage to fail.
After Donna's admission, Swanson agreed to meet with her in person. On October 26, 2004, Swanson and Donna met to further discuss her trial testimony. Donna reiterated her earlier admission, stating she had been untruthful at trial
and had lied to protect herself. On two occasions during the conversation, Donna asked to speak with Swanson's attorneys and offered to help. Swanson surreptitiously recorded the conversation.
In the roughly two and one half years since the verdict, Swanson had successfully avoided attempts to collect on the $400,000 judgment, and, in the fall of 2004, Richard, who was experiencing financial difficulties, filed for bankruptcy protection. Before filing bankruptcy, Richard assigned his interest in the judgment to his lawyers. The law firm, in turn, later assigned the judgment to the bankruptcy trustee. Coincidentally, as these events were unfolding, Richard became convinced Donna had lied at trial and wrote a letter to the district court stating his belief and asking the court to dismiss the judgment against Swanson.
On November 19, 2004, Swanson filed a motion to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b); citing Donna's false trial testimony. Swanson argued Donna's admission constituted newly discovered evidence and `warranted relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(2). Alternatively, Swanson argued the perjury of a non-party witness warranted relief under Rule 60(b)(6)'s catch-all provision. In the same motion, Swanson moved for an opportunity to conduct postjudgment discovery to further explore the merits of the motion to vacate. Upon learning the judgment had been assigned to Richard's attorneys, Swanson filed a separate motion seeking a declaration of the real party in interest.
Initially, the district court found the Rule 60(b) motion timely and scheduled an evidentiary hearing. In the same order, it denied the motion to conduct post-judgment discovery. Upon reconsideration, the district court concluded the Rule 60(b)(2) motion was untimely because it had not been made within one year of the date the district court first entered judgment in favor of Richard. The court also concluded the Rule 60(b)(6) motion was untimely because it had not been made within a reasonable time after entry of the first judgment. Finally, the court denied the, motion for declaration of the real party in interest as moot, concluding the judgment had been assigned to. Richard's bankruptcy estate.
On appeal, Swanson argues the district court erred in concluding the one-year limitations period for filing a motion under Rule 60(b)(2) commenced on the date the original judgment was, entered (February 19, 2002), instead of the date the judgment remitting the damage award was entered (November 21, 2003). Swanson also argues the district court abused its discretion in concluding the motion to vacate under Rule 60(b)(6) was not filed within a reasonable time. Finally, Swanson contends the district court erred in refusing to designate the real party in interest and abused its discretion when it refused to allow post-judgment discovery.
A Rule 60(b) motion serves to relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for;
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by...
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United States v. Norwood, 20-3478
...on whether the matter at issue was resolved by the original judgment and remained "unaffected by the [ ] decision amending the judgment." 512 F.3d 1045, 1049 (8th Cir. 2008). Though we need not decide today whether Loughman 's reasoning applies to a Rule 60 motion, the Eighth Circuit's reas......
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United States v. Norwood, 20-3478
...on whether the matter at issue was resolved by the original judgment and remained "unaffected by the [] decision amending the judgment." 512 F.3d 1045, 1049 (8th Cir. 2008). Though we need not decide today whether Loughman's reasoning applies to a Rule 60 motion, the Eighth Circuit's reason......
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Mathison v. United States, C09-4045-MWB
...we will only reverse for a clear abuse of discretion.'" In re Levaquin Prods. Liab. Litig., 739 F.3d at 404 (quoting Jones v. Swanson, 512 F.3d 1045, 1049 (8th Cir. 2008)); see MIF Realty L.P, v. Rochester Assocs., 92 F.3d 752, 755 (8th Cir. 1996). As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals exp......
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Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 4:07–cv–00344–JAJ–TJS.
...court has broad discretion for considering requests for relief from orders, including motions to reconsider. See Jones v. Swanson, 512 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir.2008) (district court has wide discretion in ruling on an order to vacate judgment); Chapa v. United States, 497 F.3d 883 (8th Cir.2007) ......
-
United States v. Norwood, 20-3478
...on whether the matter at issue was resolved by the original judgment and remained "unaffected by the [ ] decision amending the judgment." 512 F.3d 1045, 1049 (8th Cir. 2008). Though we need not decide today whether Loughman 's reasoning applies to a Rule 60 motion, the Eighth Circuit's reas......
-
United States v. Norwood, 20-3478
...on whether the matter at issue was resolved by the original judgment and remained "unaffected by the [] decision amending the judgment." 512 F.3d 1045, 1049 (8th Cir. 2008). Though we need not decide today whether Loughman's reasoning applies to a Rule 60 motion, the Eighth Circuit's reason......
-
Mathison v. United States, C09-4045-MWB
...we will only reverse for a clear abuse of discretion.'" In re Levaquin Prods. Liab. Litig., 739 F.3d at 404 (quoting Jones v. Swanson, 512 F.3d 1045, 1049 (8th Cir. 2008)); see MIF Realty L.P, v. Rochester Assocs., 92 F.3d 752, 755 (8th Cir. 1996). As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals exp......
-
Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 4:07–cv–00344–JAJ–TJS.
...court has broad discretion for considering requests for relief from orders, including motions to reconsider. See Jones v. Swanson, 512 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir.2008) (district court has wide discretion in ruling on an order to vacate judgment); Chapa v. United States, 497 F.3d 883 (8th Cir.2007) ......