Jones v. Tennessee
| Decision Date | 19 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:21-CV-123-KAC-DCP |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER STEPHEN JONES, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF TENNESSEE, TONY PARKER, LISA PARKS, and MELISSA CAMPBELL, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
Plaintiff Christopher Stephen Jones, a Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) inmate proceeding pro se filed an Amended Complaint alleging that the state-sanctioned collection of funds from his inmate account to pay the costs of his criminal prosecution violates federal law, state law and the Constitution [Doc. 30]. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim [Doc. 31], and Plaintiff filed a response opposing the motion [Docs. 35 and 36][1]. While Defendants' motion was pending, Plaintiff filed two Motions for “Leave to Supplement the Complaint” [Docs. 63, 64], which the Court fairly construes as motions to file a Second Amended Complaint. In his proposed Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff would add new claims against twelve additional defendants who were not parties in his Amended Complaint. Moreover, the proposed claims in the Second Amended Complaint are not related to the claims Plaintiff raised in his Amended Complaint. For the reasons that follow, the Court (1) denies Plaintiff's motions to file a Second Amended Complaint and (2) grants Defendants' motion to dismiss.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that “the court's leave” is required for Plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint at this point in the litigation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (). The Rule also instructs that the Court “should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. (emphasis added). However, “‘when the matters alleged in a supplemental pleading have no relation to the claim originally set forth and joinder will not promote judicial economy or the speedy disposition of the dispute between the parties, refusal to allow the supplemental pleading is entirely justified.'” Whipple v. Tennessee Bd. of Paroles, No. 18-5390, 2019 WL 1804845, *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 3, 2019) (quoting 6A ARTHUR R. MILLER, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1506 (3D ED. 2018) (citations omitted) (cleaned up)).
Here, Plaintiff seeks to add new claims that are unrelated to the claims in his Amended Complaint against twelve new defendants who were not parties in his Amended Complaint. Permitting him to amend his complaint again to add such claims and parties would not be just. Nor would it promote judicial economy or the speedy disposition of the dispute between the individuals and entities already Parties to this action. Further, there is nothing to suggest that Plaintiff could assert his proposed additional claims against the twelve additional defendants in a separate action. See Whipple, 2019 WL 1804845 at *4. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff's requests to file a Second Amended Complaint. If Plaintiff wishes to raise his new claims against the newly-identified defendants, he may do so in a separate action.
In his operative Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he entered TDOC custody on May 26, 2015 and has at all relevant times been housed at the Bledsoe County Correctional Complex (“BCCX”) [Doc. 30 at 2, 5]. The issue of costs and fees was never raised during Plaintiff's judgment or sentencing, and therefore, the State was made liable for the costs and fees associated with Plaintiff's prosecution under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-25-129(a)(1).
When he filed his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff was employed by the Tennessee Rehabilitative Initiative in Correction (“TRICOR”) and worked on goods to be sold by Shaw Flooring Group, Inc., a federally funded Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program (“PIECP”) partner of the TRICOR program [Id. at 6]. Plaintiff was required to relinquish mandatory obligations on his PIECP wages under Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-6-206(a)(2) and (4), which deduct forty percent (40%) of Plaintiff's gross earnings [Id. at 6]. Under PIECP, Congress has limited garnishment to a maximum of eighty percent (80%) of gross wages [Id. at 8 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c)(2))].
On August 14, 2019, the Trust Fund Department (“TFD”) of BCCX issued a notice to Plaintiff from the TDOC Central Trust Fund Administration (“CFTA”) advising Plaintiff that the State had paid $4,038.54 in Plaintiff's criminal case [Id. at 5]. Plaintiff maintains that the notice falsely stated that TDOC may recover criminal court costs under Tennessee law Section 40-25-143; that CTFA would automatically set up deductions of fifty percent (50%) of all his deposits until the court costs are repaid; and that there was no other type of payment plan available, because the monies were automatically collected through TOMIS (the “Task Order Management and Information System”) [Id.]. Plaintiff alleges that Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-25-143 confers authority to TDOC to collect fees but does not operate as a mandate [Id. at 10]. Commissioner Tony Parker approved the implementation of TDOC Policy 208.03, which is a policy governing the debt collection practices contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-25-143(b) [Id. at 11].
BCCX's TFD began collecting money from Plaintiff's net wages, and on January 12, 2021, the TFD began deducting from Plaintiff's gross wages [Id. at 6]. Only four percent (4%) of Plaintiff's gross wages remaining after TFD's collection [Id.]. Plaintiff discovered the switch from net wages to gross wages on March 13, 2021 [Id.].
Plaintiff maintains that TDOC's collection of money from his earned wages is protected by both federal and State garnishment laws, citing 15 U.S.C. § 1673 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-106 [Id. at 7]. He contends that he is required to purchase supplemental nutrition, footwear, and necessary hygiene supplies through TDOC, and that the disruptions to his living wage not only harm him, but also result in disruptions to interstate commerce [Id. at 8-10]. Plaintiff alleges that he is an “employee” under Internal Revenue law, and that he must account for and pay taxes on earned wages [Id. at 10]. As a result of Defendants' actions, Plaintiff maintains, he will not be able to pay tax owed on his employment wages for 2021 [Id.].
Plaintiff states that he does not owe the State any debt related to his convictions, and that both Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-25-143 and TDOC policy 208.03 abridge constitutional principles of due process and equal protection; that they serve to defraud the federal government; and that Defendants, by enacting and enforcing these collection laws/policies, have conspired to deprive him of due process [Id. at 12-17]. Plaintiff contends that Defendants are liable in this action because the State enacted Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-25-143(b), Tony Parker approved TDOC policy 208.03 containing debt-collection practices, Lisa Parks directed the notice of collection from Plaintiff's account pursuant to TDOC policy, and Melissa Campbell initiated the execution of the debt collection [Id. at 11]. Plaintiff asks the Court to award monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief [Id. at 17-20].
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim for relief is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. When considering a plaintiff's claims, all factual allegations in the complaint must be taken as true. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). However, the Supreme Court has cautioned:
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will. . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not “show[n]”-“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citations omitted).
Additionally, while Plaintiff's claim survived screening under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the standard for a motion to dismiss is higher than the frivolity standard in 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See, e.g, Leach v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 3:16-CV-2876, 2017 WL 35861, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 4, 2017) ().
Plaintiff primarily seeks relief in this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [See, generally, Doc. 30]. To state a claim for relief under Section 1983, Plaintiff must establish that a “person” acting “under color of” state law deprived him of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights.'” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Rather, it “provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred” by the Constitution or federal law. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly,...
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