Jones v. Three Rivers Management Corp.

• Decision Date: 18 November 1978
• Citation: 394 A.2d 546,483 Pa. 75
• Parties: Evelyn M. JONES, Appellant, v. THREE RIVERS MANAGEMENT CORPORATION and Pittsburgh Athletic Company, Inc.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

394 A.2d 546

483 Pa. 75

Evelyn M. JONES, Appellant, v. THREE RIVERS MANAGEMENT CORPORATION and Pittsburgh Athletic

Company, Inc.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 18, 1978

Argued Sept. 21, 1978.

Clyde P. Bailey, Bailey & Bailey, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Donald W. Bebenek, Michael V. Gilberti, Meyer, Darragh, Buckler Bebenek & Eck, Pittsburgh, for appellees.

Before EAGEN C. J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROBERTS Justice.

Appellant Evelyn M. Jones brought an action of trespass in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County against appellee Pittsburgh Athletic Company, Inc., holder of the Pittsburgh Pirates baseball franchise, and appellee Three Rivers Management Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Pittsburgh Athletic Company, Inc., which manages Three Rivers Stadium. ^[1] A jury found appellees negligent and awarded appellant damages of $125,000. The Superior Court held that appellant failed to establish a prima facie case and reversed and remanded for entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to both appellees. We granted allowance of appeal and now reverse. ^[2]

I

Appellant was injured at Three Rivers Stadium, Pittsburgh, on July 16, 1970, the sport facility's inaugural day. Two interior concourses, or walkways, encircle the stadium on its second level. One concourse, at the outer circumference of the stadium and away from the playing field, houses concessions and restrooms. The other, located behind the seating and scoreboard areas, runs, in part, directly behind and above "right field." Built into the concourse wall above right field, are large openings through which pedestrians may look out over the field and stands. Ramps lead patrons from this second walkway to the seating areas overlooking the field of play. Appellant was standing in this second walkway in the vicinity of one of the large right field openings when she was struck in the eye by a ball hit during batting practice.

Appellant's evidence established that the stadium's structure requires pedestrians interested in looking out onto the playing field to stop or to divert their attention away from the path of the concourse. Appellant testified that as she entered the right field area of the concourse, she directed her attention away from the walkway, approached one of the right field openings and scanned the playing field. She testified that, although she saw some activity on the field, she was not aware that batting practice had begun and did not see home plate. ^[3] After this stop, she decided not to continue around the walkway, but to walk back to get some food in the "concession" concourse. Appellant turned away from the field of play, started back, and almost immediately heard a cry of "Watch!" As she turned, again, toward the field, she was struck in the eye by a batted ball. Appellant testified, in addition, that she was a fan of the Pittsburgh Pirates and that she had attended many of the "home" games played at Forbes Field, the Pirates' former stadium. The day she was injured marked her first visit to Three Rivers Stadium. She testified that in Forbes Field patrons were not exposed to batted balls until they had left the walkways and emerged onto ramps in the seating area.

In response to appellant's case, appellees presented no evidence. Instead, they moved for both nonsuits and directed verdicts. The trial court denied the motions and submitted the case to the jury. After the jury's verdict for appellant, the trial court denied appellees' motions for judgments notwithstanding the verdict.

On appeal, a majority of the Superior Court held that appellant failed to meet her burden of proving negligence and that the trial court erred in denying the motions for judgments n. o. v. Judge Spaeth filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part which Judge Hoffman joined. Judge Spaeth agreed with the result as to the Pittsburgh Athletic Co., Inc. He concluded, however, that appellant presented sufficient evidence to reach the jury on the question of appellee Three Rivers Management Corp.'s liability.

II

Appellees in this appeal argue only that appellant has not established a prima facie case of negligence and that, in the alternative, appellees' defense of assumption of the risk precludes appellant's recovery. Appellees contend that the outcome in this case is controlled by "the universal rule" that batted balls in baseball stadiums do not present an unreasonable risk of harm, and thus, do not create liability in trespass for negligence. Appellant concedes the existence of such a rule, but maintains that its application is limited to injuries which occur during games and regularly scheduled batting practice sessions. Appellant maintains that any injury which occurs on a concourse behind the stands, from which the injured party could not and did not see the source of danger, and which results from an unusually early batting practice falls outside the scope of the above rule.

This Court has never considered the liability of a baseball stadium operator for damages incurred by a patron in the grandstand or bleachers, struck by a batted ball. There are, however, settled principles which apply to all cases involving a place of amusement for which admission is charged. An operator of such an establishment is not an insurer of his patrons. E. g., Taylor v. Churchill Valley Country Club, 425 Pa. 266, 269, 228 A.2d 768, 769 (1967) citing Haugh v. Harris Bros. Am. Co., 315 Pa. 90, 172 A. 145 (1934). Rather, he will be liable for injuries to his patrons only where he fails to "use reasonable care in the construction, maintenance, and management of (the facility), Having regard to the character of the exhibitions given and the customary conduct of patrons invited." Id. (emphasis added in Taylor ) Accord, e. g., Wood v. Conneaut Lake Park, 417 Pa. 58, 209 A.2d 268 (1965) and cases cited therein.

Thus, this Court affirmed a directed verdict for a defendant golf club sued on the ground that it was negligent not to provide screening over an area on the golf course where a caddy was exposed to flying golf balls, Taylor, supra. ^[4] The Court granted a judgment n. o. v. to a defendant movie theatre operator where the plaintiff patron alleged no more than that his injury was caused by the lighting conditions, or degree of darkness, ordinarily necessary to show a movie, Beck v. Stanley Co. of America, 355 Pa. 608, 50 A.2d 306 (1947). Beck unanimously concluded:

"a moving picture operator violates no duty to a patron if, while a picture is being shown, the condition of light is that ordinarily used in exhibiting moving pictures to enable the audience to get a reasonably clear view of the image thrown on the screen. Also . . . the person who sues on the ground that the condition of light was not equal to that ordinarily used for such purposes should submit some proof of the ordinary usage, thus manifesting the deficiency."

Id., 355 Pa. at 615, 50 A.2d at 310.

And we granted a judgment n. o. v. to an amusement park, holding no liability for injuries allegedly suffered from slipping in the seat of a roller coaster equipped with individual seat belts and large handrails, when the coaster went through a steep turn. Wood, supra.

The Superior Court has applied these principles to two baseball cases in which spectators seated in the stands during games have been struck by batted balls. In Iervolino v. Pittsburgh Athletic Co., 212 Pa.Super. 330, 243 A.2d 490 (1968) (allocatur refused), Superior Court directed entry of a judgment n. o. v. where plaintiff contended it was negligent "to invite a patron to a sports event and view a baseball game from a position where she was exposed to a hard projectile traveling 94 1/2 feet in a split second," but did not go on to also establish that exposure to this risk resulted from any deviation from established custom in a baseball stadium.

The Superior Court has also directed entry of a judgment n. o. v. where plaintiff's allegations were "tantamount to a request for a holding that a baseball club must at its peril always have available a seat behind the screen whenever a patron requests one." Schentzel v. Philadelphia National League Club, 173 Pa.Super. 179, 96 A.2d 181 (1953). ^[5]

Recovery is not granted to those who voluntarily expose themselves to the kind of risks involved in Iervolino,supra, and Schentzel, supra, by participating in or viewing the activity. We have therefore regularly granted or affirmed judgments n. o. v. in cases involving places of amusement where the plaintiff alleges no more than injury caused by a risk inherent in the activity in question. Only when the plaintiff introduces adequate evidence that the amusement facility in which he was injured deviated in some relevant respect from established custom will it be proper for an "inherent-risk" case to go to the jury. The Superior Court has articulated this principle:

"In this case, plaintiff produced no evidence tending to show that defendant's screening of certain sections of its grandstand deviated from that customarily employed at other baseball parks. The courts of this Commonwealth have adhered to general usage as a test of negligence with respect to methods and appliances employed in business and have held that in the absence of proof by plaintiff that defendant deviated from ordinary standards the question of negligence is not for the jury. See Mills v. Lit Brothers, 347 Pa. 174, 32 A.2d 10; Beck v. Stanley Co. of America, 355 Pa. 608, 50 A.2d 306; and Yearsley v. American Stores Co., 97 Pa.Super. 275. . . . 'While customary methods do not furnish a conclusive or controlling test of negligence or justify a practice obviously laden with danger they are...