Jones v. Town of East Haven

Decision Date06 July 2007
Docket NumberNo. 3:99CV00632 (AWT).,3:99CV00632 (AWT).
Citation493 F.Supp.2d 302
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
PartiesEmma JONES, as Administratrix of the Estate of Malik Jones and as Guardian Ad Litem for Priya Jones, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF EAST HAVEN, et al., Defendants.

Joseph A. Moniz, Moniz & Associates, Hartford, CT, for Plaintiff.

Hugh F. Keefe, Nicole M. Fournier, Lynch, Traub, Keefe & Errante, New Haven, CT, Lawrence C. Sgrignari, Hamden, CT, for Defendants.

RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS

THOMPSON, District Judge.

Defendant Town of East Haven (the "Town") has filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, and for the reasons set forth in Part I below, that motion is being denied. Plaintiff Emma Jones has filed a "motion for hearing on compensatory damages," which included a request for a new trial on compensatory damages, and for the reasons set forth in Part II below, that motion is being granted. The Town has filed a motion to set aside the jury's award of punitive damages against it, and for the reasons set forth in Part III below, that motion is being granted. Finally, the court includes, in Part IV below, a written summary of its findings on the plaintiff's Batson claims.

I. RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

Defendant Town of East Haven has renewed its motion, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50, for judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiffs Monell claim. For the reasons set forth below, the renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law is being denied.

A. Legal Standard

The, standard governing motions for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 is well-established. Such a motion should not be granted "unless the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party, is insufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find in [the opposing party's] favor." Galdieri-Ambrosini v. National Realty & Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 289 (2d Cir.1998); Davis v. Rodriguez, 364 F.3d 424, 432 (2d Cir.2004). The court deciding a Rule 50 motion "must give deference to all credibility determinations and reasonable inferences of the jury, and it may not itself weigh the credibility of witnesses or consider the weight of the evidence." Galdieri-Ambrosini, 136 F.3d at 289 (citations omitted); Advance Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. U.S., 391 F.3d 377, 390 (2d Cir.2004) ("[i]n assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict, we must view the record in the light most favorable to the opposing party, assuming all reasonable inferences were drawn and all credibility disputes resolved in its favor"). Accordingly, judgment as a matter of law should not be granted unless: (I) "there is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture," or (ii) "there is such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair minded [persons] could not arrive at a verdict against [the movant]." Galdieri-Ambrosini, 136 F.3d at 289 (citations omitted); Mattivi v. South African Marine Corp., "Huguenot,", 618 F.2d 163, 168 (2d Cir.1980); see also Cross v. New York City Transit Authority, 417 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir.2005) (noting that "[a] movant's burden in securing Rule 50 relief is particularly heavy after the jury has deliberated in the case and actually returned its verdict" and pointing to (I) and (ii) as set forth in Galdieri-Ambrosini as the only grounds for setting aside the verdict under those circumstances). "In other words, a Rule 50 motion must be denied unless the evidence is such that, without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence, there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable men could have reached.'" Cross, 417 F.3d at 248 (citations omitted).

B. Factual Background

The evidence at trial included evidence with respect to the East Haven Police Department (the "EHPD") and testimony by and other evidence pertaining to the chief of police in 1997. It also included evidence pertaining to an incident involving an individual named Shane Gray; comments made to an individual named Donald R. Jackman; the wearing of racially offensive T-shirts by members of the EHPD; the shooting of Malik Jones; actions by other EHPD officers immediately following that shooting; and incidents involving an individual named Patricia Snowden.

1. The EHPD

In 1997, James Criscuolo was the chief of the EHPD, having been appointed chief in 1993. There were approximately 52 members of the department. In terms of vehicles, the EHPD had 11 marked units, six unmarked units, and two police vans. These vans were used both for prisoner transport and for patrol. The Town had a minority population of approximately 1.4%, and the EHPD was all white. Several communities along the shoreline east of New Haven were also predominately white.

The EHPD had three staggered shifts. There was an 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. shift, and some people on that shift worked 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. There was a 4 p.m. to midnight shift, and some people on that shift worked 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. Finally, there was a midnight to 8 a.m. shift; And some people on that shift worked 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. Depending on the particular evening, there were five to eight people working from 4 p.m. to midnight and two people working 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. on the evening shift. This included the shift commander, who would be a lieutenant or sergeant, the dispatcher, and detectives. Typically, there would be five to six marked units patrolling during the evening shift.

The Town encompasses approximately 14 square miles, and it is bordered on the west by New Haven, on the south by the Long Island Sound, on the east by Branford and North Branford, and on the north by North Haven. The EHPD had four geographic sectors for patrol purposes. The Town is longer than it is wide, and the southern patrol sector is bordered by New Haven, the Long Island Sound, and Branford; the, center patrol sector is bordered by New Haven and Branford; the north patrol sector is bordered by New Haven, Branford, and North Branford; and the upper north patrol sector is bordered by New Haven, North Haven, and Branford. The New Haven Municipal Golf Course (the "Golf Course"), which lies Mostly in East Haven, straddles the New Haven/East Haven line, and there is no thoroughfare through the Golf Course.

Chief Criscuolo, who had commanded the patrol division from 1985 to 1992, testified that EHPD officers patrolled those sectors and that there was no policy, written or unwritten, of patrolling the borders between New Haven and East Haven. Chief Criscuolo testified that the EHPD had both written and unwritten policies. He also told the jury that, while he was chief of police, he was aware that other communities were talking about the issue of racial profiling, but the EHPD did not have that problem, and he concluded that it was not necessary to address that issue. Chief Criscuolo testified that there was no EHPD policy against discriminating against people based on race.

Chief Criscuolo testified that no African-American individual had ever filed a formal complaint or lawsuit against the EHPD alleging excessive force. Joseph A. Pascarella, who was chief of police from 1964 to 1993, testified that, to his knowledge, no one ever claimed they had been mistreated because of his or her race during his tenure as chief.

The EHPD had a formal, written policy on use of deadly force and use of firearms. It was promulgated under the authority of Chief Pascarella. The policy provides, in part:

* * *

B. Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so. A police officer may not seize an unarmed non-dangerous suspect by shooting him.

C. Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of deadly physical harm either to the officer or to others, it is permissible to use deadly physical force to defend himself or a third person to prevent escape by using deadly physical force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer or another with the use of deadly physical force or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly physical force may be used if necessary to defend himself or another, or to effect an arrest or to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been given.

POLICE OFFICERS SHALL NOT USE DEADLY FORCE IN ANY OTHER MATTER INVOLVING A MISDEMEANOR OR TRAFFIC VIOLATION.

* * *

F. MOVING VEHICLES

Discharging a firearm from or at a moving vehicle is prohibited, unless the occupants of the other vehicle are using deadly physical force against the officer or another person.

(Defendant's Ex. 47).

2. The Shane Gray. Incident

The plaintiff introduced evidence from which the jury could have reasonably concluded that on September 15, 1991, Officer Flodquist used excessive force in taking Shane Gray into custody and that, while the EHPD conducted a routine inquiry into Flodquist's discharge of his weapon, that inquiry was deficient and the EHPD ignored and did not investigate at all Gray's complaint that Flodquist used excessive force.

It was undisputed that at approximately 9:15 p.m. that night an East Haven resident, Nicholas Pappacoda, was robbed by three black males in their twenties while trying to buy drugs on Eastern Circle in New Haven. New Haven police were called to the scene. At 11:34 p.m., the New Haven Police Department sent out a bulletin to surrounding police departments that three unknown black males in their early twenties, who were wearing dark clothing, were wanted for robbery with a firearm. The bulletin stated that the incident occurred on Eastern Circle in New Haven, that a silver handgun was displayed, and that gunshots were fired....

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  • Chepilko v. City of New York, 06-CV-5491 (ARR) (LB)
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • February 7, 2012
    ...conduct can be circumstantial evidence of the existence of preceding municipal policy or custom. See Jones v. Town of East Haven. 493 F.Supp.2d 302, 331-332 (D.Conn. 2007) (holding that subsequent conduct "is probative for purposes of showing the existence of a municipal policy or custom");......

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