Jones v. Town of Carroll

• Citation: 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 07780,996 N.Y.S.2d 804,122 A.D.3d 1234
• Decision Date: 14 November 2014
• Docket Number: 856 CA 14-00282
• Parties: Carol L. JONES, as Executor of the Estate of Donald J. Jones, Carol L. Jones and Jones–Carroll, Inc., Plaintiffs–Respondents, v. TOWN OF CARROLL and Town Board of Town of Carroll, Defendants–Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

122 A.D.3d 1234

996 N.Y.S.2d 804

2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 07780

Carol L. JONES, as Executor of the Estate of Donald J. Jones, Carol L. Jones and Jones–Carroll, Inc., Plaintiffs–Respondents

v.TOWN OF CARROLL and Town Board of Town of Carroll, Defendants–Appellants.

856 CA 14-00282

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Nov. 14, 2014.

Erickson Webb Scolton & Hajdu, Lakewood (Paul V. Webb, Jr., of Counsel), for Defendants–Appellants.

Cohen & Lombardo, P.C., Buffalo (Anthony M. Nosek of Counsel), for Plaintiffs–Respondents.

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, FAHEY, and PERADOTTO, JJ.

OpinionMEMORANDUM:

As we noted when the parties were before us on three prior appeals (Jones v. Town of Carroll, 32 A.D.3d 1216, 821 N.Y.S.2d 708, lv. dismissed 12 N.Y.3d 880, 883 N.Y.S.2d 174, 910 N.E.2d 1004 ; Jones v. Town of Carroll [Appeal No. 1], 57 A.D.3d 1376, 873 N.Y.S.2d 391, revd. 15 N.Y.3d 139, 905 N.Y.S.2d 551, 931 N.E.2d 535, rearg. denied 15 N.Y.3d 820, 908 N.Y.S.2d 153, 934 N.E.2d 886 [Jones I ]; Jones v. Town of Carroll [Appeal No. 2], 57 A.D.3d 1379, 873 N.Y.S.2d 395 [jones ii ] ), IN 1984 PLAINTIFF CAROL L. JONES (jones) and her huSband, DONald j. Jones (decedent), purchased 50 acres of property in an agricultural/residential (AR–1) zoning district in defendant Town of Carroll (Town). In 1989, the Town's Zoning Board of Appeals granted decedent's application for a use variance permitting him to use the entire parcel as a construction and demolition landfill (C & D landfill) conditioned upon receipt of a permit from the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC). Decedent obtained a permit from the DEC permitting him to use “less than two acres” of the property as a C & D landfill and, in 1996, he obtained another permit from the DEC permitting him to construct a “one acre expansion.” Plaintiff Jones–Carroll, Inc. (JCI) operated the landfill. After defendants were informed that a potential buyer of plaintiffs' property had applied for a DEC permit to operate a landfill on the entire parcel, defendants enacted Local Law No. 1 of 2005 (2005 Law), which eliminated landfills as a permitted use in AR–1 zoning districts. Section 2 of the 2005 Law provides that section 406–C of the Town's Zoning Law is amended to provide that “ [s]anitary landfill/demolition landfill is eliminated as a use allowed by special use permit.” Section 3 provides that landfills “operating under a permit issued by the [DEC] shall be allowed to continue without expansion[, but a]bsolutely no expansion of any landfill beyond the area and scope allowed under the operator[']s permit from the DEC as of the date of th [e] Local Law shall be allowed.”

Plaintiffs commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge the 2005 Law, and Supreme Court converted that proceeding to a declaratory judgment action. In Jones I, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment declaring that the 2005 Law is void, and defendants cross-moved for, inter alia, summary judgment declaring that the 2005 Law is valid. The court granted judgment in favor of plaintiffs declaring that sections 2 and 3 of the 2005 Law are invalid as they relate to plaintiffs' property. Defendants appealed. While that action was pending, defendants enacted Local Law No. 1 of 2007 (2007 Law), which provides that “[n]o solid waste management facility shall hereafter be constructed, allowed to commence operation or to continue operation within the Town.” The law made the operation of solid waste management facilities in the Town a class A misdemeanor but exempted, inter alia, “[a]ny bona-fide solid waste management facility which is in operation under a permit issued by the [DEC] as of the date of this Local Law ... under the current terms and conditions of its existing operating permit issued by the DEC.” In Jones II, plaintiffs commenced an action seeking a judgment declaring that the 2007 Law is and void. Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) and (8) alleging, inter alia, that plaintiffs sought merely an advisory opinion. Plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment on the same grounds raised in their motion in Jones I. The court granted defendants' motion, and plaintiffs appealed.

In Jones I, we concluded that the court erred in granting judgment in favor of plaintiffs declaring sections 2 and 3 of the 2005 Law invalid as they relate to plaintiffs' property; that defendants complied with the State Environmental Quality Review Act ( [SEQRA] ECL art. 8) in issuing the negative declaration pursuant to SEQRA; and that there were issues of fact precluding judgment in favor of either party on plaintiffs' regulatory taking claim (Jones I, 57 A.D.3d at 1377–1379, 873 N.Y.S.2d 391 ). In Jones II, we concluded that the court erred in granting defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint because “a justiciable controversy exists,” but that plaintiffs were not entitled to summary judgment “for the reasons stated in our decision in [Jones I ]” (Jones II, 57 A.D.3d at 1380, 873 N.Y.S.2d 395 ).

The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal in Jones I and reversed, concluding that “plaintiffs adequately demonstrated that they acquired a vested right to operate a C & D landfill on their entire parcel, subject to regulation by DEC, and that the 2005 local law could not extinguish their legal use of the land for that purpose” (Jones I, 15 N.Y.3d at 145–146, 905 N.Y.S.2d 551, 931 N.E.2d 535 ). The Court thus held that the 2005 Law “does not apply to plaintiffs” (id. at 142, 905 N.Y.S.2d 551, 931 N.E.2d 535 ). In light of its determination, the Court deemed it unnecessary to consider plaintiffs' remaining contentions (id. at 146 n. 4, 905 N.Y.S.2d 551, 931 N.E.2d 535 ).

Following the decision of the Court of Appeals in Jones I, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in Jones II, adding a cause of action asserting that the Town was “collaterally estoppe[d]” from enforcing the 2007 Law based upon that decision. Plaintiffs thereafter moved to renew their motion for summary judgment declaring the 2007 Law “ and void” on the ground that Jones I was “clearly determinative of the 2007 Local Law under the same rationale the Court applied to the 2005 law.” Defendants cross-moved for “a determination that the enactment of the [2007 Law] was a proper exercise of the [Town's] police power and did not result in a regulatory taking of Plaintiffs' property or interfere with Plaintiffs' contractual rights in violation of any state or federal law and that Plaintiffs must comply fully with the provisions of the [2007 Law].” By the judgment now on appeal, Supreme Court granted plaintiffs' motion, denied defendants' cross motion, and declared that the 2007 Law “is null and void and of no force and effect with respect to the Plaintiffs ['] use and variance on the acreage owned and operated by the Plaintiffs upon the ground that the Local Law is unconstitutional under the United States and New York Constitutions because it takes Plaintiffs' property without compensation and unlawfully extinguishes Plaintiffs' vested rights in their property and in the use of their property.”

Initially, we agree with defendants that collateral estoppel does not apply here. “The doctrine of collateral estoppel ‘precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party’ ” (Ridge v. Gold, 115 A.D.3d 1263, 1264, 983 N.Y.S.2d 140, appeal dismissed 23 N.Y.3d 1010, 992 N.Y.S.2d 771, 16 N.E.3d 1249, quoting Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 500, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 467 N.E.2d 487 ). The doctrine “applies only ‘if the issue in the second action is identical to an issue which was raised, necessarily decided and material in the first action’ ” (City of New York v. Welsbach Elec. Corp., 9 N.Y.3d 124, 128, 848 N.Y.S.2d 551, 878 N.E.2d 966 ; see Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449, 455–456, 492 N.Y.S.2d 584, 482 N.E.2d 63 ). “The party seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel has the burden of demonstrating the identity of the issues in the present litigation and the prior determination” (Kaufman, 65 N.Y.2d at 456, 492 N.Y.S.2d 584, 482 N.E.2d 63 ; see Ridge, 115 A.D.3d at 1264, 983 N.Y.S.2d 140 ). Here, the issue in this case—the legality of the 2007 Law as applied to plaintiffs—was neither raised by the parties nor decided by the Court of Appeals in Jones I. The issue before the Court of Appeals in Jones I was whether the 2005 Law was constitutional as applied to plaintiffs, i.e., whether the 2005 Law extinguished plaintiffs' legal use of their land for the purpose of operating a C & D landfill on the entire parcel (see Jones I, 15 N.Y.3d at 145–146, 905 N.Y.S.2d 551, 931 N.E.2d 535 ). The Court of Appeals held that “the zoning ordinance at issue in this case [i.e., the 2005 Law], which restricted the development of landfills, does not apply to plaintiffs because they acquired a vested right to use their 50–acre parcel as a landfill for construction and demolition debris before the enactment of the zoning law” (id. at 142, 905 N.Y.S.2d 551, 931 N.E.2d 535 [emphasis added] ).

Although the 2005 Law and the 2007 Law both regulate landfill operations, they are not identical. The 2005 Law amended the Zoning Law to eliminate sanitary and demolition landfills as a permitted use in the AR–1 zoning district. The 2007 Law did not amend the Zoning Law to eliminate landfills in a particular zoning district but, rather, it enacted a Town-wide ban on solid waste management facilities. In concluding that the 2005 Law did not apply to plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals relied upon its decisions in Matter of Syracuse Aggregate Corp. v. Weise, 51 N.Y.2d 278, 434 N.Y.S.2d 150, 414 N.E.2d 651, Buffalo Crushed Stone, Inc. v. Town of Cheektowaga, 13 N.Y.3d 88, 885 N.Y.S.2d 8, 913 N.E.2d 394, rearg. denied 13 N.Y.3d 808, 890 N.Y.S.2d 429, 918 N.E.2d 941 and Glacial Aggregates LLC v. Town of Yorkshire, 14 N.Y.3d 127...