Jones v. Tracy School Dist.

• Decision Date: 12 May 1980
• Docket Number: S.F. 24045
• Citation: 611 P.2d 441,165 Cal.Rptr. 100,27 Cal.3d 99
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 611 P.2d 441, 26 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 762, 25 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 586, 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,988 Bessie JONES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. TRACY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.

Page 100

165 Cal.Rptr. 100

27 Cal.3d 99, 611 P.2d 441, 26 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 762,

25 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 586,

23 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,988

Bessie JONES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. TRACY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.

S.F. 24045.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

May 12, 1980.

As Modified May 20, 1980.

Rehearing Denied June 25, 1980.

Cerney, McIlwrath, Fass & Yecies and Rolleen McIlwrath, Stockton, for plaintiff and appellant.

Christine C. Curtis and Peter H. Weiner as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and appellant.

Gerald A. Sherwin, County Counsel, and Rebecca A. Davis, Deputy County Counsel, Stockton, for defendant and respondent.

RICHARDSON, Justice.

Is a female employee who establishes an unlawful wage discrimination practice which is violative of Labor Code section 1197.5 subject to the two-year limitations period for recovery of back wages, and is she entitled to the attorney's fees which she incurred in asserting her claim? We will conclude that under the applicable statutory provisions, (1) recovery of back wages is ordinarily limited to the two-year period preceding the filing of a complaint for wage discrimination, but under the circumstances herein presented the period may be extended because plaintiff filed a wage discrimination claim in an earlier federal administrative proceeding; and (2) attorney's fees are recoverable.

I. THE FACTS

From a review of the pleadings and declarations filed herein we glean the following uncontradicted facts: Appellant Bessie Jones has been a custodian for respondent Tracy School District since 1964, and has continuously performed the same duties as her male colleagues. In 1968, after four years of wage parity, she was reclassified by the district as a "custodial matron," with a decrease in salary, while continuing to perform the same work.

In January 1974, appellant requested reinstatement to her former classification with equal pay, together with her lost pay accumulated during the previous six years. In response, the district changed appellant's classification and gave her commensurate pay, but refused to compensate her for any back wages.

Appellant consulted the United States Department of Labor, which investigated and, on June 24, 1974, informed respondent that it was in violation of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act. (29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).) The department estimated that respondent owed $1,838 in back wages as a result of its unlawful discrimination over the preceding six years. Respondent refused to accept the Labor Department's recommendation, but offered appellant $558.30. This offer was rejected by appellant, who then filed suit in superior court on July 8, 1975, under Labor Code section 1197.5, the state "equal pay" provision. (All further statutory references are to the Labor Code unless otherwise cited.) It is unclear from the record why appellant abandoned assertion of her federal claim.

Appellant moved for a summary judgment, claiming that she was entitled to back pay for the entire period of unlawful discrimination. While the trial court granted her motion, it found that although respondent had discriminated against her for six years, recovery was limited to the actual loss of wages sustained within the two years immediately preceding the filing of her complaint herein. (See § 1197.5, subd. (h).) Accordingly, appellant was awarded only $318.58 in back wages and court costs. Her request for attorney's fees was denied and she appeals.

II. LIMITATIONS PROVISION

It is undisputed that respondent unlawfully discriminated against appellant because of her sex by withholding a portion of her salary from 1968 to 1974. The issue herein presented is whether appellant may recover compensation for that entire six-year period or only for the limited period during the two years preceding the filing of her complaint. In combination, the language of the statute taken as a whole, prior interpretations of similarly worded antidiscrimination statutes, and the important policy promoted by the statute of limitations, point strongly toward a limitation of recovery. In part III we discuss the question of tolling of the statute of limitations.

Section 1197.5 provides in pertinent part:

"(a) No employer shall pay any individual in the employer's employ at wage rates less than the rates paid to employees of the opposite sex in the same establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to a seniority system, a merit system, a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, or a differential based on any bona fide factor other than sex.

"(b) Any employer who violates subdivision (a) is liable to the employee affected in the amount of the wages, and interest thereon, of which such employee is deprived by reason of such violation. . . .

"(d) Every employer shall maintain records of the wages and wage rates, job classifications, and other terms and conditions of employment of the persons employed by such employer. All such records shall be kept on file for a period of two years. . . .

"(h) A civil action to recover wages under subdivision (a) may be commenced no later than two years after the cause of action occurs."

This section was intended to codify the principle that an employee is entitled to equal pay for equal work without regard to gender. (Subd. (a).) An employer in violation of this principle is liable to the employee "in the amount of the wages . . . deprived by reason of such violation." (Subd. (b).) Other provisions of the section may be paraphrased. The statute is enforced by the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement of the Department of Industrial Relations, which can approve and finalize a settlement between an employer and an employee. (Subd. (c).) Employers are required to keep records of wages and job classifications for two years. (Subd. (d).) An aggrieved employee may file a complaint with the division, which is then charged with the enforcement of the statute. (Subd. (e).) The division may file a civil action to recover back wages on the employee's behalf (subd. (f)), or an employee may file on his or her own behalf (subd. (g)). Finally, any such action "may be commenced no later than two years after the cause of action occurs." (Subd. (h).)

To support her contention that recovery of back pay is not limited by the foregoing statute of limitations, appellant correctly observes that section 1197.5 must be read as a whole to give effect to all of its provisions. (People v. Shirokow (1980) 26 Cal.3d 301, 306-307, 162 Cal.Rptr. 30, 605 P.2d 859; People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 30, 40, 127 Cal.Rptr. 122, 544 P.2d 1322.) In appellant's view, subdivision (h) is merely a filing requirement, and the language of subdivisions (b), (e), (f), and (g), seemingly allowing recovery for all back wages without express reference to a two-year limitation, evinces a legislative purpose to provide for complete recovery in discrimination cases.

In this regard, appellant's contention lacks merit. The section, read as a whole, demonstrates a legislative intent to limit back pay recovery to two years. It is significant that subdivision (d) requires all employers to keep records of wages and job classifications for only two years. As explained below, this requirement discloses a legislative intent to limit recovery of back wages in the manner sought by respondent.

The relationship between the two-year record-keeping requirement of subdivision (d) and the limitations period set forth in subdivision (h) becomes apparent when these provisions are viewed in the light of the important purpose served by the statute of limitations, namely, "to prevent the assertion of stale claims by plaintiffs who have failed to file their action until evidence is no longer fresh and witnesses are no longer available." (Addison v. State of California (1978) 21 Cal.3d 313, 317, 146 Cal.Rptr. 224, 226, 578 P.2d 941, 942-943; People v. Universal Film Exchanges (1950) 34 Cal.2d 649, 659, 213 P.2d 697.) By reason of the operation of subdivision (d), documentary evidence may be lacking to support or defend against claims of discrimination occurring more than two years before the initiation of an action for back wages, while less stale claims, in all probability, will be well documented. Surely the Legislature would not have imposed only a two-year record retention requirement had it intended to permit unlimited recovery in wage discrimination cases. Thus, in order to harmonize the various provisions of section 1197.5, we read the two-year limit of subdivision (h) as both a filing requirement and a limitation upon recovery.

This interpretation is further supported by prior decisions in cases awarding back pay or similar periodic benefits under similar California statutes or administrative regulations. We have consistently limited the extent of such awards by the applicable statute of limitations. (Fry v. Board of Education (1941) 17 Cal.2d 753, 761, 112 P.2d 229 (teacher's pay improperly withheld because of reduced job classification); Dryden v. Board of Pension Commrs. (1936) 6 Cal.2d 575, 580-581, 59 P.2d 104 (policeman's pension benefits unlawfully withheld); Raymond v. Christian (1937) 24 Cal.App.2d 92, 115, 74 P.2d 536 (state hospital worker's pay withheld after administrative revision of pay scale).) Recovery limitations were imposed in these cases on the theory that each deficient payment created a separate and distinct violation, triggering the running of a new limitations period. (Dryden, supra, at [27 Cal.3d 106] p. 581, 59 P.2d 104; see Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Company (5th Cir. 1973) 475 F.2d 1041, 1050 (interpreting the federal Fair Labor Standards Act).) The application of this "separate violation" rationale to suits filed under ...