Jones v. Tyson Foods, Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 October 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 4:10–CV–00011–GHD–JMV.
• Parties: Marvin JONES, Plaintiff v. TYSON FOODS, INC.; Haley Barbour, in His Official Capacity of Governor of the State of Mississippi; Christopher Epps, in His Individual and Official Capacities as Commissioner of the Mississippi Department of Corrections; Lee McTeer, in His Official Capacity as Community Correctional Director for Region I and in His Individual Capacity; Jonathan Bradley, in His Official Capacity as Correctional Supervisor of Leflore County Restitution Center and in His Individual Capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

971 F.Supp.2d 648

Marvin JONES, Plaintiff

v.TYSON FOODS, INC.; Haley Barbour, in His Official Capacity of Governor of the State of Mississippi; Christopher Epps, in His Individual and Official Capacities as Commissioner of the Mississippi Department of Corrections; Lee McTeer, in His Official Capacity as Community Correctional Director for Region I and in His Individual Capacity; Jonathan Bradley, in His Official Capacity as Correctional Supervisor of Leflore County Restitution Center and in His Individual Capacity, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 4:10–CV–00011–GHD–JMV.

United States District Court,

N.D. Mississippi,

Greenville Division.

Oct. 3, 2013.

Joseph Robert Murray, II, Murray Law Firm, PLLC, Ripley, MS, for Plaintiff.

R. David Kaufman, Christopher R. Fontan, William Easom Jones, III, Brunini, Grantham, Grower & Hewes, Pelicia Everett Hall, Tommy D. Goodwin, Office of the Attorney General, Jackson, MS, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FILED BY DEFENDANTS CHRISTOPHER EPPS, LEE McTEER, AND JONATHAN BRADLEY

GLEN H. DAVIDSON, Senior District Judge.

Presently before the Court is a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity [48] jointly filed by Defendants Christopher Epps, Lee McTeer, and Jonathan Bradley in their individual capacities. Upon due consideration, the Court finds that the motion [48] should be granted in part and denied in part, as set forth below.

A. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Marvin Jones (“Plaintiff”), a former resident of Leflore County Restitution Center, brings this suit for monetary and declaratory relief, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated when he was subjected to dangerous conditions and contracted mycobacterium tuberculosis (“TB”) while fulfilling the terms of his restitution at a chicken-processing plant, Tyson Foods, Inc., in Carthage, Mississippi (“Tyson”). Plaintiff sues Tyson; Haley Barbour, in his official capacity as the then-Governor of Mississippi (“Barbour”); Christopher Epps, in his individual capacity and official capacity as the Commissioner of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (“Epps”); Lee McTeer, in his individual capacity and official capacity as the Community Correctional Director for Region I (“McTeer”); and Jonathan Bradley, in his individual capacity and official capacity as the Correctional Supervisor of Leflore County Restitution Center (“Bradley”).

The alleged facts are set out in some detail in this Court's two previous memorandum opinions in this case, see Mem. Ops. [57, 2013 WL 4876313 and 59, 971 F.Supp.2d 632, 2013 WL 4876373 (N.D.Miss.2013)]; therefore, the Court incorporates the facts set out in those opinions into this opinion, and for background purposes merely summarizes Plaintiff's claims as follows: Plaintiff's amended complaint asserts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that (1) Defendants violated Plaintiff's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when they subjected Plaintiff and others to the inherently harmful conditions of a chicken plant wherein workers were forced to work sometimes “covered in chicken feces” and “in an environment filled with dust, feathers, and chicken feces,” even if physically ill, and alongside illegal immigrants who might carry diseases such as TB and workers who might “urinat[e] close to the slaughter line,” Pl.'s Am. Compl. [12] ¶¶ 15, 20, 24–26, 31, 52, 58, 62, 71–75; (2) Defendants violated Plaintiff's Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from slavery and/or involuntary servitude by forcefully detaining Plaintiff at Leflore County Restitution Center even after he had satisfied his restitution, as part of a conspiracy “to deprive, by force[,] intimidation[,] or threat, [Plaintiff] from receivinghis freedom after he satisfied the terms of his sentencing,” to “deny [Plaintiff] his civil rights,” and “to intimidate him,” id. ¶¶ 2, 3, 40, 59, 63, 66–70, 79–82; (3) Defendants violated Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by its actions, id. ¶¶ 64, 76–78; and (4) Defendants failed to adequately train and supervise their administration, staff, and/or faculty not to violate a resident's Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, which was the proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries, id. ¶¶ 53, 83–87. Plaintiff's amended complaint asserts under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 that “Defendants conspired to deprive, by force, intimidation, or threat, [Plaintiff] from receiving his freedom after he satisfied the terms of his sentencing.” Id. ¶ 2. The amended complaint further asserts under state law that (1) Defendants were negligent and/or grossly negligent in providing an unsanitary work environment for Plaintiff, thus causing him foreseeable harm, id. ¶¶ 89–94; (2) Defendants committed the tort of battery against Plaintiff, id. ¶¶ 95–97; and (3) Defendants' conduct subjected Plaintiff to intentional infliction of emotional distress, id. ¶¶ 98–102. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' actions were conducted “under the color and pretenses of the ordinances, policies, practices, customs, regulations, usages[,] and/or statutes of the Counties of Leflore and/or Leake, as well as the State of Mississippi.” Id. ¶ 44. Plaintiff further alleges that it is the policy, practice, or custom of Defendants to suppress the constitutional and statutory rights of those residents entrusted to their care, id. ¶¶ 46–49, and that “[t]he unlawful actions of Defendants ... were taken or ratified by final policy makers for [Leflore County Restitution Center] and thus constitute policies, practices[,] and usage sufficient to impose liability,” id. ¶ 50. Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief that Defendants' alleged actions violated his Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; nominal and actual damages for Defendants' alleged violations of his state and federal constitutional rights; compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants for the alleged state torts of negligence and gross negligence; and the costs of litigation, including attorney's fees and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Defendants Barbour, Epps, McTeer, and Bradley previously filed motions to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds [16, 35, & 37]. Tyson subsequently filed a motion to dismiss [18] the amended complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On September 11, 2013, the Court entered a memorandum opinion [57], 2013 WL 4876313 and Order [56] ruling on the Eleventh Amendment motions to dismiss, sustaining all official-capacity claims against McTeer and Bradley and the official-capacity claims for declaratory relief brought against Barbour and Epps, but dismissing all other official-capacity claims against Barbour and Epps on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds. That same day, the Court entered another memorandum opinion [59], 971 F.Supp.2d 632, 2013 WL 4876373 (N.D.Miss.2013) and Order [58], sustaining certain claims against Tyson—negligence, gross negligence, and conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on an alleged violation of Plaintiff's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment—but dismissing all other claims against Tyson,

On March 15, 2013, Defendants Epps, McTeer, and Bradley (“these Defendants”) filed the present motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity [48]. Plaintiff filed a response to the motion, and these Defendants filed a reply. The motion is now ripe for review, and the Court finds as follows.

B. Qualified Immunity Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment “should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Weaver v. CCA Indus., Inc., 529 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir.2008). The rule “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Under Rule 56(a), the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to “go beyond the pleadings and by ... affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548;Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 282 (5th Cir.2001); Willis v. Roche Biomedical Labs., Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir.1995).

Where the parties dispute the facts, the Court must view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (internal citations omitted). “However, a nonmovant may not overcome the summary judgment standard with conclusional allegations, unsupported assertions, or presentation of only a scintilla of evidence.” McClure v. Boles, 490 Fed.Appx. 666, 667 (5th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (citing Hathaway v. Bazany, 507 F.3d 312, 319 (5th Cir.2007)).

The usual summary judgment burden of proof is altered in the case of a qualified immunity defense. See Gates v. Tex. Dep't of Protective and Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 419 (5th Cir.2008). An official need only plead his good faith, which then shifts the burden to the plaintiff, who must rebut the defense...