Jones v. U-Haul Co. of Mass. & Ohio Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 April 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:13–cv–1265.
• Citation: 16 F.Supp.3d 922
• Parties: Stacy A. JONES, Plaintiff, v. U–HAUL CO. OF MASSACHUSETTS AND OHIO INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

16 F.Supp.3d 922

Stacy A. JONES, Plaintiff

v.U–HAUL CO. OF MASSACHUSETTS AND OHIO INC., et al., Defendants.

Case No. 2:13–cv–1265.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

Signed April 23, 2014.

Ambrose Moses, III, Moses Law Office, Columbus, OH, for Plaintiff.

Susan M. Dimickele, Squire Sanders & Dempsey, Meghan E. Hill, Squire Sanders (U.S.) LLP, Columbus, OH, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

JAMES L. GRAHAM, District Judge.

Plaintiff Stacy Jones brings this civil rights action against defendants U–Haul Co. of Massachusetts and Ohio Inc. (“U–Haul”), Dean Haske (“Haske”), and Roberta Tucker (“Tucker”) (collectively “defendants”). Jones alleges that defendants discriminated against her on the basis of race and age in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. Further, Jones alleges a state law claim under the Ohio Fair Employment Practices Act, O.R.C. Ch. 4112, as well as numerous common law claims related to her employment with defendants. Finally, Jones seeks a declaratory judgment, pursuant to O.R.C. Ch. 2721, regarding the enforceability of two arbitration agreements that Jones allegedly signed.

This matter is before the Court on defendants' motion to compel arbitration and dismiss or stay proceedings pending arbitration. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds the defendants' motion well taken.

I. Background

On September 7, 1999, defendants hired Jones as a Reservation Manager at one of its Columbus, Ohio U–Haul locations; defendants employed Jones as an at-will employee. Am. Compl. ¶ 2. As a Reservation Manager, Jones's duties included “direct[ing] incoming U–Haul equipment to dealerships and moving centers to fill every confirmed reservation and assist in controlling rental equipment inventories within ... her geographic area to balance customer requirements with rental equipment supply.” Aleo Aff. ¶ 20, doc. 14–1. Jones's position also required her to be able to read and write in English. Id. Jones, a high school graduate who attended community college, met this requirement without issue.

In February 2006, defendants adopted and implemented a new dispute resolution policy called the U–Haul Arbitration Policy (“UAP”). U–Haul Arbitration Policy, doc. 14–2. The UAP consisted of two documents: (1) the Notice to Employees About U–Haul's New Arbitration Policy (“UAP Notice”), and (2) the U–Haul Employee Agreement to Arbitrate, (“UAP Agreement”). The UAP Notice provided:

Effective February 20, 2006, [defendants] adopted and implemented a new arbitration policy, requiring mandatory, binding arbitration of disputes, for all new employees....The UAP applies to all [defendants'] employees who are hired after February 20, 2006, regardless of length of service or status, and covers all disputes relating to or arising out of an employee's employment with [defendants] or the termination of that employment. Examples of the type of disputes or claims covered by the UAP include, but are not limited to, claims for wrongful termination of employment, breach of contract, fraud, employment discrimination, harassment or retaliation under the [ADA], [ADEA], [Title VII], state fair employment and housing acts or any other state or local antidiscrimination laws, tort claims ... or any other legal or equitable claims and causes of action recognized by local, state or federal law or regulations....Because the UAP changes the forum in which you may pursue claims against U–Haul and affects your legal rights, you may wish to review the UAP with an attorney or other advisor of your choosing. U–Haul encourages you to do so.

Your decision to accept employment or to continue employment with [defendants] constitutes your agreement to be bound by the UAP.

Id. at 1 (emphasis in original).

On January 12, 2007, Jones maintains that she “was called into management's office and pressured to sign the [UAP Agreement] or lose her job with U–Haul....” Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n at 2–3, doc. 15. Jones contends that she was “confused and did not actually understand the [UAP] ..., had no idea what she was signing ..., [and] did not realize that the [UAP] applied only to new employees.” Id. According to Jones, the UAP “was being forced upon her as a requirement to keep her employment,” and thus “[i]n order to keep her job, [Jones] signed the [UAP] that day.” Id. It is undisputed that Jones signed the UAP, by hand, on January 12, 2007. After signing the UAP Agreement, Jones continued her at-will employment with defendants as a Reservation Manager.

In the summer of 2007, defendants updated the UAP and renamed it the Employment Dispute Resolution Policy (“EDR Policy”). U–Haul's EDR Policy, doc. 14–3. Like the UAP, the EDR Policy also consisted of two documents: (1) the Notice to Employees About U–Haul's Employment Dispute Resolution Policy (“EDR Notice”), and (2) the U–Haul Employee Agreement to Arbitrate (“EDR Agreement”). Id.

In most respects, the language and terms of defendants' updated EDR Policy were almost identical to its original dispute resolution policy, the UAP. One difference was that the EDR Policy applied to all employees, not just new employees hired after February 20, 2006. Id. (emphasis added). The EDR Notice provided for “mandatory, binding arbitration of disputes, for all employees ... [and] applies to all [defendants'] employees regardless of length of service or status....” Id. at 1 (emphasis added). The type of claims and disputes expressly covered by the EDR were identical to those claims and disputes covered by the UAP. Id. (“[T]he type of disputes or claims covered by the EDR include ... the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act....”). Finally, like its predecessor the UAP, the EDR Notice reiterated that:

Because the EDR changes the forum in which you may pursue claims against U–Haul and affects your legal rights, you may wish to review the EDR with an attorney or other advisor of your choosing. U–Haul encourages you to do so. Your decision ... to continue employment with [U–Haul] constitutes your agreement to be bound by the EDR.”

Id. (emphasis in original).

Jones contends that defendants engaged in “discriminatory conduct and other wrongful acts [ ] throughout the many years of Jones's employment with certain acts occurring in 2007, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013. Am. Compl. ¶ 4, doc. 9. Specifically, Jones alleges that for a period of months during 2007, she would answer the telephone at work and the caller would use racial epithets. Id. at ¶ 5. On June 13, 2007, Jones informed defendants of the offensive telephone calls by sending an email to U–Haul management. Id., Ex. 3; see Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n at 10, doc. 15. As a result of her email, Jones alleges that defendants conditioned Jones's continued employment upon her agreeing to the updated EDR Policy, which Jones allegedly signed electronically on June 18, 2007. Am. Compl., at ¶ 5. Jones maintains that she “has no recollection of signing, electronically or otherwise, an arbitration or employment dispute resolution policy in June, 2007.” Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n at 3, doc. 15. After allegedly signing the updated EDR Policy, Jones continued her employment with defendants for six years before voluntarily resigning from her position on June 24, 2013. Am. Compl., at ¶¶ 2–5.

Jones first filed a Complaint against defendants on November 22, 2013 in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas asserting violations of Title VII, the ADEA, the Ohio Fair Employment Practices Act, and various claims under common law. Stacy A. Jones v. U–Haul Co. of Massachusetts and Ohio Inc., et al.,

Case No. 13CV012772 (Franklin Cnty. Ct. C.P.). On December 18, 2013, Jones filed an Amended Complaint (doc. 9) in which she further alleged that the purported arbitration agreement she signed on June 18, 2007 is “an adhesion contract, invalid, unenforceable, unconscionable, inequitable, and was procured through undue influence and duress.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 6. Defendants removed the case to this Court on December 26, 2013 on the basis of federal subject matter jurisdiction.

Defendants assert that Jones's lawsuit must be dismissed pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 –16, because her claims are subject to one, if not two mandatory arbitration agreements existing between the parties. Defs.' Mot. to Compel Arbitration, doc. 14 at 1. Additionally, defendants request an award of the attorneys' fees incurred as a result of Jones's refusal to voluntarily submit her claims to arbitration, despite a demand by defendants. Id. at 12; Defs.' Reply, doc. 16 at 3–4.

In support of its motion, defendants submitted: (1) the affidavit of Robert M. Aleo, defendants' director of human resources programs (doc. 14–1); (2) the UAP Notice and UAP Agreement that Jones allegedly signed by hand on January 12, 2007 (doc. 14–2); (3) the EDR Notice and EDR Agreement that Jones allegedly signed electronically on June 18, 2007 (doc. 14–3); (4) Jones's August 1999 employment application (doc. 14–4); (5) the affidavit of Meghan E. Hill, defendants' attorney of record (doc. 14–5); (6) a series of emails between the parties' attorneys discussing the enforceability of the arbitration agreement (doc. 14–6–doc. 14–8); and (7) six out of circuit cases upholding the enforceability of defendants' EDR Policy (doc. 14–9).

II. Standard of Review

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides that arbitration clauses in commercial contracts “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. The FAA applies in the employment setting and agreements to arbitrate employment discrimination disputes have been enforced. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991). Where a cause of action is determined to be covered by arbitration, the...