Jones v. U.S., No. 06-CF-1000.

• Decision Date: 04 June 2009
• Docket Number: No. 06-CF-1000.
• Citation: 972 A.2d 821
• Parties: Rodney A. JONES, Appellant v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

972 A.2d 821

Rodney A. JONES, Appellant v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 06-CF-1000.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Submitted September 10, 2008.

Decided June 4, 2009.

Donald L. Dworsky, appointed by the court, was on the brief for appellant.

Jeffrey A. Taylor, United States Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese, III, Fernando Campoamor Sanchez, and Elizabeth H. Danello, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief for appellee.

Before NEBEKER, TERRY, and SCHWELB, Senior Judges.

TERRY, Senior Judge:

Appellant, Rodney Jones, was convicted of carrying a pistol without a license, possession of an unregistered firearm, possession of unregistered ammunition, and possession of marijuana. His arrest and conviction arose from the stop and search of his vehicle at a police traffic checkpoint in Northeast Washington. Jones argues that the trial court erred in denying his pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence recovered from his vehicle and his person. He also asserts that the government presented insufficient evidence to support his convictions of the three weapons-related offenses. We agree with the trial court that the search of Jones' vehicle and his person was lawful and that the evidence was sufficient. Accordingly, we affirm.

I

On the night of January 26, 2006, the Metropolitan Police Department established a traffic safety compliance checkpoint at 21st and East Capitol Streets, Northeast. At that location 21st Street has three lanes. The police blocked the two outer lanes with patrol cars, funneling traffic into one slow-moving lane, and set up additional lighting so that they could monitor the flow of traffic more effectively. They stopped vehicles only when they saw an obvious traffic violation.

Officer Ty Truong was monitoring traffic at the checkpoint that night when he saw a burgundy van, driven by appellant Jones, approach the checkpoint at a speed of about seven miles per hour. From a distance of approximately five to seven feet, Officer Truong noticed that Jones' van did not have a rear-view mirror. The officer then motioned for Jones to pull over.

After Jones pulled his van to the curb, Officer Truong told him that he had been stopped because the van lacked a rear-view mirror. The officer asked Jones for his driver's license, and Jones replied that he did not have one.¹ Officer Truong then asked if Jones had anything illegal in the van. Jones hesitated, then answered, "No." Jones did not look at the officer as he was being questioned but stared straight ahead, behavior which struck Truong and his partner as unusual. Officer Truong then asked Jones to step out of the van. When Jones did not comply at first, Officer Truong asked him again to alight from the van. Jones then attempted to reach for the ignition keys, which were still in place. At that moment, however, another officer who had approached the van from the passenger side reached in through the window and took the keys out of the ignition. Officer Truong then opened the door on the driver's side of the van, and Jones stepped out. After Officer Truong confirmed via radio that Jones' license had expired in 2002, he arrested Jones for driving without a license. The officer then conducted a search of the van and discovered a loaded gun under the driver's seat, with the butt of the gun facing outward. A search of Jones' person yielded several plastic bags of marijuana.

The government introduced into evidence at the suppression hearing a photograph of the van as it appeared on the night of Jones' arrest. Officer Truong noted in his testimony that no rear-view mirror was visible in the picture.

Jones testified at the suppression hearing that on January 26 he had borrowed and was driving his girl friend's car, which had side mirrors and a rear-view mirror. Jones stated that when Officer Truong pulled him over, he never asked about a rear-view mirror but instead requested his driver's license and registration. Jones added that after he told the officer that he did not have his license with him, Officer Truong responded that he was "out here looking for drugs and guns." After Jones replied that he could not be of any assistance, Officer Truong asked Jones for permission to search the car, but Jones declined. Jones said that Officer Truong then instructed him to turn off the engine, but as he was doing so, the officer became agitated and called for assistance. Truong and another officer then "snatched" him out of the van and proceeded to search it.

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the court credited Officer Truong's testimony that he stopped Jones' van because it lacked a rear-view mirror, and did not credit Jones' testimony. The court ruled that the stop of the van was lawful, and that the search of the van and of Jones' person was lawful as incident to his arrest for driving without a license. Accordingly, the court denied the motion to suppress evidence.

At trial Officer Truong and other officers testified about the circumstances leading to the stop of the van and the seizure of the gun and the marijuana. Jones did not testify. The jury found him guilty of all charges.

II

Our review of a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress is limited. See White v. United States, 763 A.2d 715, 719 (D.C.2000) (citing cases). "We must defer to the court's findings of evidentiary fact and view those facts and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to sustaining the ruling below." Joseph v. United States, 926 A.2d 1156, 1160 (D.C.2007) (citations omitted). The court's "ultimate conclusion[s]" on Fourth Amendment issues, however, are "subject to de novo review." Brown v. United States, 590 A.2d 1008, 1020 (D.C.1991) (quoting United States v. Campbell, 843 F.2d 1089, 1092 (8th Cir.1988)). "Essentially, our role as an appellate court `is to ensure that the trial court had a substantial basis for concluding' that no constitutional violation occurred." Joseph, 926 A.2d at 1160 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 540 A.2d 1090, 1091 n. 2 (D.C. 1988)).

Jones maintains that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the traffic checkpoint was in reality an unconstitutional roadblock. Since the police set up the roadblock for the purpose of general crime control, he argues, the resulting stop of his van was illegal, and the gun and the marijuana should have been suppressed.

In denying Jones' motion, the trial court made no ruling as to the constitutional validity of the checkpoint. We agree with the trial court that this case does not turn on whether the police arrested Jones in an unconstitutional roadblock; rather, for the reasons we shall explain, we are satisfied that the police checkpoint was not an impermissible roadblock. What we must decide instead is whether Officer Truong and his fellow officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that Jones was violating the District's motor vehicle laws, and whether he was seized while approaching the checkpoint before such suspicion materialized. See Duckett v. United States, 886 A.2d 548, 551 (D.C.2005) (validity of traffic stop under Fourth Amendment turns on whether officer had "at least a reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was witnessing a traffic violation"). We hold that Jones was lawfully arrested for driving without a license and that his van and his person were lawfully searched incident to his arrest.²

The court heard testimony that Officer Truong saw Jones driving a van without a rear-view mirror from a distance of approximately five to seven feet. The government also introduced a photograph of that van which showed that it had no rear-view mirror, and the officer testified that the photograph accurately reflected the state of the van when he stopped it. In light of this evidence, and given the court's determination that Jones' testimony was not credible, its finding that Officer Truong stopped Jones' van because it lacked a rear-view mirror is supported by the evidence and is not clearly erroneous.³ See Limpuangthip v. United States, 932 A.2d 1137, 1141-1142 (D.C.2007) (discussing scope of review of trial court's factual findings in a suppression hearing).

Nor can there be any doubt that Officer Truong had a "reasonable articulable suspicion," based on objective facts, to believe that Jones had committed a traffic violation.⁴ See, e.g., United States v. Glover, 851 A.2d 473, 476 (D.C.2004) (officer's observation of minor civil traffic violation justified traffic stop); Lewis v. United States, 632 A.2d 383, 388 n. 12 (D.C.1993) ("the absence of a front tag on the automobile constituted reasonable articulable suspicion justifying the stop"); Minnick v. United States, 607 A.2d 519, 524 (D.C. 1992) ("The Fourth Amendment does not bar the police from stopping and questioning motorists when they witness or suspect a violation of traffic laws, even if the offense is a minor one"). Officer Truong was thus entitled to ask Jones to exhibit his driver's license, to require him to get out of the van as a routine safety precaution, and then to arrest him after he failed to produce a valid driver's license and the officer independently confirmed that he did not have one. Mitchell, 746 A.2d at 887 ("An officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, [and] run a computer check"); Glover, 851 A.2d at 476 (officer may require driver to get out of the car during a lawful traffic stop); see D.C.Code § 50-1401.01(d) (2001) (prohibiting operation of a motor vehicle without a valid operator's permit); D.C.Code § 50-2302.02(8) (violation of § 50-1401.01(d) is a criminal offense); cf. Botts v. United States, 310 A.2d 237, 239-240 (D.C.1973) (probable cause to arrest when driver can produce neither license nor vehicle registration). Thus the only issue genuinely in dispute is whether the police illegally seized Jones—that is, whether he was seized before Officer Truong developed a...