Jones v. United States
| Decision Date | 07 October 1913 |
| Docket Number | 1,965. |
| Citation | 209 F. 585 |
| Parties | JONES v. UNITED STATES. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
David K. Tone, of Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff in error.
James H. Wilkerson, U.S. Atty., of Chicago, Ill.
This matter is before us on writ of error based upon the judgment of the District Court committing plaintiff in error hereinafter termed 'respondent,' to prison for alleged contempt of court, in that he tendered himself on November 8, 1912, to said court as a surety upon the bail bond of one Johnson, who was before said court under indictment, and represented to the court under oath that he was the owner in fee of premises known as No. 2969 Michigan avenue, Chicago, Ill.
From the record it appears that on August 24, 1912, one Mary Meyer, who four days thereafter became the wife of respondent, deeded to him said real estate, which was approximately, of the value at which it was scheduled, for considerations which are not clearly set out but some of which were valuable. This deed was duly recorded on August 28, 1912. During the examination to which respondent was subjected at the time he tendered himself as a surety, he disclosed to the court, somewhat reluctantly and under the pressure of rigid inquiry, that on the day he recorded his deed to said premises he executed a deed back to his said wife. Just what was to be done as to the custody of this deed he does not clearly remember, but does testify that it was to be delivered to her only in the event of his death, in order to prevent any interest therein vesting in his child by a former marriage. In this he is corroborated by his said wife and by Levering, the lawyer who prepared both deeds and acted as attorney for both parties in regard to their said transactions. The latter remembers little concerning the understanding had at the time as to what immediate disposition was to be made of the deed, but testified unqualifiedly that it was not to be placed of record during the grantor's lifetime. He supposes it was taken away with the rest of the papers. Respondent testifies that he supposed his lawyer would keep it. It was never recorded. Just what was done with it does not appear, except that, when the District Court had ordered respondent into the jury room after hearing his testimony for the purpose of investigating whether the same were true or false, he directed the court bailiff to accompany Mrs. Jones to their home and bring the deed back to the court. This was done, and the deed impounded. The bailiff testified that he remained downstairs in the premises, while Mrs. Jones went upstairs and then came down and delivered the deed to him. He knew nothing of the circumstances under which she obtained it. All of the foregoing proceedings were had and entitled in the matter of Johnson's application for release on bail. Respondent having been sent to and directed to remain in the jury room, at the close of his testimony as above stated, was not present in court during said subsequent proceedings in re said Johnson's bond. Thereupon on said 8th day of November, 1912, the District Court entered an order based upon the testimony adduced in re said Johnson's application for release on bail aforesaid, finding that respondent had testified falsely in deposing before the court that he was the owner in fee of said premises and that the same were free from all incumbrance; that he had, by the name of A. Charles Jones, executed and delivered a warranty deed to said premises to Mary M. Jones on August 28, 1912, which deed was in her possession and produced in open court; that respondent had committed perjury and, by reason of his said attempt to impose on the court, did willfully and maliciously attempt to obstruct and impede the due administration of justice in said court, and ruled that he show cause by a day named before said court why he should not be punished for contempt; and that, pending further hearing, he be held under bond in the penal sum of $10,000. Thereupon, and on November 8, 1912, respondent was committed to jail in default of bond.
For answer to said rule, respondent charged that the court was without jurisdiction to try or punish him because no sworn complaint had been filed advising him of what he was charged with; that he had been excluded from the courtroom at the time testimony was taken as to his qualification as surety; that no copy of said testimony was filed in the present cause; that the said contempt order was based upon the testimony of his wife and his attorney, neither of whom should have been permitted to give evidence against him. For further answer respondent stated under oath that he was the owner of the premises in question when he so deposed in court and that his testimony in that behalf was not false; that he gave his present wife valuable consideration for said conveyance to him, and that the same was a bona fide conveyance to him, and that his deed back to his said wife was not to be recorded or take effect until after his death; that said deed had never been recorded; that at the time he deposed as aforesaid he had been advised by his lawyer, and believed, and still believes, himself to be the owner of said lot and house, and that his attorney, Levering, took said deed, as he supposed, in escrow, and that he was of that mind at the time he so attempted to qualify as bondsman. A hearing was had upon said rule on November 14, 1912, at which witnesses were examined. At the close of the evidence, respondent by counsel moved the court for discharge from said rule because it was entered without the filing of a complaint or information, and for the further reason that the testimony was incompetent and was taken in his absence; also, because perjury was punishable by indictment and not as for contempt of court, and also because of his sworn answer and because the evidence did not show respondent to be guilty as charged, beyond a reasonable doubt. All of which motions were overruled by the District Court, and respondent, having been adjudged to have failed to show cause, was adjudged to be guilty of contempt and ordered to be confined in the jail of Will county, Ill., at Joliet, for a term of 12 months.
For error respondent assigns:
(1) That no sworn complaint was...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Tucker v. State ex rel. Snow
... ... the bill nor the information states facts sufficient to ... constitute a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and ... against ... evidence; 13 C. J. 6, 77-78; 6 R. C. L. 490; Jones v ... U.S., 209 F. 585. A defendant charged with one offense, ... cannot be convicted of ... State ex rel. v. Daugherty, 137 Tenn. 125, 191 S.W ... 974; McGovern v. United States, (C. C. A.) 280 F ... 73; Lewinsohn v. United States, (C. C. A.) 278 F ... 421. Such ... ...
-
Blim v. United States
...was true, then, of course, there was no contumacious conduct or disobedience of the court's order. What this court said in Jones v. United States, 209 F. 585, 587, is especially applicable to the case at bar: "Under the authorities, the present contempt proceeding, having been entitled as s......
-
United States v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.
...to testify against himself." To the same effect are Parker v. United States, 1 Cir., 153 F.2d 66, 70, 163 A.L.R. 379; Jones v. United States, 7 Cir., 209 F. 585, 587, and Kelly v. United States, 9 Cir., 250 F. 947, In Wilson v. State of North Carolina, 169 U.S. 586, 600, 18 S.Ct. 435, 42 L.......
-
In re Mcintosh
...Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746; Coffin v. U. S., 156 U. S. 432, 15 S. Ct. 394, 39 L. Ed. 481; Jones v. U. S. (C. C. A.) 209 F. 585, 587; Blim v. U. S. (C. C. A.) 68 F.(2d) 484. See also Wakefield v. Housel (C. C. A.) 288 F. 712, 717. As the government offered no e......