Jones v. United States

• Decision Date: 31 March 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 11–2116(EGS).
• Parties: Treshawn V. JONES, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

934 F.Supp.2d 284

Treshawn V. JONES, Plaintiff,

v.UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 11–2116(EGS).

United States District Court,

District of Columbia.

March 31, 2013.

Gregory L. Lattimer, Law Offices of Gregory L. Lattimer, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

William Mark Nebeker, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

EMMET G. SULLIVAN, District Judge.

This case is before the Court on defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment. Upon consideration of the motion, the opposition and reply thereto, the entire record, and for the reasons explained below, defendants' motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment is DENIED as to Counts I through IV of the complaint. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Count V of the complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

In her Complaint, plaintiff brings several claims arising from a January 28, 2009 traffic stop that occurred in the District of Columbia. Plaintiff alleges that she was traveling near Southern Avenue and Galveston Street, S.E. with her minor child in the vehicle. Compl. ¶ 5. Plaintiff states that as she approached the intersection, she noticed that her sister's fiancé, Eric Herrion, was a passenger in a vehicle that had been stopped by Officer Yeliz Kadiev, a law enforcement officer employed by the United States Park Police. Compl. ¶ 4, 5.

Plaintiff stopped her vehicle near the intersection and exited her car. Compl. ¶ 6. Plaintiff states that as she got out of her car, Officer Kadiev “began yelling and screaming at the plaintiff to get back her car.” Id. At the same time, plaintiff's daughter ran to Mr. Herrion, who was in the passenger side of the vehicle that had been stopped. Id. Plaintiff states that Officer Kadiev “became even more irate even as the plaintiff attempted to explain the situation to her.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that as she attempted to lead her daughter back to their car, Officer Kadiev “accosted the plaintiff, who was pregnant at the time, by pushing, manhandling and taking her to the ground.” Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff further states that she was placed in handcuffs, arrested, and taken to jail. Id. Plaintiff was charged with disorderly conduct and failure to obey. Id. ¶ 8. Following a bench trial in the District of Columbia Superior Court, plaintiff was acquitted of all charges on October 7, 2009. Id.

Plaintiff states that she filed a notice of claim with the United States on January 28, 2011 by filing a Standard Form 95 with the National Park Service of the Department of the Interior. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff's claim was denied on May 25, 2011. Id. Plaintiff then filed this suit on November 28, 2011.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEWA. Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C.Cir.2002). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). While detailed factual allegations are not necessary, plaintiff must plead enough facts “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.

When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court may consider “the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint, and matters about which the Court may take judicial notice.” Gustave–Schmidt v. Chao, 226 F.Supp.2d 191, 196 (D.D.C.2002). The Court must construe the complaint liberally in plaintiff's favor and grant plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences deriving from the complaint. Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994). However, the Court must not accept plaintiff's inferences that are “unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.” Id. “[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

B. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Moore v. Hartman, 571 F.3d 62, 66 (D.C.Cir.2009). To establish a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must demonstrate—through affidavits or other competent evidence, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)—that the quantum of evidence “is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Steele v. Schafer, 535 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C.Cir.2008) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505). While the Court views all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party in reaching that determination, Keyes v. District of Columbia, 372 F.3d 434, 436 (D.C.Cir.2004), the nonmoving party must nevertheless provide more than “a scintilla of evidence” in support of its position, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.But “[i]f material facts are at issue, or, though undisputed, are susceptible to divergent inferences, summary judgment is not available.” Kuo–Yun Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C.Cir.1994).

III. DISCUSSIONA. Evidence Properly Before the Court

Rule 56 allows a party seeking or opposing summary judgment to “object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). Plaintiff objects on the basis of inadmissibility to several of the statements in defendants' Local Rule 56.1 statement of material facts not in dispute. Plaintiff does not explain the basis for her objections, merely responding that “there is no admissible evidence” in the record to support several statements. Plaintiff's argument focuses on two documents: the transcript from her trial in Superior Court and the criminal incident report of her arrest.

At the summary judgment stage, a party is not required to produce evidence in a form that is admissible, but the evidence must be capable of being converted into admissible evidence at trial. Gleklen v. Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm., Inc., 199 F.3d 1365, 1369 (D.C.Cir.2000); see also America v. Mills, 654 F.Supp.2d 28, 35 (D.D.C.2009) (finding that “if it is possible to convert evidence into a form that would be admissible at trial,” the court may consider it for summary judgment); see Richards v. Option One Mortgage, No. 08 Civ. 0007(PLF), 2009 WL 2751831, at *1 n. 3 (D.D.C.2009) (explaining that hearsay statements may be converted into admissible evidence if a witness with personal knowledge can testify to them at trial). Accordingly, to the extent that the evidence cited by defendants can be converted into admissible evidence, it can be considered on summary judgment.

The nature of plaintiff's Rule 56(c)(2) objection to the admissibility of portions of the trial transcript is unclear. To the extent that plaintiff is objecting to the authenticity of the trial transcript, defendants have attached to their reply a copy of the court reporter's certification of the transcript, see Defs.' Reply, Ex. 8, and the Court finds that this is sufficient to establish the authenticity of the trial transcript for purposes of summary judgment. SeeFed.R.Evid. 901 (the requirement of authentication is satisfied if the proponent produces “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is”); Mills, 654 F.Supp.2d at 34 (on summary judgment, the Court “need not find that the evidence is necessarily what the proponent claims, but only is that there is sufficient evidence so that the jury ultimately might do so”). If, instead, plaintiff seeks to object to the use of a transcript at trial, rather than live evidence, that argument also fails because such testimony can be “converted” into admissible live testimony if the witness in question testifies at the trial. See Richards, 2009 WL 2751831, at *1 n. 3. Plaintiff makes no argument that any of the Superior Court trial witnesses would be unavailable for this trial. Accordingly, the Court finds that the trial transcript is properly cited as evidence in support of summary judgment.

The Court also finds that the use of the police report is also proper under Rule 56(c)(2). Defendants have properly established the authenticity of the police report in an affidavit submitted with their Reply. See Defs.' Reply, Ex. 9. To the extent that plaintiff is also challenging the police record as hearsay, this argument also fails. As an initial matter, and although not argued by either party, the Court finds that the report would likely be admissible as a business record under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) or a public record under Rule 803(8). The Court also notes that while many of the statements contained within the police report are “out-of-court” statements, it does not appear that they are being used in this context to “prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). Rather, the statements are being offered by the defendants to establish that certain statements were made and their effect on the listener, Officer Kadiev. Ali v. D.C. Government, 810 F.Supp.2d 78, 83 (D.D.C.2011) (rejecting Rule 56(c)(2) objection to certain statements and documents that were offered on summary judgment for non-hearsay purposes such as the effect on the listener). Similarly, to the extent that any of plaintiff's own statements in the report are being offered for their truth, such statements would likely also be admissible in this case as admissions by party opponent. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2).

In view of the Court's...