Jones v. United States
| Decision Date | 06 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 4:98-cr-10-01 |
| Citation | 431 F.Supp.3d 740 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | David JONES , Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent. |
Keith Kimball, Assistant Federal Public Defender, for Petitioner.
Howard Zlotnick, Assistant U.S. Attorney, for Respondent.
Before the Court is David Jones' ("Petitioner") motion seeking relief under the FIRST STEP Act. ECF No. 217. For the reasons stated below, Petitioner's motion is GRANTED.
On October 12, 1984, Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-47, 98 Stat. 1976 ("CCCA"), which included the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("SRA"). Through this, the legislature created the United States Sentencing Commission, which in turn established the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See United States Sentencing Guidelines, § 1A1.1. As part of this new federal sentencing scheme, Section 3553(b)(1) of Title 18 of the United States Code made the guideline ranges mandatory.
On January 12, 2005, the United States Supreme Court held that these mandatory guideline sentences were unconstitutional in United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220, 244–45, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). Since then, federal courts have considered the guideline ranges as advisory and are free to impose sentences that are within the statutory minimums and maximums. However, every single United States Court of Appeals has held that the Booker decision is not retroactive for purposes of collateral attacks. In re Fashina , 486 F.3d 1300, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (collecting cases); Cirilo-Munoz v. United States , 404 F.3d 527, 533 (1st Cir. 2005) ; Guzman v. United States , 404 F.3d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 2005) ; Lloyd v. United States , 407 F.3d 608, 610 (3d Cir. 2005) ; United States v. Morris , 429 F.3d 65, 72 (4th Cir. 2005) ; United States v. Gentry , 432 F.3d 600, 604 (5th Cir. 2005) ; Humphress v. United States , 398 F.3d 855, 860 (6th Cir. 2005) ; McReynolds v. United States , 397 F.3d 479, 481 (7th Cir. 2005) ; Never Misses A Shot v. United States , 413 F.3d 781, 783–84 (8th Cir. 2005) ; United States v. Cruz , 423 F.3d 1119, 1120–21 (9th Cir. 2005) ; United States v. Bellamy , 411 F.3d 1182, 1186–87 (10th Cir. 2005) ; Varela v. United States , 400 F.3d 864, 868 (11th Cir. 2005).
The undercutting of Booker's core remedial measure has created a lost generation, a group caught in a national purgatory, where individual citizens pay penance for the constitutional errors of the sovereign. For twenty years of this nation's history, at the height of what has been called the "crack epidemic," harsh sentences which disproportionately impacted African Americans were imposed based in unconstitutionally high guideline ranges.1 Although courts now have the discretion to depart from the Guidelines as they see fit after Booker , they could not review the sentences of this twenty-year period, leaving those individuals to serve their sentences based on an unconstitutional framework. The Petitioner in this case, David Jones, is but one of the many members of this lost generation.
On December 21, 2018, Congress passed the Formerly Incarcerated Reenter Society Transformed Safely Transitioning Every Person Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018) ("FIRST STEP Act"), which authorizes courts to "impose a reduced sentence for anyone" who (1) was convicted of a statute, for which the penalties were modified by Sections 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010) ("FSA"); (2) the offense was committed before August 3, 2010; and (3) did not already receive a reduction under the FSA or the FIRST STEP Act. See FIRST STEP Act, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222. With this newest legislation, Congress has indeed taken the first step to begin correcting the wrongs done to the lost generation of 1984 to 2005.
From late 1989 to March 1998, Petitioner was involved in a long-running crack cocaine distribution conspiracy. ECF No. 216 at 4. On April 14, 1998, Petitioner was named in a 14-count superseding indictment (ECF No. 9) as indicated below:
Petitioner elected to go to trial, which commenced on July 6, 1998. On July 15, 1998, a jury found Petitioner guilty on Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, and 10. ECF No. 37. Petitioner's conviction on Counts 2 was vacated and Counts 5 and 11 were dismissed after a motion from the Government. ECF No. 62. On November 17, 1998, this Court sentenced Petitioner as required under the then-mandatory sentencing guidelines to a total term of life plus 540 years as follows: life imprisonment on Counts 1, 3, 9 and 10; 60 months on Count 4 to run consecutively with the term in Counts 1, 3, 9, and 10; 240 months on Count 6 to run consecutively with the term in Counts 1, 3, 4, 9, and 10; and 240 months on Count 7 to run consecutively with the term in Counts 1, 3, 4, 6, 9, and 10. Id.
On May 11, 2015, this Court reduced Petitioner's life sentence to 360 months on Counts 1, 3, 9, and 10 pursuant to his motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) after revisions to the guideline ranges ("Amendment 782 Motion"), while maintaining the full cumulative term of 540 months for Counts 4, 6, and 7, to run consecutively with the revised sentence of 360 months on Counts 1, 3, 9, and 10. ECF No. 179. After the Court's May 11, 2015 Order, Petitioner's sentence was for 900 months, or seventy-five years. Id. Petitioner has served over twenty-one years of his sentence. ECF No. 225-2.
On September 13, 2019, Petitioner filed his Motion to Reduce Sentence under the FIRST STEP Act. ECF No. 225. On September 16, 2019, the Court received a copy of Petitioner's original Presentence Report ("PSR"). ECF No. 226. On November 4, 2019, the Government responded in opposition to Petitioner's motion. ECF No. 229.
When a court imposes a sentence of imprisonment, that is considered a final judgment on the matter. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b). It is well established that "[t]he law closely guards the finality of criminal sentences against judicial ‘change of heart.’ " United States v. Goodwyn , 596 F.3d 233, 235 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Layman , 116 F.3d 105, 109 (4th Cir. 1997) ). Under statutory law, a "court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed" except in limited circumstances, including "to the extent otherwise expressly permitted by statute." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B).
Petitioner seeks relief under the FIRST STEP Act through 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B). The Court must decide (1) whether Petitioner is eligible for a sentence reduction under the FIRST STEP Act; (2) whether a hearing is necessary or required; and (3) what, if any, relief should the Court grant.
The parties disagree on whether the Petitioner is eligible for a reduced sentence under the FIRST STEP Act. Petitioner argues that the Court has discretion to reduce his entire sentence under the FIRST STEP Act. ECF No. 225. The Government argues that Petitioner does not qualify for a sentence reduction and uses an eligibility argument previously rejected by this Court in its evaluation of Petitioner's co-defendant. See e.g., United States v. Dshanna Yvonne Randall , No. 4:98-cr-00010 (E.D. Va. Oct. 21, 2019).
As relevant to the FIRST STEP Act, § 3582(c)(1)(B) states that the court "may modify an imposed term of imprisonment to the extent otherwise expressly permitted by statute." When it comes to legislation, § 3582 gives Congress wide discretion to craft the relief a court may impose. Therefore, it is the language of § 404 of the FIRST STEP Act that controls the amount of relief sought.
Two instances of the FIRST STEP Act's language guide this Court's analysis. First, § 404(b) states that "a court that imposed a sentence for a covered offense may" grant relief to the petitioner. "The word ‘may,’ when used in a statute, usually implies some degree of discretion ... [but] can be defeated by indications of legislative intent to the contrary or by obvious inferences from the structure and purpose of the statute." United States v. Rodgers , 461 U.S. 677, 706, 103 S.Ct. 2132, 76 L.Ed.2d 236 (1983) (citing United States ex rel. Siegel v. Thoman , 156 U.S. 353, 359–60, 15 S.Ct. 378, 39 L.Ed. 450 (1895) ). The FIRST STEP Act's use of "may" provides broad discretion to the federal courts; in fact, the Act explicitly notes, "Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant to this section." FIRST STEP Act, § 404(c), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222. Other district courts have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Rose , 379 F.Supp.3d 223 , 229-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (citing United States v. Allen , 384 F.Supp.3d 238 ,...
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