Jones v. United States
| Citation | 484 F.Supp.3d 1238 |
| Decision Date | 31 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case Number: 19-20852-CIV-MORENO |
| Parties | John Mark JONES, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America; Special Agent Luis Arias, individually; and Special Agent Jason Scelsa a/k/a Jason Wilson, individually, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Stuart N. Kaplan, The Law Offices of Stuart N. Kaplan, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, FL, for Plaintiff.
Christopher Edward Cheek, U.S. Attorney's Office, Miami, FL, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
In this excessive force case, Plaintiff John Mark Jones, a Sergeant with the Monroe County Sheriff's Office, alleges that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by federal agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives because they used excessive force against him during an investigatory stop. In his Amended Complaint, Jones asserts 6 excessive force claims under Bivens and Section 1983 against ATF Agents Luis Arias and Jason Scelsa, and 4 claims against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for negligence, assault, battery, and false imprisonment.
Defendants move to dismiss all claims. They argue that the allegations fail to state any claims against the United States, and that the Agents are immune from suit on qualified immunity grounds. Jones insists that his claims are adequately pleaded and that qualified immunity is not appropriate here.
For the reasons below, the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (D.E. 26) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
In September 2017, Plaintiff John Mark Jones, a Sergeant with the Monroe County Sheriff's Office, was working alongside other law enforcement agencies to coordinate security and clean-up efforts in the Florida Keys following the devastation left by Hurricane Irma. (D.E. 25 at ¶¶ 12, 14.) While traveling on a two-lane highway on Sugarloaf Key, Jones approached two vehicles stopped in the road. Id. at ¶¶ 16–20. The vehicles, which were heading in opposition directions, were positioned mirror-to-mirror. Id. at ¶¶ 19–20. Unable to drive around the stopped vehicles, Jones honked his horn at the black Chevrolet Suburban stopped immediately in front of him. Id. at ¶¶ 21–22. Although the other vehicle moved, the driver of the Suburban "glanced" at Jones with an "irritated" and "angry" stare and refused to move his vehicle. Id. at ¶ 23. Left with no choice, Jones "was forced to proceed" around the Suburban. Id. at ¶ 24.
Almost one mile down the highway, Jones noticed the Black Suburban traveling at a high rate of speed with his emergency lights and siren activated. Id. at ¶ 25. Jones "immediately pulled over" and "exited" his "unmarked" truck. Id. at ¶¶ 16, 26.2 He then, "pursuant to policy and procedure," stated that he worked for the Sheriff's Office and asked why he was stopped. Id. at ¶ 26. The Suburban was occupied by Defendants Luis Arias and Jason Scelsa, both agents with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. Id. at ¶¶ 15, 27. The Agents exited the Suburban, And unlike Jones, who was wearing plain clothes,3 both Agents wore tactical gear with "ATF" displayed on their vests. Id. at ¶ 27. Jones again shouted that he worked for the Sheriff's Office and announced that he was going to get his wallet. Id. at ¶ 28. It was then that Jones "wanted to reach for his wallet" but the driver4 ordered Jones to stop and show his hands, and then warned Jones not to reach for anything or else he would be shot. Id. at ¶ 29.
Jones complied with the driver's order, again asserted that he worked for the Sheriff's Office, and again asked why he was stopped. Id. at ¶ 30. At this point, both Agents approached Jones with their guns drawn and pointed at his face. Id. at ¶ 32. The driver then "grabbed" Jones, directed him to the Suburban, and "slammed" him against the side fender and hood. Id. at ¶ 33. During this time, Jones continued to tell the Agents that he worked for the Sheriff's Office and told the Agents to check his wallet or truck. Id. Agent Arias continued to yell at Jones while Agent Scelsa continued to aim his gun at Jones's face. Id. at ¶ 34. Then, Agent Arias grabbed Jones's right arm and "forcefully pulled it behind his back and to the middle of his neck." Id. at ¶ 35. Jones immediately felt pain and his shoulder muscle and tendons tear. Id. It was not until after this injury that the Agents checked Jones's law enforcement credentials. Id. at ¶ 36.
The Agents considered bringing in and arresting Jones, yet, despite Jones's repeated questions, refused to tell him why he was stopped. Id. at ¶ 37. Jones "requested to leave" but the Agents "refused and held" him "against his will." Id. at ¶ 38. After Jones told the Agents that he was going to tell his Captain and the Sheriff about the incident, the Agents told Jones that they would be taking him to jail. Id. The Agents then started yelling obscenities louder and louder to the point where some local residents started observing the incident. Id. at ¶ 39. It was at this point that the Agents decided to let Jones go. Id. at ¶ 41. Jones asked why he was stopped one last time, and Agent Scelsa replied that he was stopped for speeding. Id. at ¶ 42. Jones alleges that "all parties know" that this is "a fabricated story ... in an attempt to justify the stop." Id.
"A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain ... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To survive a motion to dismiss, the "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ).
"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). While legal conclusions can provide the framework of the complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Detailed factual allegations are not required, but the complaint must offer more than "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of the cause of action." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation omitted). The factual allegations must be enough to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. (citations omitted). Finally, at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court must view the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept well-pleaded facts as true. See St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc. v. Hosp. Corp. of Am. , 795 F.2d 948, 954 (11th Cir. 1986).
The Amended Complaint asserts 4 claims against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for negligence (Count 1), assault (Count 2), battery (Count 3), and false imprisonment (Count 4). And against the Agents, the Amended Complaint asserts 3 claims under Bivens (Counts 5–6 and 9) and 3 claims under Section 1983 (Counts 7–8 and 10) for excessive force. Defendants move to dismiss all claims. Jones insists that all his claims survive as pleaded.
The Federal Tort Claims Act demands that federal courts apply the law of the situs state to determine whether a tort claim has been stated. See Gomez v. United States , 601 F. App'x 841, 851 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) ). The events in this lawsuit occurred in Monroe County, Florida, and thus Florida law applies to Jones's claims under the Act.
To state a negligence claim under Florida law, Jones must allege that the United States owed him a duty of care, that the United States breached that duty, that the breach injured him, and that he is entitled to damages. See Miles v. Naval Aviation Museum Found., Inc. , 289 F.3d 715, 722 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Ewing v. Sellinger , 758 So. 2d 1196, 1197 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) ).
Previously, the Court dismissed Jones's negligence claim under the public duty doctrine. (See D.E. 20 at 2.) This doctrine, recognized in Trianon Park Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Hialeah , generally provides that a government entity's exercise of discretionary power to enforce the law is a matter of governance for which there has never been a common law duty of care. 468 So. 2d 912, 919 (Fla. 1985). This time, Jones seeks to avoid dismissal under the Trianon public-duty doctrine by alleging that the United States owed him a "special duty." A special duty arises when law enforcement officers become directly involved in circumstances that place people within a "zone of risk" by creating or permitting dangers to exist, by taking persons into police custody, detaining them, or otherwise subjecting them to danger. See Wallace v. Dean , 3 So. 3d 1035, 1048 (Fla. 2009) (citing Pollock v. Fla. Dept. of Highway Patrol , 882 So. 2d 928, 935 (Fla. 2004) ).
In the Amended Complaint, Jones alleges that the United States undertook a "special duty" based on a " ‘special relationship’ with other law enforcement entities": (1) to ensure that various government agents could carry out their assistance in the cleanup of the Florida Keys following Hurricane Irma in a professional and safe manner; and (2) to not increase harm and to eliminate any risk and harm to other law enforcement members. (See D.E. 25 at ¶¶ 45, 48.) Jones further alleges that the United States breached these duties by, among other reasons, failing to ensure that the Agents were aware of their specific duties and responsibilities while assisting other law enforcement members and by inflicting excessive, objectively unreasonable and unwarranted...
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