Jones v. United States

Decision Date04 November 2021
Docket NumberNo. 18-CO-899,18-CO-899
Parties Christie Carolyn JONES, Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

Jenifer Wicks, Washington, for appellant.

Jessie K. Liu, United States Attorney at the time, with whom, Elizabeth Trosman, John P. Mannarino, Pamela Satterfield, and Sharon A. Sprague, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before Blackburne-Rigsby, Chief Judge, and Easterly and Deahl, Associate Judges.

Blackburne-Rigsby, Chief Judge:

Appellant Christie Carolyn Jones contends on appeal that the trial court erred in denying her motion to vacate her sentence under D.C. Code § 23-110 (2012 Repl.), on the grounds that she was denied her Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial because the attorney failed to call an expert witness on eyewitness identification. Specifically, appellant alleges that the jury could not be as competent as the expert on eyewitness identification such that on its own it could properly consider the evidence and draw necessary conclusions. Additionally, appellant alleges that trial counsel was deficient for failing to seek witnesses to testify to appellant's movements on the morning of the offense. For these reasons appellant contends that the conduct of her court-appointed trial counsel fell below prevailing professional norms and that this deficient performance prejudiced appellant. We find appellant's contentions persuasive, and therefore vacate the convictions and remand for a new trial.

I. Background
A. Procedural History

Following her arrest on August 31, 2011, appellant was indicted on fourteen counts. A jury trial commenced on June 27, 2012, and on July 3, 2012, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on nine counts.1 The remaining charges were dismissed by the government prior to trial.2

On September 27, 2012, the trial court sentenced appellant to a total of 156 months of incarceration, followed by a period of five years of supervised release. Appellant appealed, and this court affirmed appellant's convictions and remanded the case for re-sentencing because appellant was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon, a lesser included offense of the conviction of assault with intent to commit robbery while armed.

Appellant, through her court-appointed counsel, moved to vacate her convictions pursuant to D.C. Code § 23-110 on May 13, 2016. In response, the trial court granted appellant's request for a hearing on her motion in part3 and ordered that the parties appear for a Post Disposition Motion hearing, to address the claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call an expert in eyewitness identification and for failing to call other witnesses. On August 31, 2018, the trial court denied appellant's § 23-110 motion and this timely appeal followed.

B. Factual Background

At trial, complainant Benjamin Rushing testified that on the morning of August 30, 2011, he was lying in bed in the basement apartment of 1636 Fort Davis Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., when he awoke to a woman standing over him beside the bed. There were no lamps on in the bedroom, but the light in the fish aquarium was on and the shutters over the windows were half open. When Mr. Rushing told the woman to leave, she demanded he give her money and she threatened to hurt him. While Mr. Rushing attempted to leave the apartment, the woman then reached into a bag, retrieved a sock with a hard object in it, and hit Mr. Rushing on the head. Mr. Rushing was knocked down by the blow to the head and bled on the floor and the kitchen counter as the woman continued hitting him in the back. The woman left the basement apartment, ran up the exterior steps of the residence, and entered the first floor of the house. Mr. Rushing then got up from the floor and went into his bathroom to wipe the blood off of his head. He then left the basement apartment and went outside where he saw his landlord, Robert Hartridge. Mr. Rushing told Mr. Hartridge that someone hit him over the head, and Mr. Hartridge called the police. When the police arrived, Mr. Rushing told the police that someone broke into his house and hit him over the head. Mr. Rushing described the perpetrator as a "sort of heavy-set lady" with brown skin, shoulder length red hair, wearing dark clothes, and carrying a dark bag.

Mr. Rushing was transported to Howard University Hospital, where the police showed him a nine-person photo array. Mr. Rushing did not pick appellant out of the photo array. At trial, Mr. Rushing testified that he did not have any physical conditions that would affect his ability to understand what was happening on the morning of the incident and that he was not under the influence of any medication, drugs, or alcohol that would influence his perception. Mr. Rushing additionally stated that he almost lost consciousness after the perpetrator hit him over the head and that he was "weak, bloody, and blurry."

Mr. Rushing made an in-court identification of appellant at trial, despite previously being unable to identify appellant in a photograph array when he was still in the hospital following the assault. The bloody towel and Mr. Rushing's bloody T-shirt were admitted into evidence, as were photographs of the blood-stained kitchen floor, Mr. Rushing's appearance on the day of the crime, and Mr. Rushing's injuries.

The government also called Mr. Hartridge as a witness. Mr. Hartridge explained that he rented the house to three people, including Mr. Rushing, and that he lived next door. Mr. Hartridge testified that on the morning in question, he drove another tenant to work and returned to his house between 6:00 and 6:30 A.M. He then parked his car in the rear of the house and went to the front of the house to pick up his newspaper. Mr. Hartridge noticed that the front door to 1636 Fort Davis Street was open and called the tenant who lived on that floor to confirm that he had locked the front door before he left. Mr. Hartridge heard a "running noise" inside of 1636 Fort Davis Street so he entered the house and yelled to inquire if anyone was there. He saw a woman walk down the interior steps of the house wearing "something dark" and carrying a "shiny object" in her hand. Mr. Hartridge made an in-court identification of appellant. When asked to describe the perpetrator, Mr. Hartridge pointed at appellant stating that appellant was "the lady that was coming down the steps" and "she's the lady that ran me out of my house." Mr. Hartridge could not describe the size of the object, nor could he recall in which hand the object was held. He stated, "I'm really not really trying to look to see exactly what it was or—but I know it's something in her hand." Mr. Hartridge elaborated that the woman pointed the shiny object at him, and he backed out of the front door and down the front steps of 1636 Fort Davis Street with the woman following him. When testifying about the perpetrator pointing the "shiny object" at him, Mr. Hartridge "used his right hand to make a jabbing motion." Mr. Hartridge recounted that the perpetrator was approximately four feet away from him as she backed him out of the house. He then "chased [the perpetrator] out of the yard" with a stick and followed her south along a stone path that ran next to the house. Mr. Hartridge further testified that, throughout the entire incident, he did not recall whether or not he was wearing his prescription glasses, though there were no "obstructions" in the way of seeing the perpetrator's face. Mr. Hartridge testified that the time between his first seeing the perpetrator and the perpetrator running away was "a minute." Although he could not recall if a light had been on inside the house, "it wasn't dark" when he saw the perpetrator.

After the perpetrator fled, Mr. Hartridge walked back to the front of house where he saw Mr. Rushing come out of the basement apartment. Mr. Hartridge saw that Mr. Rushing "had blood all over him," which appeared to be coming from Mr. Rushing's head. Mr. Hartridge then called 911. During the 911 call, Mr. Hartridge described the perpetrator as "about five feet and 140 pounds" and "dark skinned."4 The police arrived on the scene about five minutes after Mr. Hartridge called 911.

As he was speaking to the police outside, Mr. Hartridge saw appellant standing on the sidewalk in front of 1636 Fort Davis Street, asking what was happening. Mr. Hartridge did not see appellant walk up or the direction from which she approached. According to Mr. Hartridge, appellant was standing about two feet away from him and he recognized appellant as the perpetrator because he "had just seen her" and because of "her size and complexion." Mr. Hartridge testified that "[a]pproximately, a half hour’’ passed between seeing the perpetrator in 1636 Fort Davis Street and seeing appellant on the sidewalk in front of the house.

District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Officer Heriberto Lucena processed the crime scene and recovered a crystal replica of a baseball that was wrapped inside two socks and admitted into evidence at trial. Officer Lucena attempted to recover fingerprints from the baseball but was unsuccessful.

At trial, the defense called Diane Wilks as a witness. Diane Wilks worked as a Criminal Justice Act Investigator. Investigator Wilks interviewed Mr. Rushing at 1636 Fort Davis Street on February 25, 2012, as part of the defense's preparation for trial. Investigator Wilks testified that she took crime scene photos and walked through the interior and exterior of 1636 Fort Davis Street. On February 25, 2012, approximately six months after the crime took place, Investigator Wilks also presented Mr. Rushing with a nine-photograph photo array that included a photo of appellant, and asked Mr. Rushing if he could identify the perpetrator. Mr. Rushing did not select appellant in the photo array, but instead pointed to another person in the photo array and stated...

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