Jones v. Vasu, W2009-01873-COA-R10-CV.
| Decision Date | 09 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. W2009-01873-COA-R10-CV.,W2009-01873-COA-R10-CV. |
| Citation | 326 S.W.3d 577 |
| Parties | Stephanie JONES and Howard Jones v. Renga I. VASU, M.D., the Neurology Clinic, and Methodist LeBonheur Hospital. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Emily Turner Landry and Quinn N. Carlson, Memphis, Tennessee, for Defendant/Appellant, Methodist Healthcare-Memphis Hospitals.
Jerry E. Mitchell and Justin E. Mitchell, Memphis, Tennessee, for Defendant/Appellants, Renga I. Vasu, M.D., and The Neurology Clinic.
Bryant D. Guy, Jackson, Mississippi, and Regina Guy and Joanie Perkins Potter, Memphis, Tennessee, for Plaintiff/Appellees, Stephanie Jones and Howard Jones.
This appeal involves delay of service of process. The plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendants, alleging medical malpractice by the defendants almost a year earlier. The plaintiffs delayed service on the defendants until they had an expert witness review their claim. Summonses were issued to the defendants over eleven months after the complaint was filed. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, alleging insufficiency of service of process, and assertingthat the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied the defendants' motion. The defendants appeal. We reverse and remand for entry of an order dismissing the complaint, finding that the delay of prompt service of process rendered the filing of the complaint ineffective to commence the action and stop the running of the statute of limitations.
Between September 13, 2006, and September 30, 2006, Plaintiff/Appellee Stephanie Jones received medical treatment at Defendant/Appellants The Neurology Clinic and Methodist Healthcare—Memphis Hospitals ("Methodist"), under the primary care of Defendant/Appellant Renga I. Vasu, M.D. ("Dr. Vasu"). Ms. Jones asserts that the medical care she received during this time period fell below the applicable standard of care, and that she suffered serious injury as a result of the negligence of Dr. Vasu, The Neurology Clinic, and Methodist.
On September 27, 2007, Stephanie Jones and her husband Howard Jones (collectively "Jones" or "Plaintiffs") filed a complaint against Dr. Vasu, The Neurology Clinic, and Methodist (collectively "Defendants") alleging medical malpractice.1 Jones did not submit any summonses to the clerk for service of process on the Defendants at that time. Instead, Jones proceeded to obtain the opinion of an expert in support of the claim of medical malpractice. After the opinion of an appropriate expert was secured, on August 29, 2008, some eleven months after the complaint was filed, Jones had process served on the Defendants through a private process server.
On October 29, 2008, Methodist filed its answer, denying liability and asserting, inter alia, insufficiency of service of process and that the complaint was time-barred.
On December 12, 2008, Dr. Vasu and The Neurology Clinic filed a motion to dismiss and, in the alternative, for summary judgment, asserting that Jones' complaint was barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice actions. See T.C.A. § 29-26-116(a)(1) (2000). Citing Rule 4.01(3) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, the motion for summary judgment claimed that, because Jones intentionally delayed service of process for over eleven months, the filing of the complaint was ineffective, and the applicable limitations period expired.
On February 3, 2009, Methodist filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, likewise asserting that Jones' complaint was time-barred, for the same reason. The motion included a notice of joinder in the motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss filed by Dr. Vasu and The Neurology Clinic.
On February 20, 2009, Jones filed a response to the motions to dismiss and/or for summary judgment. In the response, Jones admitted that service of process was intentionally delayed until August 29, 2008. Jones explained that service of process was delayed because they experienced "difficulty obtaining an opinion from an expert, authorized to render such opinion testimony." Had such an expert opinion not been obtained, Jones claimed, the complaint would have been dismissed. Jones asserted that process was issued within one year after the filing of the complaint, as required under Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Jones maintainedthat any delay in the issuance and service of process was the result of excusable neglect, and asked the trial court to enlarge the period for issuance and service of process or toll the statute of limitations, pursuant to its authority under Rule 6.02(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.
After a hearing on the motions, the trial judge issued a letter ruling on March 31, 2009, denying the Defendants' motions. After citing and reviewing the applicable caselaw, the trial court explained its reasoning:
Thus, the trial court denied the Defendants' motions to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.
The Defendants filed motions for permission for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.2 The trial court denied permission for interlocutory appeal. The Defendants then filed an application for extraordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.3 This Court granted the application.
On appeal, the issue presented is whether Jones' intentional delay in issuance and service of process rendered the filing ofthe complaint ineffective under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.01(3), and thus whether Jones' claims are time-barred.
Here, we review the trial court's denial of the Defendants' motions to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Rule 12.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court," then a motion to dismiss shall be treated as a motion for summary judgment. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02. The Defendants' motions were predicated on the date of service of process, a matter outside the Jones' complaint. Therefore, on appeal, we treat the order as a denial of a motion for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is warranted when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. We review the trial court's conclusions of law de novo without a presumption of correctness. Campbell v. Fla. Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26, 35 (Tenn.1996). Accordingly, we review the denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo without a presumption of correctness. Johnson v. LeBonheur Children's Med. Ctr., 74 S.W.3d 338, 342 (Tenn.2002) (citing Webber v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 49 S.W.3d 265, 269 (Tenn.2001)).
It is undisputed on appeal that the alleged acts of medical malpractice occurred between September 13, 2006 and September 30, 2006. The complaint was filed on September 27, 2007. The Defendants were served with process no earlier than August 29, 2008.
It is also undisputed that a one-year statute of limitations is applicable to Jones' claims of medical malpractice. Thus, unless the filing of Jones' complaint was effective to toll the statute of limitations, the claims set forth in the complaint are time-barred.
Rule 4.01 provides:
Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.01. This Court addressed Rule 4.01(3) in Estate of Butler v. Lamplighter Apartments, 278 S.W.3d 321 (Tenn.Ct.App.2008). Butler involves a wrongful death and personal injury action arising out of a fatal fire. The plaintiffs' attorney filed the complaint within the limitations...
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