Jones v. Walgreen Co.

• Decision Date: 24 February 2011
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 09–cv–30004–MAP.
• Citation: 42 NDLR P 213,765 F.Supp.2d 100
• Parties: Pamela A. JONES, Plaintiffv.WALGREEN CO., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

765 F.Supp.2d 100

42 NDLR P 213

Pamela A. JONES, Plaintiff

v.WALGREEN CO., et al., Defendants.

C.A. No. 09–cv–30004–MAP.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Feb. 24, 2011.

Tracy Thomas Boland, Gregory A. Manousos, Robert P. Morris, Morgan, Brown & Joy, LLP, Boston, MA, Beth G. Catenza, William D. Pandolph, Sulloway & Hollis, P.L.L.C., Concord, NH, for Defendants.John M. Brown, Law Office of John M. Brown, Matthew L. Tuccillo, Matthew L. Tuccillo LLC, West Hartford, CT, for Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT WALGREEN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND PLAINTIFF'S CROSS–MOTION FOR DISCOVERY RELIEF (Dkt. Nos. 73, 85, & 107)

PONSOR, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Pamela Jones, filed a ten-count complaint against her employer, Defendant Walgreen Company (“Defendant Walgreen”); Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, the claims administrator for Defendant Walgreen's Income Protection Plan for Store Managers; and Michael Campbell, an employee of Defendant Walgreen. Plaintiff alleges retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3 (Count I); retaliation in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4 (Count II); disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (Count III); disability discrimination in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B (Count IV); and numerous violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (Counts V–X). In prior proceedings, the court dismissed Counts VI and X and stayed various of Plaintiff's other ERISA claims.

At issue here are Defendant Walgreen's motion for summary judgment on Counts I, II, III, and IV (Dkt. No. 73), and Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on Counts III and IV (Dkt. No. 85). For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion will be allowed, and Plaintiff's motion will be denied.

II. FACTS

Plaintiff began working as a Store Manager for Defendant Walgreen in Enfield, Connecticut, in 1986. Plaintiff reported to District Manager Jerry Telson, who had worked for Defendant Walgreen for more than twenty years. In January 2004, Plaintiff injured her knee when she slipped on ice at work. Plaintiff was on medical leave until May, when she returned to work, but left again in June to have surgery on her knee. (Dkt. No. 89, Pl. Statement of Facts, ¶ 4.) On November 30, 2004, Plaintiff sent Telson a report from her orthopedist, Dr. Martin Luber, regarding her prognosis and work restrictions. The report provided a return-to-work date of “undetermined,” with the recommendation that Plaintiff do “[n]o work,” “no prolonged standing or walking,” “[n]o squatting, kneeling, stair climbing,” and “[n]o lifting, pushing, pulling, or carrying greater than 25 pounds” until her next appointment, the date of which was not on the report. (Dkt. No. 93, Ex. 2.) The report further stated, “I think that Ms. Jones is most likely left with some permanent restrictions.... I think that she could perform a sedentary job or a job in which she is not expected to carry or lift more than 25 lbs.” ( Id.)

Nevertheless, three months later, on March 2, 2005, Plaintiff informed Telson that she wished to return to work with “reasonable accommodations.” (Dkt. No. 81, Ex. 11.) On April 14, 2005, Plaintiff followed up this letter with a revised report from Dr. Luber restricting her to lifting less than twenty-five pounds and recommending minimal bending, stooping, and squatting. (Dkt. No. 81, Ex. 12.) In early May 2005, Telson offered Plaintiff a position as Training Manager, a slot below her prior position of Store Manager, which she accepted. However, days later, on May 4, Plaintiff took another medical leave to have surgery on her foot. (Dkt. No. 81, Ex. 14.) Following this surgery, Plaintiff sent a doctor's note to Telson, stating that she could return to work on July 11, 2005, with no new restrictions. (Dkt. No. 81, Ex. 15.)

Meanwhile, in July 2005, while out on medical leave, Plaintiff filed an action with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities and the federal Equal Opportunity Employment Commission accusing Defendant Walgreen of engaging in illegal workplace discrimination against women. In mid–2006, Plaintiff received release of jurisdiction and right-to-sue letters, and she then filed a class action complaint in the District of Connecticut. Defendant Walgreen was served with notice of process on July 1, 2006.¹

In mid-October 2005, Telson offered Plaintiff a promotion to her prior position as a Store Manager for the Springfield, Massachusetts location. On October 12, 2005, Plaintiff responded to him by email to express “concerns I have which you should be aware of before I accept this position.” (Dkt. No. 1, Ex. 5.) Plaintiff described her “substantial” health restrictions, which precluded her from climbing ladders, lifting anything in excess of twenty pounds, and working for longer than eight hours, and stated that she believed that the store was understaffed and that she deserved a raise. ( Id.) Finally, Plaintiff clarified that “[a]s the Store Manager, it will be my approach to delegate, as often as time and circumstances allow, the physical obligations of store operations to the assistant managers and store personnel.” ( Id.)

In September 2006, Plaintiff expressed to Telson that she was “walk[ing] imbalanced” and having difficulty putting in shelving, which she attributed “maybe” to “the way I stand because of my knees.” (Dkt. No. 93, Ex. 10, Telson Dep. 274:22–25.) Plaintiff also told Telson that she was working longer hours than her doctor had advised. ( Id. at 171:11–12.) Telson requested updated medical information from Plaintiff, which she sent on September 11 with additional clarifications on September 14. Dr. Luber's response described significant additional limitations beyond those noted in April 2005. He indicated that Plaintiff now could not stand or walk for longer than thirty minutes without sitting and could not stand or walk on any day for longer than a total of four-to-five hours. She could not at any time squat, stoop, bend, reach below her knees, or climb stairs or ladders. She could not lift anything more than fifteen pounds. (Dkt. No. 93, Exs. 11, 13.)

One month later, on October 13, 2006, Telson tendered Plaintiff a notice of termination, effective immediately. The letter stated in part:

I have reviewed the September 11 and September 14, 2006 correspondence from Martin J. Luber, M.D. which outline your permanent work-related restrictions. Based on that information, it is clear that you can no longer perform the essential functions of your position as Store Manager. Therefore, we have no choice but to relieve you of your position effective today.... Please know that there may be district office positions available for which you may be qualified given your skill set and the essential functions of which you can perform given your restrictions.... Please let me know if there are any other areas of the country or specific districts in which you are interested.

(Dkt. No. 93, Ex. 15.) The letter outlined Plaintiff's benefits, including that she would receive full pay through January 18, 2007. In a series of letters in November, Plaintiff expressed her interest in working in a district office but did not specify, despite Telson's request, in which of Defendant Walgreen's 231 district offices she would be willing to work. (Dkt. No. 82, Exs. 23–26.) Discussions about alternative employment apparently ceased at that point.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard.

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of genuine issues of material fact. The burden then shifts to the opposing party who must demonstrate that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in its favor based on the evidence. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “A party opposing summary judgment must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion.” Torres v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 219 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir.2000) (citations omitted).

B. Counts III and IV: Disability Discrimination Claims.

Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant Walgreen discriminated against her based on her disability in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(16). Because “Chapter 151B is considered the ‘Massachusetts analogue’ to the federal Americans with Disabilities Act,” the court's analysis under federal and state law is the same. Sensing v. Outback Steakhouse of Fla., LLC, 575 F.3d 145, 153 (1st Cir.2009) (quoting Whitney v. Greenberg, Rosenblatt, Kull & Bitsoli, P.C., 258 F.3d 30, 32 & n. 1 (1st Cir.2001)). To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, Plaintiff must prove: “(1) that she was ‘disabled’ within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that she was able to perform the essential functions of her job with or without accommodation; and (3) that she was discharged or adversely affected, in whole or in part, because of her disability.” Ruiz Rivera v. Pfizer Pharms., LLC, 521 F.3d 76, 82 (1st Cir.2008).

1. Prong One: Disability.

To prove that she is disabled under the ADA, Plaintiff must demonstrate that she has “a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of [her] major life activities.” Carreras v. Sajo, 596 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir.2010) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)).² “The ADA does not define ‘substantially limits,’ but ‘substantially’ suggests ‘considerable’ or specified to a large degree.” Id. at 33 (citations omitted). Without question, “[t]o be substantially limiting, an impairment must cause a person ... to be significantly restricted in the performance of a particular major life activity as compared to...