Jones v. Wash. Health Sys.
| Decision Date | 29 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2:16-1308 |
| Parties | DEBRA JURIK JONES, Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON HEALTH SYSTEM A/K/A WASHINGTON HOSPITAL, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
This matter is before the court upon a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Washington Health System ("Defendant" or "Washington Hospital") (ECF No. 32). Also before the court is a Partial Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff Debra Jurik Jones ("Plaintiff" or "Jones") (ECF No. 30). For the reasons that follow, Defendant's Motion will be granted and Plaintiff's Motion will be denied.
From November 1, 1982 through June 30, 2014, Defendant employed Plaintiff as a nurse anesthetist. Defendant's Concise Statement of Material Facts ("Def. CSMF") (ECF No. 33) ¶ 1; Plaintiff's Concise Statement of Material Facts ("Pl. CSMF") (ECF No. 38) ¶ 1. In 2014, Defendant entered into a contract with Keystone Anesthesia ("Keystone") to provide anesthesia services. Def. CSMF ¶ 3; Pl. CSMF ¶ 9. Although Plaintiff was offered continued employment with Keystone, she declined, resulting in her termination. Def. CSMF ¶¶ 5-6; Pl. CSMF ¶ 9. As of the date of her termination - June 30, 2014 - Plaintiff had accumulated 576 hours of sick time and was 57 years old. Def. CSMF ¶¶ 7-8.
During the course of Plaintiff's employment, Defendant offered guidance to employees in the form of an Employee Handbook. The preamble to each relevant version of Defendant's Employee Handbook states:
The policies stated in this handbook are guidelines only and are subject to change at the sole discretion of the Hospital. This handbook should not be construed as and does not constitute a contract guaranteeing employment for any specific duration. Although we hope that your employment relationship with us is long-term, either you or the Hospital may terminate this relationship at any time, for any reason.
Def. CSMF ¶ 11; ECF No. 42 at 6.
With respect to sick time, the Employee Handbook in effect at the time of Plaintiff's termination permitted employees to earn up to 96 hours of sick time per year and to accumulate up to 608 hours of sick time. Def. CSMF ¶¶ 13-14; Pl. CSMF ¶ 5. Prior to 2009, employees were also permitted to "buy back" sick time pursuant to a "Buy Back Sick Time Policy." Def. CSMF ¶ 19; Pl. CSMF ¶ 6. Pursuant to that policy, Defendant agreed to "buy back" portions of an employee's sick time upon request, provided the employee satisfied a number of conditions. Def. CSMF ¶¶ 23-24. However, the Buy Back Sick Time Policy was eliminated in 2009 and was not included in Employee Handbooks issued after that date, including the handbook in effect at the time of Plaintiff's termination. Def. CSMF ¶¶ 21, 41; Pl. CSMF ¶ 8.
Summary judgment may only be granted where the moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and that a judgment as a matter of law is warranted. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the court must enter summaryjudgment against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to his or her case, and on which he or she will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In evaluating the evidence, the court must interpret the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in his or her favor. Watson v. Abington Twp., 478 F.3d 144, 147 (3d Cir. 2007). The burden is initially on the moving party to demonstrate that the evidence contained in the record does not create a genuine issue of material fact. Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 2004). A dispute is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable trier of fact could render a finding in favor of the nonmoving party. McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005). Where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may meet its burden by showing that the admissible evidence contained in the record would be insufficient to carry the nonmoving party's burden of proof. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who must go beyond his or her pleadings and designate specific facts by the use of affidavits, depositions, admissions or answers to interrogatories showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. at 324. The nonmoving party cannot defeat a well-supported motion for summary judgment by simply reasserting unsupported factual allegations contained in his or her pleadings. Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989).
Plaintiff contends that she is entitled to payment for her unused sick days pursuant to the Pennsylvania Wage Collection Law, 43 P.S. § 260.2(a) ("WPCL"), and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq ("FLSA"). Plaintiff relies exclusively on the Employee Handbooksissued by Defendant, arguing that those handbooks created an express and/or implied contractual right to payment for unused sick time upon her termination. Defendant counters that the Employee Handbooks explicitly disclaim any contractual rights and provide no provision for payment for unused sick time upon retirement or termination. Each of Plaintiff's claims will be addressed in turn.
Plaintiff first alleges that she is entitled to payment for her unused sick time based upon Section 207(o)(4) of the FLSA. This claim fails for at least three reasons. First, the FLSA subsection upon which Plaintiff relies, Section 207(o)(4), relates only to unused compensatory time, rather than accrued sick time.1 Second, it is well-settled that "the FLSA does not provide recovery for accrued vacation and sick time." Hartman v. White Hall Pharmacy, LLC, 112 F.Supp.3d 491, 493 (N.D.W.V. 2015); Sosnowy v. A.Perri Farms, Inc., 764 F.Supp.2d 457, 462-63 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (same); Arjumand v. Laguardia Associates, L.P., 2015 WL 1470470, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2015) (). Finally, even if the FLSA did create a cause of action for unpaid sick time, Plaintiff's FLSA claim would be time-barred. An FLSA claim based on a non-willful violation of the statute must be commenced within two years of the employer's failure to pay the required compensation for any particular workweek.2 29 U.S.C. § 255(a); 5 C.F.R. § 551.702(b).Plaintiff filed her complaint on August 26, 2016, more than two years after the effective date of her termination.
Perhaps recognizing these principles, Plaintiff declined to address Defendant's FLSA-based arguments in any of her briefs. See ECF Nos. 30, 42. For each of the foregoing reasons, summary judgment will be granted in favor of Defendant with respect to Plaintiff's FLSA claim.
Plaintiff next seeks relief pursuant to the WPCL. In broad brush, the WPCL requires employers to pay an employee any "wages or compensation earned" at the time of the employee's separation from employment. 43 P.S. § 260.5(a). The WPCL defines wages as "all earnings of an employee, regardless of whether determined on time, task, piece, commission or other method of calculation." Id. § 260.2a. Wages include any fringe benefits that the employer provides. Id.
The WPCL does not create a statutory right to compensation, but "provides a statutory remedy when the employer breaches a contractual obligation to pay earned wages." Costenbader v. Classic Design Homes, Inc., 2010 WL 597456, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2010) (citing Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., 596 F.2d 793, 801 (3d Cir. 1990)). Consequently, "a prerequisite for relief under the WPCL is a contract between employee and employer that sets forth their agreement on wages to be paid." Nagle v. Comprehensive Women's Health Services, P.C., 2018 WL 1473833, at *14 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2018) (quoting sources omitted); Razak v. Uber Techs., 2016 WL 5874822, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2016) (). "The contract between the parties governs in determining whether specific wages are earned." Weldon, 896 F.2d at 801.
Applying these principles, Plaintiff's WPCL claim rests on her ability to demonstrate that she was contractually entitled to payment for her unused sick time at the time of her termination. She initially attempts to meet this burden by asserting that the Employee Handbooks issued by Defendant represent express written contracts. This contention fails for several reasons.
First, each of the Employee Handbooks issued by Defendant explicitly states that "[t]he policies stated in this handbook are guidelines only and are subject to change at the sole discretion of the Hospital." The handbooks further caution that they "should not be construed as and [do] not constitute a contract guaranteeing employment for any specific duration." Courts have repeatedly held that this type of disclaimer is sufficient to preclude a breach of contract claim based on policies set forth in an employee handbook. See, e.g., Martin v. George Junior Republic in Pennsylvania, 2015 WL 5472885, at *3-5 (W.D. Pa. Sep. 16, 2015) (); Henderson v. Nutrisystem, Inc., 634 F.Supp.2d 521, 535 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (...
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