Jones v. Williams

• Decision Date: 24 June 2019
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 18SA189
• Citation: 443 P.3d 56
• Parties: Richard S. JONES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Dean WILLIAMS, Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

443 P.3d 56

Richard S. JONES, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.Dean WILLIAMS, Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.

Supreme Court Case No. 18SA189

Supreme Court of Colorado.

June 24, 2019

Richard S. Jones, pro se, Olney Springs, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent-Appellee: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Alison Faryl Kyles, Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado

En Banc

PER CURIAM.

¶1 The Habeas Corpus Act requires that a habeas petition "be accompanied by a copy of the warrant of commitment." § 13-45-101(1), C.R.S. (2018). In this habeas corpus appeal, we consider whether a district court may summarily dismiss a petition for lack of jurisdiction when the petition includes the petitioner's mittimus for his latest conviction but does not include the mittimuses for two earlier convictions, which he asserts are relevant to his habeas claim. To resolve this issue, we review the constitutional and statutory authority authorizing habeas corpus and our prior caselaw discussing the warrant requirement. We conclude that noncompliance with the warrant requirement does not deprive courts of jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions. We overrule our prior cases holding that failing to provide a copy of the warrant of commitment is a jurisdictional defect, deprives the court of authority to act on a habeas petition, and requires summary dismissal. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order dismissing the habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction and remand to the district court for further consideration.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶2 Richard S. Jones filed a habeas corpus petition in the district court challenging the Department of Corrections' ("DOC") calculation of his parole eligibility date ("PED"). Jones asserted that the DOC used only his latest 2008 conviction to calculate his PED, but, to correctly calculate his PED, he believed that the DOC's calculation should include two earlier convictions from 1991. If his PED was calculated utilizing the 1991 convictions, Jones argued that he had passed his PED and was being unlawfully denied consideration for parole.¹ His habeas petition included the mittimus for the 2008 conviction but did not include the mittimuses for the two 1991 convictions.

¶3 In response to Jones's petition, the DOC moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The DOC characterized Jones's failure to include all three of his mittimuses as a "jurisdictional failure which requires dismissal." The district court granted the DOC's motion and dismissed the petition.

¶4 Jones appealed the district court's order to this court. See Colo. Const. art. VI, § 2 (outlining appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court); § 13-4-102(1)(e), C.R.S. (2018) (excluding habeas corpus appeals from the jurisdiction of the court of appeals); see also Nowak v. Suthers , 2014 CO 14, ¶ 11, 320 P.3d 340, 343.

¶5 Jones is representing himself. In his appellate briefs, he reasserts the merits of the claims he outlined in his habeas corpus petition. Pleadings by pro se litigants must be broadly construed to ensure that they are not denied review of important issues because of their inability to articulate their argument like a lawyer. See People v. Bergerud , 223 P.3d 686, 696–97 (Colo. 2010). Broadly construed, Jones argues that he was entitled to a ruling on the merits, and the district court should not have dismissed his petition.

¶6 Relying on this court's precedent, the DOC contends that the district court properly dismissed the petition because the district court lacked jurisdiction² as a result of Jones's failure to provide all three of his mittimuses.³

II. Analysis

¶7 When, as here, the challenge to the court's jurisdiction involves no disputed facts and instead involves interpreting a statutory requirement, we review the district court's dismissal order de novo. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. Loveland , 2017 CO 54, ¶ 10, 395 P.3d 751, 754 ; Nowak, ¶ 17, 320 P.3d at 344. In interpreting a statutory requirement, we must give effect to the General Assembly's intent. Colorow Health Care, LLC v. Fischer , 2018 CO 52M, ¶ 11, 420 P.3d 259, 262. To determine that intent, we look at the statute's plain language, apply the text as written, and read the words in context giving the words their ordinary meanings. Id .

¶8 To decide whether the warrant requirement of section 13-45-101(1) is a jurisdictional requirement, we review the constitutional and statutory authority allowing habeas corpus. We also revisit our caselaw discussing the warrant requirement. We disagree with the DOC and conclude that the statutory requirement that a habeas petition "be accompanied by a copy of the warrant of commitment" is not jurisdictional. Therefore, noncompliance with the statute does not deprive the court of authority to act on the petition. When a habeas petition's allegations involve multiple sentences from multiple cases, a district court should either order the petitioner to provide the missing information or consider the petition based on the information provided.

A. Habeas Corpus Authority

¶9 The court's power to hear habeas corpus petitions derives from constitutional and statutory grants of authority. The Colorado Constitution grants the right to seek a writ of habeas corpus. Colo. Const. art. II, § 21. The Habeas Corpus Act, in turn, makes it "lawful ... to apply to the ... district courts for a writ of habeas corpus." § 13-45-101(1). Thus, all district courts in Colorado have subject matter jurisdiction to hear and decide habeas corpus cases. See Horton v. Suthers , 43 P.3d 611, 615 (Colo. 2002) ; see also Colo. Const. art. VI, § 9 (authorizing district courts to "be trial courts of record with general jurisdiction").

¶10 In addition to granting district courts authority to entertain habeas corpus cases, the Habeas Corpus Act sets out statutory requirements for habeas petitions. Petitions

shall be in writing and signed by the prisoner or some person on his behalf setting forth the facts concerning his imprisonment and in whose custody he is detained, and shall be accompanied by a copy of the warrant of commitment , or an affidavit that the said copy has been demanded of the person in whose custody the prisoner is detained, and by him refused or neglected to be given.

§ 13-45-101(1) (emphasis added).

¶11 The DOC asserts that the statutory warrant requirement is jurisdictional and that noncompliance deprives the court of the authority to act on the petition. To support its position, the DOC relies on Evans v. District Court , 194 Colo. 299, 572 P.2d 811, 813 (1977). Evans is the fourth case in a line of cases discussing the warrant requirement. Over time, these cases evolved to equate the statutory requirement with a jurisdictional requirement.

¶12 We first considered the effect of noncompliance with the statutory warrant requirement in reviewing a district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition in 1961. A copy of the warrant of commitment was not included with the petition. See Wright v. Tinsley , 148 Colo. 258, 365 P.2d 691, 692 (1961). We acknowledged the petitioner's failure to follow the statute and stated that "[t]he importance of this statutory provision is immediately apparent. In our consideration of this writ of error we have nothing but the allegations of the pleadings from which to determine the specific convictions upon which the commitment was made." Id . But we went on to conclude that "[t]here is nothing shown to indicate that petitioner is being illegally incarcerated at this time or that he is entitled to immediate liberation, the relief sought by this habeas corpus proceeding[ ]." Id.

¶13 Five years later, we again reviewed a district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition which lacked a copy of the warrant of commitment. See McNamara v. People , 159 Colo. 139, 410 P.2d 517, 517 (1966). This time, we did not reach the merits; we stated instead that a petition lacking a copy of the warrant of commitment "has no validity and cannot be acted upon." Id. at 518 (citing Wright , 365 P.2d at 692 ). We determined that, in this circumstance, the district court should have summarily denied the petition without a hearing. Id. at 517–18. The leap from Wright , which characterized the warrant requirement as necessary to provide information to support the petition's allegations, to McNamara , which characterized the warrant requirement as necessary to furnish the court with authority to act, was not supported by any reasoning.

¶14 In 1971, borrowing the language from McNamara , we continued down this path and expressly described the warrant requirement as "jurisdictional." See Garrett v. Knight , 173 Colo. 419, 480 P.2d 569, 571 (1971). Knight, a juvenile, was convicted in municipal court without the assistance of counsel and sentenced to ninety days in jail. Id . at 570. Instead of appealing his conviction, he filed a habeas petition in the district court. Id . The petition failed to include the warrant of commitment. Id . The district court granted the habeas petition. Id . The city appealed and argued that the remedy of habeas corpus was not available to Knight because he could have appealed his municipal conviction; the city also argued that Knight did not procedurally comply with the habeas statute because he did not provide the warrant of commitment. Id . We reversed the judgment, agreeing with both points. Id . at 570–71. In discussing the warrant requirement, the opinion quoted the section of McNamara recited above, then added "[s]uch is a jurisdictional requirement." Knight , 480 P.2d at 571.

¶15 Next, in 1977, the superintendent of the Colorado State Penitentiary ("CSP") filed an original proceeding asking this court to prohibit a district court from taking further action on a habeas corpus petition. Evans , 572 P.2d at 812. The habeas petition there, which was filed by four CSP inmates, alleged that CSP's regressive classifications deprived them of fundamental...