Jones v. Woodstock Iron Co.

• Decision Date: 05 January 1892
• Citation: 95 Ala. 551,10 So. 635
• Parties: JONES ET AL. v. WOODSTOCK IRON CO. ET AL.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

10 So. 635

95 Ala. 551

JONES ET AL. v. WOODSTOCK IRON CO. ET AL.

Supreme Court of Alabama

January 5, 1892

Appeal from city court of Anniston; B. F. CASSADY, Judge.

Alice Jones and others, heirs of James M. Jones, deceased, brought ejectment against the Woodstock Iron Company and others. Defendants then filed a bill in equity against plaintiffs seeking to enjoin them from prosecuting the ejectment suit and to have the title to the land in dispute invested in defendants in the ejectment suit. Alice Jones and the other heirs demurred to the bill, and the demurrer was overruled. Then Alice Jones and the other heirs filed an answer and cross-bill. A demurrer to the cross-bill was sustained, and plaintiffs in the cross-bill appeal. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

The land in dispute was in the possession of James M. Jones at the time of his death intestate, but the entire purchase price had not been paid, and Jones did not have the legal title. After the death of Jones, his administrator paid the balance of the purchase price, and took a deed to Jones' heirs. Subsequent to this the administrator filed a petition in the probate court, praying for an order of sale of the land for the purpose of dividing it among the heirs. An order of sale was made, and the sale duly made, reported, and confirmed. A guardian ad litem was appointed for the minor heirs Alice Jones and Walter Jones, and citations were issued to the adult heirs. The order of sale recited that the lands "should be sold for the purpose of paying debts," but this was corrected by an amendment nunc pro tunc, ordering the sale to be made for distribution.

Parsons & Darby, Gordon McDonald, and Kelly &amp Smith, for appellants.

Knox & Bowie and Caldwell & Johnston, for appellees.

COLEMAN J.

The bill was filed to enjoin suits in ejectment, commenced by the heirs of James M. Jones, to recover certain lands which were sold under an order of the probate court, and also to have the legal title to the lands sued for divested out of said heirs, and invested in complainants. The facts sufficiently appear in the statement of the facts of the case and in the further progress of the opinion. The petition to the probate court of Calhoun county in its allegations for the sale of the lands for distribution sufficiently complied with the statute to give jurisdiction to the court. Code 1886, § 2106; Code 1876,§§ 2449, 2450. Citations to the parties in interest regularly issued, and a guardian ad litem, who accepted the appointment to represent the minor heirs, appeared and represented them in the proceedings in the probate court to have the lands sold for distribution.

Even though a petition be subject to demurrer, or a judgment on the demurrer be reversible for error on appeal, yet, if the petition sufficiently alleges all the necessary jurisdictional facts, and final judgment is rendered thereon, from which no appeal is taken, such irregularities or reversible errors cannot avail when the judgment is collaterally assailed. Whitlow v. Echols, 78 Ala. 208; Pollard v. Hanrick, 74 Ala. 337; 3 Brick. Dig. p. 467, §§ 182, 183, 185. The probate court has jurisdiction to sell for division lands in which the decedent held only an equitable interest. Pettit v. Pettit, 32 Ala. 288; Vaughan v. Holmes, 22 Ala. 595; Rice v. Drennan, 75 Ala. 338; Jennings v. Jenkins, 9 Ala. 285; Duval v. McLoskey, 1 Ala. 708. The statute which authorizes the probate court to sell land for division is as follows, (Code, § 2105:) "Lands of an estate may be sold by order of the probate court having jurisdiction of the estate, when the same cannot be equitably divided among the heirs or devisees." A difficulty arises as to what constitutes "lands of an estate," within the meaning of the statute. The preceding section, in regard to the sale of lands for the payment of debts, uses the same broad term, "land." As we have seen, the statute includes a mere equity in lands; and in the case of Vaughan v. Holmes, 22 Ala., supra, it was held that a purchaser of lands, who died before paying the entire purchase money, had such inchoate interest or equity as was subject to sale under the statute by decree of the probate court.

When a sale of lands for distribution has been made in pursuance of an order of the court having jurisdiction of the question, and on proof taken as required by the statutes, and the sale and payment of the purchase money regularly reported to the court and confirmed by a decree of the court, and a conveyance of the title is executed to the purchaser in pursuance to an order of the court to that effect, no fraud being alleged, the validity of the sale and the title of the purchaser cannot be collaterally assailed by showing that the purchase money was not paid as reported, or that the sale in fact was not made as directed by the court. These questions are judicially ascertained and adjudicated by the judgment of confirmation. It makes no difference that the probate courts is of limited jurisdiction. After it has properly acquired jurisdiction, its judgments have the same extent, and are as conclusive quoad rem and the parties properly before it, as judgments of courts of general jurisdiction. A purchaser at such sale is only bound to see that the court had jurisdiction. Wyman v. Campbell, 6 Ala. 219; Whitlow v. Echols, 78 Ala. 210; Farley v. Dunklin, 76 Ala. 530; Kellam v. Richards, 56 Ala. 240; Stevenson v. Murray, 87 Ala. 442, 6 South. Rep. 301; Cantelou v. Whitley, 85 Ala. 248, 4 South. Rep. 610; Goodwin v. Sims, 86 Ala. 102, 5 South. Rep. 587; Morgan v. Farned, 83 Ala. 367, 3 South. Rep. 798.

These general propositions of law are subject to the qualifications that the statute which confers the power on the probate court to sell lands for distribution extends only to the title or estate as it descended, and not to an after-acquired title or interest, different and distinct from that which the intestate had at the time of his death. In support of this qualification of the general principle the following authorities are cited: Johnson v. Collins, 12 Ala. 336; Pettit v. Pettit, 32 Ala. 288, 305; Burns v. Hamilton, 33 Ala. 213; Cothran v. McCoy, Id. 65; Bishop v. Blair, 36 Ala. 80; McCain v. McCain, 12 Ala. 510; McKay v. Broad, 70 Ala. 380; Whorton v. Moragne, 62 Ala. 207; Mounger v. Burks, 17 Ala. 50; Rice v. Drennen, 75 Ala. 338. The citations from 36 Ala., 33 Ala., 32 Ala., and Johnson v. Collins, 12 Ala. 336, are not directly in point, though often quoted to the proposition. In the case of Pettit v. Pettit, 32 Ala., supra, the conclusion of the court rested upon the fact that the contract of the intestate for the purchase of the land was void as contravening public policy, and in violation of a statute of the United States, and this defect was apparent upon the petition to the probate court for the sale of the lands. In the case of Johnson v. Collins, 12 Ala 336, the conclusion of the court was that the intestate had no inheritable or devisable interest in the lands, either legal or equitable, and consequently there was nothing upon which the order of the court could operate; that under the pre-emption law the heir, by virtue of the statute, was entitled to perfect the inchoate pre-emption right of the settler, and not the administrator of the intestate. The other case cited from 33 Ala. merely reaffirms the same ruling. The proposition, however, is broadly stated and declared in McCain v. McCain, 12 Ala. 510. In this case the intestate had purchased the land, and died without making payment of the purchase money, and before receiving the title. His administrator paid the unpaid balance of the purchase money, and titles were made to the heirs of the decedent. The court held the power to sell lands for distribution "is only given when the land remains in the same condition, as to the title, as it was at the decease of the intestate, but has no power when the title of the ancestor has been divested and made to the heirs." The facts in the case of Bishop v. Blair show that Mrs. Bishop, with funds of her husband's estate, entered certain lands. Under a petition by her, as executrix, to the probate court, these lands were represented as belonging to the estate of her deceased husband, and as such were decreed to be sold for division. It was held that the court had no jurisdiction to sell the lands for distribution, and the order of the court for this purpose was null and void. The rule has been recognized without a single departure, to the present time, since it was first declared in McCain v. McCain, 12 Ala., supra. Whatever hardships may arise, it is now a rule of property too firmly fixed to be departed from, without legislation.

So far as the adult heirs are concerned, we are fairly convinced they are estopped from asserting any claim hostile to that of the purchasers. These adult heirs, with a full knowledge of all the facts, permitted the sale of the lands to be reported to the court, and the sale confirmed by the decree of the court. They were parties to the settlement by the...