Jonesboro, Lake City & Eastern Railroad Company v. Wright

• Decision Date: 29 March 1926
• Docket Number: 265
• Citation: Jonesboro, Lake City & Eastern Railroad Company v. Wright, 281 S.W. 374, 170 Ark. 815 (Ark. 1926)
• Parties: JONESBORO, LAKE CITY & EASTERN RAILROAD COMPANY v. WRIGHT
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

281 S.W. 374

170 Ark. 815

JONESBORO, LAKE CITY & EASTERN RAILROAD COMPANY v. WRIGHT

No. 265

Supreme Court of Arkansas

March 29, 1926

Appeal from Craighead Circuit Court, Lake City District; G. E. Keck Judge; affirmed.

STATEMENT BY THE COURT.

This is an action by J. W. Wright against the Jonesboro, Lake City & Eastern Railroad Company to recover damages for personal injuries received by him while riding upon a motor car from work, which was being driven by another employee of the company. Wright and six other employees were riding on the motor car from their place of work on the section to their homes in Blytheville, Arkansas. The injury to Wright was caused by a collision between the motor car and an automobile at a public crossing in Blytheville.

It appears from the testimony of J. W. Wright and of another witness for him, that he was working on the section gang for the railroad on the day of the accident. He was sixty years of age, and had been working on railroads most of his life. The section gang was returning home from work on the motor car, which was driven by Charlie Chandler, one of the section hands. The railroad runs through the Chicago Mill yard about a quarter of a mile in the city of Blytheville. The car was going between 15 and 20 miles an hour as it approached the crossing at Twenty-first Street, in the city of Blytheville. Just before the car got to the crossing, the plaintiff saw an automobile approaching the crossing and told Chandler, the driver, to be careful. The driver of the motor car never attempted to stop it. The plaintiff saw an automobile pass over the crossing ahead of the motor car, but did not see the automobile which collided with motor car. The plaintiff was watching the shovels and tools on the motor car, and holding them in place.

Another one of the section hands testified that the motor car had defective brakes on it, and that when it was going fast it would take about three rail lengths to stop it. The motor car did not check its speed after it turned the curve and approached the public crossing at which the accident happened. When the motor car got about forty feet from the crossing, the witness saw an automobile about fifty yards south of the track, going towards the crossing at a speed of between 15 and 20 miles an hour. It looked like it might reach the crossing about the time the motor car did, and the section hands commenced hallooing and waving their hands for him to stop. Both wheels of the automobile struck the motor car near the middle when it was about the center of the crossing. All of the section hands on the motor car, except the witness, were injured, and the plaintiff was hurt worse than any one. According to his testimony, the speed of the motor car was between four and six miles an hour.

Other witnesses testified that the motor car was running between 15 and 20 miles an hour, and that the automobile was running at the rate of between 15 and 20 miles an hour.

W. D Chamblin, the owner of the Ford touring car which collided with the motor car of the railroad company, was also a witness for the plaintiff. According to his testimony, the automobile was about five months old, and in good condition. An automobile passed over the crossing just ahead of him and, just as he started to drive his car over the crossing the motor car shot out in front of him from the Chicago Mill yard, and struck his car. He did not see the motor car before it got on the crossing. The motor car was running about 20 miles an hour. It was within three feet of him when he saw it. His brakes were in good condition, but he saw the motor car too late to avoid a collision. The motor car was running faster than his automobile. It was getting dark when the collision occurred. It had been raining, and all of the curtains were up on the automobile. The driver of the automobile does not think that he was going more than 15 miles an hour.

Evidence was adduced by the plaintiff showing the character and extent of his injuries, which will be stated under an appropriate heading in the opinion.

The defendant adduced evidence tending to show that the accident was caused by the negligence of the driver of the automobile.

From a verdict and judgment rendered against it, the defendant has duly prosecuted an appeal to this court.

Judgment affirmed.

Eugene Sloan, for appellant.

Sam Costen and Wils Davis, for appellee.

OPINION

HART, J., (after stating the facts).

It is first insisted that the judgment should be reversed because the court erred in not directing a verdict for the defendant. We cannot agree with counsel in this contention. At the outset it may be stated that the plaintiff was a section hand, and riding home from work on one of the defendant's motor cars, and was entitled to be treated as an employee at the time the injury occurred. St. Louis S. F. R. Co. v. Barron, 166 Ark. 641, 267 S.W. 582, and Arkansas Land & Lbr. Co. v. Cook, 157 Ark. 245, 247 S.W. 1071.

It is also the settled rule of law in this State that, where the negligent acts of two persons concur to produce an injury, the author of either negligent act is liable to the injured party for the damages sustained. Jenkins v. Midland Valley Rd. Co., 134 Ark. 1, 203 S.W. 1; Bona v. Thomas Auto Co., 137 Ark. 217, 208 S.W. 306; Arkansas Land & Lumber Co. v. Cook, 157 Ark. 245, 247 S.W. 1071; and Johnson v. Mo. Pac. Rd. Co., 167 Ark. 660, 269 S.W. 67.

According to the evidence for the plaintiff, he was going home from work in a motor car of the defendant, and was still in its service, under the authorities above cited. It was the duty of the defendant to exercise ordinary care for his safety while carrying him home from work, and it was also its duty to make reasonable inspection to see if the motor car was in safe condition. In this connection it may be stated that while the statutory duty of keeping a lookout applies only to the operation of trains, and not to motor cars operated on railway tracks, it is the duty of persons operating such cars to maintain a lookout when approaching a public crossing. Cook v. Mo. Pac. Rd. Co., 160 Ark. 523, 254 S.W. 680. Bearing in mind these well-settled principles of law, the jury might...